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From Authenticity to Accountability: 
Re-Imagining Charles Taylor’s Best Account Principle 
 
Andrew Renahan, Ph.D. 
Concordia University, 2013 
This dissertation explores the possibility of re-imagining aspects of the moral 
theory advanced by Charles Taylor. The framework of my study is moral discourse as it 
is, and has been, expressed in what is historically and culturally understood as western 
philosophy.   
What might it mean to live a good life? It is upon this question that the crux of my 
dissertation revolves. In his tome Sources of the Self, Charles Taylor eloquently drew the 
distinction between a utilitarian concept of what it is right to do, and a more substantive 
consideration of what it is good to be. My own work has been considerably influenced by 
this short dialectic. Despite my sympathy with some of Taylor’s arguments, my 
dissertation involves a considerable critique of his conclusions vis-à-vis authenticity and 
dignity. A prime focus of my analysis deals with what I contend is Taylor’s unnecessarily 
limited descriptions of languages and embodiment.  
My aim is to engage in a re-imagining of Taylor’s concept of the “best account 
principle”. I argue that in Taylor’s work, the “best account” evinces a genre of 
clairvoyance on the part of a self-reading moral agent. I critique Taylor’s portrayal of 
agents transitioning toward increasingly lucid expressions of their vision of the good. The 
basis of my critique is focused upon what I contend to be the narcissistic self-concern 
underlying Taylor’s concept of moral agency. In re-imagining the “best account 
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principle”, I expand upon the description of embodiment to include a consideration of 
gender, and an examination of implied “normativity”. To this thickened portrait of 
embodiment I apply insights from the work of Emmanuel Levinas regarding the “I” and 
the “other(s)”. The juxtaposition of Taylor’s theory with that of Levinas’ will help us to 
transform the “best account”, from an expression of authenticity, to one of accountability.   
I employ aspects of Charles Taylor’s theory in a fashion which I do not believe 
would beget his blessing. Mine is not the story of the making of the self. It is, rather, an 
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19. And to imagine a language means to imagine a form of life.  
                                                                           (Wittgenstein 1958, 11e)          
I have chosen to begin my Doctoral dissertation under the auspices of the above 
quote from Ludwig Wittgenstein, as I strongly believe that my work constitutes merely 
the addition of my voice to an ongoing conversation within a pre-existing form of life. As 
such, I contend that it is imperative that I position my contribution within the body of 
western moral philosophy according to the framework of the existent tenor of the 
discourse. Wittgenstein’s statement is central to this situating task. Over the course of my 
studies I have become a firm proponent of a Wittgensteinian understanding of language. 
While Wittgenstein wisely refrained from the attempt to devise a systematic theory of 
language, he did advance some profoundly interesting insights regarding the character of 
languages as heterogeneous, composed of metaphor and analogy, and grammatically 
particular to the form of life within which they are comprehensible. I have endeavoured 
to use these critical insights to shape my study of moral discourse as it has variously been 
expressed in what is historically and culturally understood as western philosophy.   
I am keenly aware that my entry into the scholarly discourse surrounding moral 
and ethical concerns in the west signals my taking up the mantle of a participant in the 
language game apropos to this field. I fully acknowledge my own embeddedness in this 
discourse, and thus make no claim to occupying a disengaged, or meta, position 
empowering me to comment upon the subject from a theoretical crow’s nest. In doing 
philosophy one invents a “being” capable of asking specific questions; a notion I have 
borrowed from Martin Heidegger (Heidegger 2010, 6). For the purposes of writing this 
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dissertation I have invented a persona uniquely interested in the subject at hand; carrying 
out investigations seemingly oblivious to all other concerns or interests. In undertaking 
this project I am engaging in a specialized discourse concerning the study of moral 
language. Commensurately, I am also a moral subject enmeshed in the pursuit of a good 
life. I strongly believe that it is critically important that I acknowledge that I occupy a 
variety of other roles in different forms of life which simultaneously complement, clash 
with, or proceed entirely indifferent to, my scholarly role.  
The temptation to assume a totalizing voice when engaged in philosophical work 
is, in my experience, very strong. The chief symptom of succumbing to this totalizing 
voice is evinced by an attitude of disengagement evoked by authors who write as though 
they were capable of occupying a position regarding their subject from an objective 
remove. This position, so penetratingly described by Thomas Nagel in his work The View 
from Nowhere, is compounded by a teleological desire to impose a reductive thesis, in a 
unilateral fashion, which effectively discounts the conceptual paradoxes and epistemic 
gaps one inevitably encounters when theorizing. The narrative structure attached to the 
normative dissertation template in the west is, I contend, rife with temptations to 
assuming a totalizing voice. This is illustrated in the foreword to the “Thesis Preparation 
and Thesis Examination Regulations”, published by the School of Graduate Studies on 
Concordia University’s website (effective as of October, 2011), wherein it is stated that 
“A thesis is the final report on a comprehensive research program that meets accepted 
scholarly criteria and is of a cohesive, unitary character…The actual style and format of a 





The consequence of desiring to adhere to these institutionalized standards of 
practice is that a doctoral candidate may feel the need to answer all questions in a 
definitive fashion. This totalizing impulse is re-enforced by established academics who 
prescribe homogeneous formulas for successful dissertation writing, such as that written 
by Tara Brabazon, a professor of media studies at Brighton University, who in the 
January 28
th
, 2010 edition of The Times Higher Education wrote an article entitled “How 
Not To Write a PhD Thesis”, wherein under tip number three she advises,  
The way to relax an examiner is to feature a sentence in the first paragraph of a 
PhD abstract that begins: “My original contribution to knowledge is…” If 
students cannot compress their argument and research findings into a single 
statement, then it can signify flabbiness in their method, theory or structure. It is 
an awful moment for examiners when they – desperately – try to find an original 
contribution to knowledge through a shapeless methods chapter or loose literature 
review. If examiners cannot pinpoint the original contribution, they have no 
choice but to award the script an MPhil.  
The key is to make it easy for examiners. In the second sentence of the abstract, 
ensure that an original contribution is nailed to the page. Then we can relax and 
look for the scaffolding and verification of this statement. 
(http://www.timeshighereducation.co.uk/story.asp?storycode=410208) 
 The result of such a doctrinaire approach is often something more akin to 
ideology than theory. Instead of a probing exploration of a given subject, attended to by 
tentative arguments, the audience is often presented with a monolithic account which 
seeks to supress any and all incongruity. To accept such a linear and parochial worldview 
would entail a sort of pathological denial of the pluralistic and heterogeneous character of  
lived experience. I assert that this problem needs to be brought out and acknowledged as 
the first step in resisting the urge to write in a totalizing voice. My concerns here have 
largely to do with style. However, I also believe that attending to the multiplicity of 
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discursive selves germane to living as we do in a variety of voices, opens up new 
perspectives on phenomenology which are central to my project. 
To pretend that a comprehensive theory of moral language represents an 
achievable end for philosophy would entail a maniacal enforcement of grammatical rules 
running roughshod over the exigencies and vagaries of everyday practice and experience. 
Evidence of such an absolutist epistemological enterprise is readily apparent in the legacy 
of the Positivist movement of the Nineteenth century, and the abiding temptation in 
contemporary philosophy toward objective knowledge claims. Hence, in a pre-emptive 
gesture surrendering the will to power inherent in totalizing theories, I renounce any 
claim to comprehensiveness in my study, and I openly avow the highly particular, 
perhaps even myopic, approach to the subject at hand.   
I owe a debt of gratitude to feminist scholars, social scientists, and artists who 
have stressed the necessity of acknowledging one’s socio-historical embededness when 
engaged in research and writing. However, the concept of embededness which I wish to 
adhere to in this dissertation also includes phenomenological embededness. Christina 
Howells offers an excellent analysis of what this intuits with regard to our freedom to 
“make the world”, in her essay “Sartre and Levinas”. Howells describes how, for both 
Jean-Paul Sartre and Emmanuel Levinas, the “other” problematizes the self’s “being in 
the world”.  
I am born into a world already structured, patterned and possessed by others; my 
interpretation of it must necessarily take into account the interpretation of others: 
my freedom to make the world is limited, its application cannot be self-sufficient 
and arbitrary. (Howells 1988, 92) 
 
If the possibility of devising a comprehensive theory is out of bounds, then what 
exactly is the job of the moral philosopher? In considering this question I have had to 
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confront my predilection to write in a postmodernist style which is, sometimes, 
needlessly opaque. Those thinkers, variously categorized as postmodernists, or neo- 
Nietzscheans, have been called out by their critics, including Charles Taylor, for 
concealing the values which drive their theories emphasizing difference, heterogeneity 
and the fragmented character of reality. In an effort to avoid slipping into an obfuscating 
voice, I will set out in my first chapter my interpretation of what ought to be the job of 
philosophy. My argument will revolve around both Ludwig Wittgenstein’s notion of 
descriptive philosophy, and Emmanuel Levinas’ notion of philosophy as unsaying the 
said. The aim of this chapter is to elucidate what I intend to accomplish in departing from 
the normative dialectical format of thesis statement, supporting argument, and 
conclusion.  
I feel it is imperative to begin my dissertation by confronting the reader with the 
idea that “126. Philosophy just puts everything before us, and neither explains nor 
deduces anything. — Since everything lies open to view, there is nothing to explain. For 
whatever may be hidden is of no interest to us” (Wittgenstein 1958, 55e). As such, I 
argue that philosophers need to avail themselves of the myriad different vocabularies 
which are already before us, and engage with them to enrich the rather narrow 
philosophical discourse dealing with descriptions of the good life in the west.  
As a philosopher in the western tradition my interest in the good life can be 
described as, at best, predictable, and as, at worst, derivative. Nevertheless, I am 
compelled to re-visit the well-trod ground of this philosophical investigation. Countless 
philosophers, theologians and artists have proffered guides to, or critiques of, the good 
life.  Their answers have varied from school to school, and era to era, depending upon 
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which interests are given priority, i.e. political, religious, epicurean, etc. Despite the 
plethora of creeds concerning the good, I remain, like many, unsatisfied and driven to 
investigate the meanings evoked in this slippery category. Thus, it is upon the enduring 
trope of the good that the crux of my dissertation revolves.  
In his seminal work, Sources of the Self, Charles Taylor eloquently draws the 
distinction between a utilitarian concept of what it is right to do, and a more substantive 
consideration of what it is good to be (Taylor 1989b, 3). My own studies and writing 
have been considerably influenced by this short dialectic. In the first part of Sources, 
entitled “Identity and the Good”, Taylor exposed a great many faults in the procedural 
and utilitarian conceptual models which dominate modern moral philosophy in the west. I 
owe a great debt to Charles Taylor’s critique of western moral thought. Taylor’s lucid 
and often compelling arguments concerning “strong evaluation” and “articulacy” (terms I 
will explore at length in subsequent chapters) made tangible the possibility of thinking 
and speaking about the good in a more nuanced fashion. The moral vocabulary brought 
out by Taylor in Sources resonates strongly with lived experience. I believe that Taylor’s 
descriptions invigorate the discourse concerning moral philosophy in the modern west. 
His is a moral vocabulary which gives heft to the notion of a relationship between the 
idea of the self, and the idea of the good.  
I have a great respect for the breadth of Taylor’s philosophical understanding, and 
an abiding conviction in the validity of many of his arguments. Thus, I proceed with a 
keen sense of my own presumptuousness upon a critical investigation of his moral 
thought; an investigation which involves a considerable critique of Taylor’s conclusions. 
While I uphold much of Taylor’s phenomenological insights, I am compelled by the 
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pluralistic and discontinuous character of languages, and related forms of life, to ask 
probing questions focusing upon Taylor’s lack of attention to the heterogeneity of the 
myriad language games within which we live our lives. Further, I am disquieted by the 
systematic tone which underlies the presentation of his moral theory in “Identity and the 
Good”.  
In an effort to avoid the old logocentric traps which I will argue ensnared Taylor 
in his own theoretical project, I will here lay out a genre of negative thesis. More plainly, 
I will explain what it is that I do not set out to accomplish in writing this dissertation. I do 
not intend my work to be read as a unified, closed, or comprehensive theory. 
Furthermore, I reject the notion that one is capable of an intellectual contribution outside 
of our profoundly interrelated discursive traditions. Our scholarly traditions in the west 
necessarily involve years of studying the work and thought of others in what might be 
described as a hermeneutic chain. It is dishonest to lay claim to any theoretical 
contribution outside of this chain.  
As scholars we think, read, and write in a genealogical tradition. At the low end of 
the tradition we are merely apprentices, learning our trade through rough mimesis. At the 
high end of the tradition we may produce something genuinely creative, perhaps even 
something new. Nevertheless, even the new must be acknowledged as being always 
already rooted in older sources. The longing after objectivity is a dangerous delusion of 
the will to power, reflecting the desire to rise above the fray of our embedded experience. 
It is a delusion which leads us to the denial of the others who give us our intellect, and a 
glorification of the hero myth at the heart of much of our modern malaise (to turn a 
phrase of Taylor’s). Here, I affirm a conviction that all theory is limited, fragmented, 
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incomplete and open. I argue that these qualities constitute the true strength and value of 
theory as a dynamic medium. It is the gaps and faux plat in theory that leave openings for 
questioning. This fluidity allows others to build upon what little insights one’s tentative 
interpretation of previous works might contribute to an ongoing and ever changing 
descriptive discourse.  
 My decision to depart from the normative archetype of a dissertation in the west 
makes me acutely aware that I must meticulously explain what it is that I do, intend to do. 
I believe that my project can best be understood as descriptive. As a philosopher I take 
seriously the idea, once again articulated by Wittgenstein, that the job of philosophy is 
descriptive, “124. Philosophy must not interfere in any way with the actual use of 
language, so it can in the end only describe it. For it cannot justify it either. It leaves 
everything as it is” (Wittgenstein 1958, 55e). It is in this spirit that I tender my 
dissertation as a descriptive essay investigating the concept of agency, authenticity and 
accountability, in contemporary western moral discourse. I harbor no illusions of 
originality, nor do I seek after hidden meaning. I am merely describing what I apprehend 
to be a potentially helpful framework for furthering the boundaries of the contemporary 
discourse concerning our understandings of moral agency.  
Although I strongly believe that philosophy, like all human enterprise, is a 
communal activity, I also acknowledge that innovations are indeed possible. The 
innovations in the descriptive capacity of discourse help us to re-think our normative 
understandings vis à vis our “being in the world”. Consequently, I hope that my own 
descriptive essay may enrich our sometimes narrow western moral vocabulary through 
critical interrogation and a re-visioning of the moral dimension of being. The iconoclastic 
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American literary critic Harold Bloom asserted that, “What ought to be seen more clearly 
is that revisionism is an energizer even when it works through loss” (Bloom 1982, 50). 
What underlies Bloom’s sentiment is the sense that revision, which necessarily relies 
upon description and interpretation, involves struggle.  
Asking critical questions and working out more critical descriptions involves the 
agonistic struggle with one’s own prejudices, misconceptions, and romanticized ideals. 
Moreover, the dynamic character of interpretive re-visioning demands  a vigilance 
against the positivistic chimeras of modern western thought conjured up to sate the 
appetite of philosophers for empirical legitimacy through reifying epistemologies. The 
incentive for undertaking the struggle of interpretative re-visioning is the invigoration 
derived from placing a given subject in a different descriptive light. It is in this vein that I 
will attempt to shine a light on a small, but important feature, in Charles Taylor’s moral 
theory. 
That which I seek to bring to light and revise, or better, to re-imagine, in Taylor’s 
philosophy is his concept of the “best account principle”, (a concept I will analyse in 
detail in chapter two). I do believe, however, that it is important to inform the reader in 
advance of the reasons underlying my immodest re-imagining of Taylor’s “best account 
principle”. It will suffice to state, for introductory purposes, that I consider Taylor’s 
description of the concept of the “best account principle” to exhibit traits of narcissistic1 
self-concern. Taylor advances a theory arguing for the possibility of developing toward 
an ever more full, dignified and authentic sense of self. Although Taylor concedes that 
                                                 
1
 In The Ethics of Authenticity Taylor invokes Christopher Lasch’s book The Culture of Narcissism for 
framing the term narcissism in his discussion of the “contemporary ideal of authenticity” (Taylor 1991b, 
14-16).  In applying the term narcissistic to Taylor’s model of the self I am suggesting that it exhibits an 
excessive self-concern. I would not, however, go so far as to link my use to that of the pathological 
condition discussed by Lasch in his work (Lasch 1979, 239).    
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self-realization is an always ongoing project, it is clear that he envisions the ideal, fully 
developed self as a being capable of exercising a genre of intentionality rooted in an 
opaque sense of phenomenological intuition. This allows the agent to discover what 
Taylor apprehends to be the sources of their own moral identity, made intelligible 
through a Kantian inspired transcendental
2
 “self-reading”, and disclose these sources in 
an act of articulation. Articulation is a crucial element in Taylor’s moral theory as it 
constitutes the conduit for agents’ expressions of their visions of the good. This in turn 
allows them to “make sense of their lives”. Taylor lays this out in his description of the 
“best account principle”. 
The terms we select have to make sense across the whole range of both 
explanatory and life uses. The terms indispensable for the latter are part of the 
story that makes best sense of us, unless and until we can replace them with more 
clairvoyant substitutes. The result of this search for clairvoyance yields the best 
account we can give at any given time, and no epistemological or metaphysical 
considerations of a more general kind about science or nature can justify setting 
this aside. The best account in the above sense is trumps. Let me call this the B.A. 
principle. (Taylor 1989b, 58) 
 
In light of my reservations concerning the tenor of Taylor’s theory, the question 
must be asked; why bother with Taylor’s “best account principle” at all? My answer is 
that I continue to find it a valuable concept for exploring moral discourse. In re-
imagining the “best account principle”, I first intend to address, what I consider, the need 
for a more substantive dimension to the notion of embodiment with regard to moral 
agency. In the fourth chapter I will expand Taylor’s extremely limited, Merleau-Pontyian 
influenced model of embodiment, to include attention to features such as gender and 
assumptions regarding “normative” cognitive function. Embodiment will act as the 
vanguard in my critique of Taylor’s homogeneous portrayal of moral agency in Sources.  
                                                 
2
 A detailed consideration of Taylor’s use of transcendental will be taken up in chapter 5. 
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Equipped with this thickened portrait of embodied agency, I will, in the fifth 
chapter, begin an interpretation of the idea of a “best account” read through Emmanuel 
Levinas’ theory of ethics. This critical hermeneutic will reverse the flow of the moral 
account from proclamation to response; a giving of account to others rather than an 
accounting for one’s vision of the good. The character of my proposed project requires 
that I describe what I mean by discourse. It is important to note that, although I use both 
the terms discourse and language throughout my proposal, these terms are not 
interchangeable. I contend that discourse can be understood as a catchall heading for the 
myriad manifestations of interrelatedness in the west. Thus, it might include statements 
and claims, assertions, tentative agreements, discord, dissensus, compromise, questions, 
critique; or indeed phenomena such as representation, movement, ritual, and architecture.  
It is neither a tidy category, nor a uniform one.  
My investigation pertains to the character and tenor of contemporary moral 
discourse in the west. Discourses are composed of languages. Languages are constituted 
by a variety of grammatical tenses, and commensurate vocabularies, particular to the 
forms of life within which they are comprehensible; their boundaries are porous, yet 
resist attempts at reductionism. Moral discourse is presented herein, under a 
Wittgensteinian understanding, as a heading for a plurality of different, inter-related 
languages. What these languages have in common is their various attempts to advance 
descriptions of the good life. The idea of heterogeneous discourse usurps the ideal of 
systemacy based on the lived experience of changes, paradoxes, and innovations in 
languages. Further, as languages are intricately intertwined with particular forms of life, 
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linguistic changes must be understood as occurring in tandem with transformations in the 
forms of life with which they are bound up.  
In this dissertation I will explore the possibility of thinking seriously about a 
particular genre of moral vocabulary largely marginalized in contemporary western 
philosophy. My investigation focuses upon tropes of accountability and responsibility 
which share a religious etymology in the west. Building upon the Levinasian inspired re-
imagining of Taylor’s “best account principle” I will explore how the idea of the good as 
a weight changes the notion of what it means to give a “best account”. To accomplish this 
will entail a recasting of articulation as no longer expressive of self-regarded authenticity, 
but rather of embodied accountability. The first step here requires abandoning the quest 
for increasingly authentic accounts of the self, focused on the dignity of living up to one’s 
vision of a worthwhile life.  
I argue that in place of this self-concern we must take up the weight of 
accountability to others, wherein we strive to articulate an ethos of responsibility and 
justice. This re-visioning/re-imagining of the “best account” renders it a forever 
unsatisfactory, and thus, unceasing obligation to respond to others. I will describe how 
this sense of accountability may be understood as an aspect of embodiment. The focus 
upon embodiment is crucial to my task of drawing the “best account” out of a self-
interested monologue concerning authenticity. In the trope of embodied accountability 
the moral agent is confronted with the others who are always, already present. My 
description of the “best account” exteriorizes the account as a response. This movement 
is in clear opposition to what I contend is Taylor’s original construal of the “best 
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account” as a self-declarative act which, consciously or not,  implies a transitional 
epistemic gain on behalf of a self-reading and self-realizing, moral agent.  
In making my case for a re-imagined “best account” I freely admit to the use of 
rhetoric in my arguments. I do not aspire to objectivity or disinterestedness. If I fly any 
flag over this work let it be the flag of the Sophists, whose memory has been so maligned 
by the impulse in modern philosophy seeking to legitimate power and authority under the 
artifice of natural law and objective reason. The purpose of a philosophical argument is to 
persuade one’s audience toward accepting a particular description of a given subject. If 
nothing else, this work constitutes an active and impassioned attempt to win my readers 
over to a limited and fragmentary description of moral agency as being continuously 
constructed through language.  
I am advocating for a vocabulary of accountability framed by metaphors and 
tropes of anarchic responsibility derived from the thought of Emmanuel Levinas. 
Although these tropes share a definite affinity with what are deemed religious languages 
in the west, they are not to be understood here as dogmatic. I cannot emphasize enough 
the importance of receiving terms from different vocabularies as metaphors native to 
particular descriptive languages. I contend that descriptive languages rooted in religious 
tropes are worth serious consideration given their ability to present responsibility in a 
fashion which is critical of egoism. I will lean heavily upon a variety of different 
languages to describe how my re-imagining of the “best account” might provide a 
conduit for an engagement in moral discourse oriented toward a vision of moral agency, 
defined by accountability, rather than authenticity.  
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Contra Taylor, my portrait of the moral agent is of a subject made unique, not 
through their allegiance to private hypergoods, but rather as a consequence of their 
particular indebtedness to others. This model of the “best account” acknowledges first 
and foremost the position of moral agents as thrown onto the “ontological plane”, and the 
limits that said throwness places upon their will and freedom. From this understanding I 
will extrapolate how every act of account is an attempt to respond, while, paradoxically, 
also a move to reify through the inevitable drive of thematization. I will conclude my 
dissertation with a brief consideration of how different languages may be integrated into 
non-exclusive descriptions of moral agency. This brief exercise will suggest future 
directions in moral philosophy and language theory which I intend to pursue using my 
dissertation as a base.  
My project calls into question the idea that the fullness of moral agency is 
measureable against one understanding their life to be authentic, and dignified; in tune 
with their vision of the good. In place of this, I tender the notion of moral agency as 
rooted in embodied accountability, wherein expressing one’s responsibility to others 
takes precedence over one’s concern for authenticity and dignity. In this respect, I will be 
employing aspects of Charles Taylor’s theory in a fashion which I do not believe would 
beget his blessing. Mine is not the story of the making of the self. It is, rather, an 















It is as though subjective life in the form of consciousness consisted in being itself 
losing itself and finding itself again so as to possess itself by showing itself, 
proposing itself as a theme, exposing itself in truth. (Levinas 1974, 99) 
 
The passage quoted above appears in the first few lines of Emmanuel Levinas’ 
seminal work, Otherwise than Being, serving to set the tone for his chapter on 
substitution. In a similar vein, I wish to employ this penetrating and provocative 
description of the totalizing insularity of modern epistemologies to establish the tenor of 
this chapter on language and philosophy. In this chapter I will explore a particular 
conceptual understanding of language, along with a consideration of what I believe the 
job of philosophy entails. Levinas’ observation offers what I contend to be a keen 
portrayal of the habits of certain strains of post-enlightenment philosophy in the west. 
The circular sense of movement evoked by Levinas sums up the method by which some 
philosophers in the west engage in a dialectic of intellectual possession.  
The philosophical camps I have in mind here are those which Taylor categorizes 
under the general heading of “philosophical naturalism” (Taylor 1989b, 79), and which 
embrace methodological proceduralism and philosophical empiricism. The knowledge 
claims articulated by these “naturalist” philosophers entails a genre of nominalism, 
wherein meaning is bound up in a strict relationship constructed between the ideality of a 
concept and its supposed concreteness, or particularity.
3
 I suspect that the pursuit of hard 
and fast naturalistic methodologies for reasoning by the lineage of modern philosophers 
                                                 
3
 Dennis H. Wrong offers an insightful consideration of the role of nominalism in contemporary western 
thought in his book The Persistence of the Particular (2005) Transaction Publishers.  
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in the west which stretches from David Hume to W.V. Quine
4
 and beyond, derives from a 
desire to legitimate philosophy in an age where a certain view of scientific empiricism 
has personified the measure of validity. It is my conviction that one of the great 
weaknesses of modern, western philosophical naturalism consists in the totalistic 
character of its discourse. The seed of this totalizing discourse was sown by Plato, and 
flourished throughout the west of Descartes, Locke, Hegel, Kant, et al. in what might best 
be described as an uneasy marriage between humanism and empiricism. The consequence 
of this union is a genre of anthropocentric idealism wherein thought is made fact, and 
meanings are reified within structured epistemologies.  
Expanding upon Taylor’s usage, I suggest that naturalist philosophers might be 
described as those who seek to establish an objective presence in the world, from which 
they can document relationships of meaning between events and terminology, and devise 
rational procedures for mapping ontological terrain. In short, naturalist philosophers are 
in the business of crafting thematizations of the world which they offer up as independent 
facts. 
 This is not a vision of philosophy I share. Rather, I have been strongly influenced 
by the description of the work appropriate to philosophy articulated by a disparate chorus 
of dissenting voices in the west. Although I would never attempt to squeeze these 
philosophers into a “school” of thought, I have recognized, like others before me, points 
of contact between thinkers such as Jacques Derrida, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Emmanuel 
Levinas, Michel Foucault, Jane Flax, et al. What I feel these thinkers share is a concept of 
philosophical investigations as limited, embodied, and descriptive practices. To varying 
                                                 
4
 Robert J. Fogelin provides an excellent analysis of Quine’s project, and his relationship to the work of 
David Hume, in his essay “Aspects of Quine’s Naturalized Epistemology”, pgs. 19-46 in The Cambridge 
Companion to Quine, ed. Roger F. Gibson Jr. 2004. Cambridge University Press.   
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degrees, these thinkers deviate from the normative practice of naturalist philosophers who 
lay out comprehensive ontological models underwritten by empirical claims. Contra the 
univalent structure germane to naturalist theories, these thinkers place an abiding 
emphasis upon dynamism and difference in their works. Their works express multivalent 
concepts of languages, and careful attention to the complicated and ephemeral portrayal 
of agency.  
I contend that two of the most eloquent challenges to the status quo in western 
philosophy are found in the works of Ludwig Wittgenstein and Emmanuel Levinas. Both 
of these philosophers advocate for a critical hermeneutic approach in philosophy, wherein 
all descriptions remain contestable, and truth eludes all attempts at possession. In the 
course of this chapter I will explore both Wittgenstein’s and Levinas’ concepts of 
language, and subsequent descriptions of agents in the world. I will also expand upon the 
ways in which their respective oeuvres have influenced my own sense of what constitutes 
the proper work of philosophy, and the consequences such a vision involves for the 
philosophers who would accept it.  
Before embarking upon this exploration however, I must address the matter of 
definitions. In my examination of Wittgenstein’s investigation into language and 
philosophy, I will employ various terms whose precise definitions are matters of great 
contention amongst philosophers. As I will make clear in my review of Wittgenstein’s 
work, I reject the possibility of any precise definition of any term, so long as precision is 
grasped as constituting an ultimate/absolute definition. However, for the purposes of 
clarity, I will lay out the tenor of the definitions of certain terms as found in scholarly 




Language is a term and concept central to the work at hand. However, language 
can be read in myriad ways, with various conflicting meanings. This ambiguity is 
immediately encountered in even the most cursory review of the definitions found under 
the category of language in dictionaries and encyclopedias of philosophy. The print 
edition of the Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy published in 1998 contains a variety 
of entries related to language (from the “Ancient Philosophy of Language”, to “Language 
and Gender”, to the “Innateness of Language”, and so on) spanning an impressive sixty-
three pages. Read any two of the entries found within side by side, and one inevitably 
confronts some disharmonious elements. Indeed, disparate ideas concerning language are 
to be found under the same heading. Take, for example, the outline of the content 
provided in the first part of the entry for “Language and Gender”.  
Language-gender debates, however, include participants with different 
conceptions both of language and of gender. This section touches on three recent 
kinds of work: the Anglo-American empirically oriented tradition, psychoanalytic 
theorizing from French philosophers and linguists, and work on discourse and 
gender construction from feminist philosophers and other theorists in literary and 
cultural studies. (Craig 1998, 362) 
 
 This brief snippet evinces the laudable effort which those who write and edit 
philosophical reference books expend in their attempt to include as many views as 
possible on a given subject. The passage also illustrates how inter-mural disputes within a 
given field (in this case that of gender and language theories) evinces the plurality of 
possible descriptions which may be used to frame a given phenomenon within an 
overarching language game. Those in search of some definite designation for the content 
of the term language would be sorely disappointed by the descriptions assembled by the 
Routledge team. Edward Craig, the editor of the Routledge edition, assigned a 
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considerable space to the plethora of philosophical approaches to the concept of 
language, yet provided no entry for the term language unaccompanied by a specific 
philosophical sub-category. In contrast, Ted Honderich, the editor of the Oxford 
Companion to Philosophy, devoted a comparatively measly eight pages to the subject of 
language, but did venture to provide an entry for Language tout court. Unhappily for 
those with structuralist sympathies, the entry for language in the Oxford resource can best 
be described as a series of questions pertaining to the nature of the subject at hand. The 
author of the entry, Professor Simon Blackburn, advances a series of critical and 
enlivening questions regarding the contours of language. The effect of this open format 
upon the reader is to spur a speculative attitude which complements the spirit in which 
Wittgenstein pursued his own investigations of language.  
The conceptual difficulties in thinking about language become vivid when 
we consider marginal and unusual candidates. Are the signaling systems of 
animals properly regarded as languages? If a chimpanzee can associate sounds 
with things, and put sounds together in simple ways, is this acquiring the essence 
of linguistic behavior? Is a computer language a kind of language? Does it make 
sense to posit a ‘language of thought’ or background language, like the machine 
code of a computer, whereby human beings processes [sic] their first natural 
language? And is there a language of music, or art, or clothes? These questions 
are not so much troublesome in themselves, since we might just posit a criterion 
that marginal cases do or do not meet. The problem is that we cannot discern a 
principle. We are not sure what status any definition or criterion of linguistic 
behaviour could deserve.  ( Honderich 1995, 454) 
 
The problem of distilling an essential definition for the amorphous term language 
is troublesome for those in the naturalist lineage of modern philosophy. We might ask, in 
an admittedly rhetorical manner, how badly some philosophers would like to announce 
that they had “sequenced the gene” of language. That is, determined a comprehensive 
model of what language is, and does.  However, the nuance and abstruseness native to the 
term language renders the possibility of such a model fantastic. What is more, the range 
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of meanings expressed by the term language is extended, as I will demonstrate in my 
review of Wittgenstein’s observations, to all the signifiers at play in language games.  
Wittgenstein asserted that meaning is largely determined through “its use in the 
language” (Wittgenstein 1958, 25e). Since usage of terms and attendant meanings shift 
from language game to language game, the ideal of a static, systematic and foundational 
dialectic between sign and signified pursued by modern theorists from Ferdinand de 
Saussure to Noam Chomsky, is destabilized. The broad range of interpretations of what 
we are talking about when we talk about language render a consensus view not only 
impossible, but undesirable. For, to choose one definition of language as superior to all 
others would entail an arbitrary marginalization of the wealth of different perspectives on 
the subject, and the limitation of inter-disciplinary discourse which animates the drive of 
speculative thought. Here I pose the question, why even attempt to establish one 
definition of language as tops? A possible response to this question rests in the prospect 
of power which accompanies the institution of a given theoretical perspective as 
authoritative. This brings us to the second term I would like to elucidate, epistemology.  
On Epistemology 
It might be said by some that philosophers are in the business of knowing things. 
As in the world of commerce, an underlying force in western philosophical practice 
(which is primarily a creature of the academy) is the increase of market share. Currently, 
the main markets for working philosophers in the west are universities. The currency in 
these markets is comprised of research funding, i.e. grants, fellowships, endowed chairs, 
etc. As is the case in all markets, there is a limited pool of funds available and thus, 
philosophers must compete with one another to prove the worth of their ideas over and 
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against the ideas of their colleagues. One way of gaining advantage in this market is to 
proffer your theory as representing the definitive methodological approach toward a 
given subject. All theories of knowledge might be described as epistemological following 
the definition of epistemology found in the charmingly concise Philosopher’s Dictionary. 
Theory of knowledge: one of the main branches of philosophy. Among the central 
questions studied here are: What is the difference between knowledge and mere 
belief? Is all (or any) knowledge based on sense perception? How, in general, are 
our knowledge claims justified? (Martin 2002, 106) 
 
The inquiring tone of this entry belies the danger which lurks in this “main” 
branch of philosophy. The threat does not reside in asking questions such as “What is the 
difference between knowledge and mere belief?” The peril lies in how one might answer 
the question. Presenting definitive answers to epistemological speculation represents a 
menace to philosophical investigation because they are constructed as comprehensive. 
The veneer of totality functions as a defensive measure meant to repel critique. The 
dealing in what Jean-Francois Lyotard dubbed metanarratives
5
 is conspicuously detailed 
in the careful inventory of competing definitions listed under the entry for epistemology 
in the Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Under the heading epistemology the author 
of the entry, Peter D. Klein, reviews the competing theories of knowledge which enjoy 
the most currency in contemporary western philosophy. Helpfully enumerated for the 
reader are, “1 The normative answers: foundationalism and coherentism”, “2 The 
naturalistic answers: causes of belief”, “3 Scepticism”, and “4 Recent developments in 
epistemology” which includes “Virtue epistemology”, “Cognitive pluralism”, and 
“Feminist epistemology” (Craig 1998, 362-365).  
                                                 
5
 For a full treatment of the concept of “metanarratives” or “grand narratives”, see Jean-Francois Lyotard’s 




Each of the epistemological models summarized in the Routledge entry express 
different features of our interpretive responses to the character of the experience of what 
we dub knowledge. However, to build a truly rich vocabulary for discussing our 
experiences we must resist the temptation of an orthodox approach to epistemology. 
Instead, we must remain open to all of the different responses to what we deem 
epistemological questions. Such an intellectually exposed stance will allow us to engage 
with a veritable omnibus of worthwhile observations regarding the character of 
experiences derived from dissimilar sources. Commensurately, we must acknowledge 
and respect the tension inherent in languages evincing vocabularies capable of expressing 
such contrasting approaches to experience as empiricism, pragmatism, skepticism, and 
pluralism. This is sure to frustrate speakers, as they continually run up against paradoxes 
and gaps in coherency. However, these aporia constitute the strengths of a re-visioned 
philosophical vocabulary. It is not my aim to do away with the term epistemology, only 
to imagine it in a pluralistic context.  
 In languages divested of unicity, one would be able to express contextually 
appropriate observations and descriptions regarding different epistemological experiences 
without indulging in hegemonic taxonomies. Thus, a feminist critique of paternalistic 
knowledge claims invoked as guarantors of discriminatory power structures could work 
alongside a coherence model which uses an arithmetic of complementarity to establish 
patterns of coherency amongst descriptions. No single approach would claim to be 
absolute, or appropriate to all fields of inquiry. Neither would any one description or 
thematization be accorded final say. Rather, the babel of theoretical tongues would 
provide the fuel for unending discourses occupied with myriad interpretations of 
23 
 
knowledge experiences in different contexts. Philosophers in the west have, now for 
several centuries, chased after or rebelled against the prospect of a fully rationalistic 
world view. The time is nigh that this struggle be abandoned.  
I argue that the aspiration of naturalist philosophers, in the post-Enlightenment 
west, to replace the hegemony of superstition with a dominion governed by empirical 
reasoning accomplishes little more than dressing the emperor in new clothes. Even 
critiques of the naturalist enterprise by various counter-movements such as that of the 
post-structuralists have indulged in excessive condemnations of all things rational. The 
shift from a dogmatic religious discourse in the west, to an episteme governed by rational 
principles, to a wholesale indictment of the Enlightenment, merely changes the tone of 
totalization.  
On Wittgenstein 
In opposition to this confusion of theories with Truth, Ludwig Wittgenstein 
proposed a scheme whereby meanings are maintained as heterogeneous, and susceptible 
to changes effected by the contexts of various forms of life, and moves in associated 
language games. Wittgenstein’s ideas offer relief from the nominalism practiced by 
naturalists, which suffocates difference through the imposition of static and univalent 
categories of meaning. In Philosophical Investigations Wittgenstein urged philosophers 
to acknowledge the similarities which link categories of meaning, while commensurately 
respecting the differences between their specific and varying uses. Wittgenstein famously 
likened this relationship to family resemblance, wherein distinctive features may be 
shared across generations of kin, yet no one feature could be singled out and assigned as 
common to all. The same scheme can be applied to language. Our categories and titles 
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may help us to group together descriptions of phenomena which exhibit certain affinities. 
However, we can in no way purport to distill any of these traits to a common, universal, 
or pure essence, expressed free of the vagaries inherent in our interpretations. 
Wittgenstein summed up this argument in the following rebuke.  
66. don’t think, but look! — Look, for example, at board-games, with their 
various affinities. Now pass to card-games; here you find many correspondences 
with the first group, but many common features drop out, and others appear…And 
we can go through the many, many other groups of games in the same way, can 
see how similarities crop up and disappear. And the upshot of these 
considerations is: we see a complicated network of similarities overlapping and 
criss-crossing; similarities in the large and the small. (Wittgenstein 1958, 36e) 
 
 It is through attentiveness to these similarities that we may undertake the 
descriptive work proper to philosophy, not by essentializing phenomena to the fixed 
noema of a totalizing intellect, but rather via the descriptive activity of an open ended 
hermeneutic. A hermeneutic which chips away at the veneer of ideality, and unleashes a 
plurality of meaning conveyed by a given term and the wealth that such heterogeneity 
represents for broadening discourse. 
65. Instead of pointing out something common to all that we call language, I’m 
saying that these phenomena have no one thing in common in virtue of which we 
use the same word for all — but there are many different kinds of affinity between 
them. And on account of this affinity, or these affinities, we call them all 
“languages”.  
(Wittgenstein 1958, 35e) 
 
I do not read Wittgenstein’s embrace of pluralism and ambiguity as taking up an 
anti-philosophical stance. Rather, I apprehend Wittgenstein as advocating for a 
philosophy of description wherein comparison and contrast drive discourse. 
Wittgenstein’s descriptive action challenges the naturalist aspiration to practice 
philosophy from a neutral and objective position. Such a disengaged position was 
famously described by Thomas Nagel in his penetrating work The View from Nowhere. I 
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have little doubt that the aspiration to maneuver philosophy into a scientific methodology 
stems, in large part, from the rise in esteem of the natural sciences over the last two 
centuries. The quest to maintain the prestige of philosophy in an age which often 
confuses utility with authority is quite understandable. It is my belief that the increasing 
emphasis on objective, disengaged reason in philosophical naturalism is rooted in a desire 
to cement the legitimacy of philosophy as a companion to the natural sciences.
6
 In this 
crusade for legitimacy, questions and descriptions have taken a back seat to systems and 
proofs.  
Wittgenstein’s observations regarding the ways in which we are embedded in a 
variety of different forms of life presents an obstacle for those philosophers in search of 
“a view from nowhere”, as we always find that we are already somewhere. Further, 
Wittgenstein describes how we rely upon languages particular to our different life 
activities to make sense of these different spheres of experience. There are two features 
of Wittgenstein’s model of language games which are important to elucidate for the 
purposes of the work at hand. The first of these is the interrelated/dependent position in 
which language games place us. Here, the salient point is that we learn the grammatical 
rules specific to the use of different language activities from others. For instance, when 
one enters the study of philosophy one does not do so fully equipped with a philosophical 
vocabulary, and a foreknowledge of its terms of use. Consequently, from the outset we, 
as agents, are inextricably entwined with others upon whom we rely for both initiation 
and engagement. Wittgenstein outlined this reality in his investigation of the concept of 
private languages. Wherein, he questioned the currency of any epistemological 
                                                 
6
 For a current example of this drive to align philosophy more closely with science, indeed as a science, 
please see Colin McGinn, “Philosophy by Another Name”, The New York Times, March 4th,  2012,  The 
Opinion Pages, http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/03/04/philosophy-by-another-name/ 
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conclusions arrived at via a supposedly disengaged perspective. Wittgenstein parodies the 
incoherence of a private form of language, one which would presume to eschew inter-
relation, in his example concerning one’s remarking upon the blue of the sky. 
275. Look at the blue of the sky and say to yourself, “How blue the sky is!” — 
When you do it spontaneously — without philosophical purposes — the idea 
never crosses your mind that this impression of colour belongs only to you. And 
you have no qualms about exclaiming thus to another. And if you point at 
anything as you say the words, it is at the sky. I mean: you don’t have the 
pointing-into-yourself feeling that often accompanies ‘naming sensations’ when 
one is thinking about the ‘private language’. Nor do you think that really you 
ought to point at the colour not with your hand, but with your attention. (Consider 
what “to point at something with one’s attention” means.) 
(Wittgenstein 1958, 102e)  
 
 Commensurately, it makes no sense to lay claim to divining the essence of a 
phenomena through a philosophical analysis which depends upon what Wittgenstein so 
succinctly described as the “pointing-into-yourself feeling”. The language of philosophy 
can lay claim to its own grammatical particularity, like the language of politics, or music, 
or sport, etc. However, philosophical language cannot lay claim to any special, 
disengaged prerogative. Philosophical language is governed by the same inter-related 
conditions as all other language games. Philosophers, like politicians, musicians and 
athletes, learn the nuances and peculiarities of their vocabulary within a community of 
discourse. Further, in evincing the embededness of philosophers in language, 
Wittgenstein also illustrates how philosophical inquiry is inherently limited to the given. 
Thus, philosophical discourse can only deal in what is already exposed through shared 
languages.  
Under the naturalist paradigm, it is supposed that one might be capable of being 
present to experience in an objective fashion. The power enshrined in this genre of meta-
perspective affords a capacity to reveal the essential meaning hidden within mundane 
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phenomena via the exercise of a disengaged analysis. This model of disengaged presence 
is seriously problematized by the a priori collective, and received, character of the 
languages within which (following Wittgenstein) we express ourselves. Wittgenstein 
provides a crisp critique of the attempt to divorce thought from language in his statement 
that, “329. When I think in words, I don’t have ‘meanings’ in my mind in addition to the 
verbal expressions; rather, language itself is the vehicle of thought” (Wittgenstein 1958, 
113e). If we accept Wittgenstein’s assertion, then as philosophers we must surrender any 
claim to the role of translating thought, and revealing hidden meaning. Thoughts are 
language all the way down. We live in shared languages wherein everyone initiated has 
the potential to access the senses conveyed therein. Thus, I argue, there can be no map to 
a disengaged position within life and language.  
 This line of thinking resonates with some elements of Heidegger’s notion of 
geworfenheit, or throwness (Heidegger 2010, 131). I argue that throwness constitutes an 
important descriptive metaphor for interpreting the way in which we find ourselves 
situated in the world as agents. Although I do not share Heidegger’s ultimate conclusions, 
I do find his concept of finding oneself always, already in the world prior to any 
reflection or willing gesture to be helpful for focusing on philosophy as an engaged, 
embodied, and embedded exercise.  
I stated above that Wittgenstein’s concept of language games evinced two 
features which support the struggle to re-cast the job of philosophy. In addition to the 
manner in which language games compel us to admit our necessarily inter-related 
position within the life world, language games also unfix meaning from the rigid 
categories integral to the business of constructing totalizing epistemologies. Wittgenstein 
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describes how different language games attend different forms of life, and how, although 
the grammar of one language game may share certain resemblances with others, they are 
always un-synthesizable. However, at no point does Wittgenstein suggest that one 
language or form of life exists in isolation from others. Rather, the sense one gets from 
reading Wittgenstein’s observation is of permeability between all forms of life and 
language, and the dynamic character of the meaning of the terms commensurable within 
them (Wittgenstein 1958, 35e).  
This perspective complicates totalizing epistemologies which depend upon rigid 
taxonomies to establish their authority. After all, if a certain feature of a procedural 
method for, say, ethical behavior, is suddenly understood as variable, then the entire 
structure of the system’s imperative onus collapses. Variability is precisely what 
accompanies Wittgenstein’s observation of meanings in languages.  
79. And this can be expressed as follows: I use the name “N” without a fixed 
meaning. (But that impairs its use as little as the use of a table is impaired by the 
fact that it stands on four legs instead of three and so sometimes wobbles.) Should 
it be said that I’m using a word whose meaning I don’t know, and so am talking 
nonsense? — Say what you please, so long as it does not prevent you from seeing 
how things are. (And when you see that, there will be some things that you won’t 
say.)  (Wittgenstein 1958, 42e)    
 
The passage quoted above returns us to the importance of considering our 
throwness in the world, and the way that we navigate our forms of life using inherited 
language and meanings which necessarily “wobble”. The activity of philosophy framed 
in this context is an activity intimately acquainted with variability. The goal of 
philosophy is here no longer understood as the construction of totalizing epistemologies 
wherein ambiguity is branded intolerable. Rather, following Wittgenstein, philosophy 
thrives upon the ebb and flow of languages, and uses the dynamic character of different 
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meanings to craft myriad descriptions of the phenomena of lived experience accessible to 
all agents. I do not discern the value of a theory calculated by the degree to which the 
concepts and arguments advanced in it may be  judged to be air tight, free from 
variability, and revelatory of  some profound and hidden essence. I contend that the worth 
of a philosophical theory is directly tied to the degree to which it is helpful as a 
descriptive language allowing its users to “cope with conceptual unclarities” 
(Wittgenstein 1958, 216e, 202).  
In this light, philosophy is understood as a descriptive activity, practiced in 
discursive communities to help elucidate a variety of life experiences. Such a model of 
philosophy would, I believe, bring into dialogue contrasting descriptions of experience, 
rendered somewhat more commensurable through the acknowledgement of pervasive 
difference underlying the terms involved. Under this rubric even idealistic vocabularies 
are entitled to be party to discussions, as long as no one ideal is advanced as synonymous 
with an illusory totality. We might even use hierarchical models in this vision of 
philosophy. However, any hierarchies here would be governed by the principle of 
pluralism and change which permeates the whole sense of Wittgensteinian language. 
Thus, hierarchies would be understood as hierarchies of description, always qualified as 
tentative, and judged more or less helpful for describing the character of an experience.     
 I share much of Wittgenstein’s vision of the activities appropriate to philosophy. 
This view has provided some of the basis upon which I demurred from pursuing the 
normative paradigm of a doctoral dissertation; as articulated in the introduction to this 
work. Thus, going forward I will be employing a descriptive style which, while 
advancing arguments, never seeks to culminate in a totalizing coup de grâce. My goal 
30 
 
remains to help to clarify the realm of experience we deign moral, or ethical, through 
tentative descriptive interpretations. My descriptions can certainly be apprehended as 
theoretical. However, they are not intended to be understood as comprehensive. In an 
effort to further explain this vision of philosophy I will review some of the insights 
regarding the work of philosophy and the spirit of language presented by Emmanuel 
Levinas. Levinas represents a major figure in this work. In subsequent chapters I will 
draw heavily upon facets of his philosophy for help in both the critique of Charles 
Taylor’s moral theory, as well as my own attempt to proffer a description of embodied 
accountability
7. In this first chapter, however, Levinas’ observations serve mainly to 
elucidate the character of philosophy and language animating my project.  
On Levinas 
In light of my critique of the naturalist aspiration toward disengagement, the 
question arises as to how we are to make peace with our fate as embedded in a world 
from which we have no recourse to a disengaged and all-encompassing perspective?  I 
believe that Emmanuel Levinas provides some helpful ideas for grappling with the 
inherent opacity of human life. Levinas also offers a description of the proper work of 
philosophy which bolsters that which I have already sketched out by Wittgenstein. With 
Wittgenstein we examined the notion of philosophy as the activity of devising 
descriptions of lived experiences. Levinas also apprehended the work of philosophy as a 
descriptive endeavour. Both Wittgenstein and Levinas offered visions of philosophy as a 
process whereby descriptions are critically refined. Neither Wittgenstein nor Levinas 
allowed that philosophers should be accorded some special access to hidden meaning or 
totalizing metaphysical explanations. Rather, they both insisted that philosophers work 
                                                 
7
 This term, and the concepts I am using it to represent, will be elaborated upon in the fifth chapter.  
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with the given phenomena common to normative experience. However, unlike 
Wittgenstein who left us a series of critical fragments, Levinas crafted a much more 
expansive descriptive philosophy. The subject of Levinas’ work is ethics. A close 
investigation of Levinas’ ideas about the ethical will be taken up in chapter five. 
However, what is of crucial importance for the task at hand, is an examination of the 
particular vocabularies which Levinas developed in his tomes Totality and Infinity, and 
Otherwise than Being.  
The aspects of Levinas’ terminology, which I explore here, will certainly serve to 
elucidate my later discussion regarding ethics. However, this lexicon is also critical for 
examining the questions concerning the scope of philosophy which form the core of this 
chapter. I used the term thematization above in reference to a description of experience. 
Levinas offers a rich conceptual frame for interpreting the ways in which a thematization 
can be said to function. Commensurately, reading Levinas’ description of the process of 
thematization is of acute importance for fleshing out the tropes he devises with regard to 
the “saying” and the “said”, which is paramount for establishing a purchase upon the 
notion of philosophy as a strictly descriptive endeavour.  In Totality and Infinity Levinas 
considers notions of the past, of presence, and of history under the heading “Discourse”. 
Within this section Levinas elucidates some features of the relationship between 
cognition and experience and how they function in the production of thematizations.  
If the object thus refers to the project and labor of the knower, it is because 
objective cognition is a relation with the being that one always goes beyond and 
that always is to be interpreted. The “what is it?” approaches “this” qua “that.” 
For to know objectively is to know the historical, the fact, the already happened, 
the already passed by. The historical is not defined by the past; both the historical 
and the past are defined as themes of which one can speak. They are thematized 
precisely because they no longer speak. The historical is forever absent from its 
very presence. This means that it disappears behind its manifestations; its 
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apparition is always superficial and equivocal; its origin, its principle, always 
elsewhere. It is a phenomenon—a reality without reality.  
(Levinas 1961, 65) 
 
 In this passage Levinas presents an argument against the confusion of narratives 
of experiences with the event of experience, which is always already past. Levinas is not 
preparing to lay claim to a more perfect epistemological method. Rather, he is sounding a 
note of caution regarding the tendency to apprehend the “said”, that is the thematization 
of a that which is “always elsewhere”, with essential meaning/Truth. This perspective 
calls into question the notion that there exists some avenue toward a genre of Platonic 
presence, wherein one might dig under the “superficial and equivocal” and get at the 
essential content of an experience. In the passage above, Levinas goes some way toward 
advancing the disenchantment of the drive toward totalizing epistemologies. Levinas’ 
description of thematizations exposes some of the assumptions which underlie the 
idealization of disengaged presence. An idealization exemplified in the Cogito. Since the 
Enlightenment, western philosophers have largely taken recourse to either empiricism or 
intuition to establish competing epistemologies tied to complimentary models of 
ontology.
8
 Levinas’ description of thematization problematizes both naturalistic and 
romantic models. As both the naturalists and the romantics lay claims binding knowledge 
to experience, through what I claim is a genre of intentionality.  
To help lay out what I intend here by the use of intentionality requires addressing 
the work of Edmund Husserl. In Husserl’s theory, intentionality is tied to consciousness 
and allows for the analysis and representation of intentional experience. Dan Zahavi 
illustrates this aspect of Husserl’s theory in his work Husserl’s phenomenology.  
                                                 
8
 Ernst Cassirer provides an uncommonly good analysis of the genealogy of modern western philosophical 
thought in his classic work The Philosophy of the Enlightenment.  Trans. Fritz C.A. Koelln, 1951. Boston: 
Beacon Press  
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According to Husserl, one can analyze every intentional experience from 
three different perspectives. One can focus on the physical process, and analyze 
the immanent (reelle) content of the act. One can analyze the meaning of the 
experience, and thereby investigate its intentional content. Finally, one can focus 
on that which is intended, that is, on the intentional object that the act is conscious 
of (cf. Hua 19/129). I have just mentioned that the intentional object, far from 
being some mysterious quasi-real entity, is simply identical with the intended 
object— but what about the intentional content? As already mentioned, the 
intentionality of consciousness is not caused by an external influence, but is due 
to internal moments in the experience itself. Briefly put, it is the intentional 
content that makes consciousness intentional, furnishing the act with its 
directedness. (Zahavi 2003, 22) 
 
Husserl’s notion of intentionality evinces a totalizing relationship between 
cognition and experience wherein agents are portrayed as present to their experiences 
(including, I would argue, those involving other agents) and are able to reduce their 
experiences to objects of intentional, mental representation. Contra Husserl, Levinas 
advanced an asymmetrical theory usurping the internalizing movement of intentionality. 
We have begun with the resistance of beings to totalization, with an 
untotaled multiplicity they constitute, the impossibility of their conciliation in the 
same.  
This impossibility of conciliation among beings, this radical heterogeneity, 
in fact indicates a mode of being produced and an ontology that is not equivalent 
to panoramic existence and its disclosure. For common sense but also for 
philosophy, from Plato to Heidegger, panoramic existence and its disclosure are 
equivalent to the very production of being, since truth or disclosure is at the same 
time the work or the essential virtue of being, the Sein of the Seiendes and of 
every human behavior it would in the last analysis govern… The break-up of 
totality, the denunciation of the panoramic structure of being, concerns the very 
existing of being and not the collocation or configuration of entities refractory to 
the system… One of the principle theses of this work is that the noesis-noema 
structure is not the primordial structure of intentionality (which is not equivalent 
to interpreting intentionality as a logical relation or as a causality.)  
                                                                                      (Levinas 1961, 294) 
 
 In the passage above Levinas begins to re-imagine intentionality. The 
complexities involved in Levinas’ endeavour are legion. However, for the purposes of my 
immediate argument, it suffices to understand the basic critique which Levinas advanced. 
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In “Section I: D. Separation and Absoluteness” of Totality and Infinity, Levinas disrupts 
the linearity underlying intentionality through a critical consideration of the trope of 
separation (Levinas 1961, 102-105). Levinas emphasizes the embodied character of the 
agent and their elemental separation from a heterogeneous exteriority, irreducible to their 
epistemic representations. Thus, intentionality is overwhelmed by separation and the 
constitutive power of representation is seriously undermined. Levinas outlines how the 
philosophical systems which seek a totalized model of ontology are vested in the 
metaphysics of unity. These discourses attempt, in their various ways, to invest agents 
with a measure of control grounded in temporal presence, and epistemological systems 
rooted in intentionality (ibid).  
In the wake of studying Levinas’ critique of intentionality I have been forced to 
confront the manner in which the totalizing drive of this genre of thinking has shaped my 
own philosophical perspective. As a student of philosophy in the 21
st
 century I have a 
healthy suspicion of modern philosophical movements such as structuralism and 
empiricism. However, I have come to realize that my own perspective is often framed by 
a linear, teleological conceptual framework. I have even interpreted radically disruptive 
theories such as deconstructionism according to an idealization of fragmentation. In this 
respect, it is also apparent that I have taken pluralism and heterogeneity, two of the great 
watchwords of postmodernism, as evincing an essential content. I have confused themes 
and thematizations with Reality.  
Levinas expends some energy addressing this confusion in his examination of the 
privileging of speech in western philosophy. Levinas plays out a dialectic juxtaposing 
speech with vision. In section three of Totality and Infinity Levinas describes the tie that 
35 
 
binds vision to both rationalistic and romantic theories of intuition. Levinas describes 
how intuition and vision operate in tandem in modern epistemological systems as reifying 
gaze and synthesizing grasp. This objectifying move allows for the reconciliation of 
disparate phenomena within a given totalizing world view via the intuitive gaze.  
Vision is not a transcendence. It ascribes a signification by the relation it makes 
possible. It opens nothing that, beyond the same, would be absolutely other, that 
is, in itself. Light conditions the relations between data; it makes possible the 
signification of objects that border one another. It does not enable one to approach 
them face to face. Intuition, taken in this very general sense, is not opposed to the 
thought of relations. It is already relationship, since it is vision; it catches sight of 
the space across which things are transported towards one another. Space, instead 
of transporting beyond, simply ensures the condition for the lateral signification 
of things within the same.” (Levinas 1961, 191)  
 
In this respect, the project of totalization is accomplished by the capacity of 
intuition/vision which allows for the reification of experiences into totalized 
epistemological models. These are the mechanics which Levinas describes as underlying 
the Sinngebung (Levinas 1961, 123), the route by which the knowing agent imbues 
meaning from their consciousness into the world of objects. In response to the totalizing 
drive of intuitive epistemologies, Levinas presents a concept of alterity which cripples the 
power of vision and intuition. The scope of alterity which Levinas introduces is not 
merely bent on usurping the Hegelian ideal of all-encompassing Geist. Rather, Levinas 
invokes an alterity which renders the trope of separation ingrained in the multiplicity of 
beings unconditionally based on the “impossibility of their conciliation in the same” 
(Levinas 1961, 294).  
The trope of alterity devised by Levinas is one oriented toward a dimension 
“otherwise than being”. This alterity evokes a sense of difference which is irreconcilable 
with the notion of totality. The stark character of Levinas’ alterity trope announces the 
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impossibility of being present. The description of alterity championed by Levinas is not 
limited to the hopelessness of objects being retained within a reciprocal epistemological 
totality. The tropes of separation and alterity also work to problematize agents’ 
objectifications of each other. Indeed, Levinas develops a description of radical 
difference, and irreconcilable separation, between the I and the Other. This drastic vision 
of alterity is articulated by Levinas in his assertion that “The ethical, beyond vision and 
certitude, delineates the structure of exteriority as such. Morality is not a branch of 
philosophy, but first philosophy” (Levinas 1961, 304).   
  For Levinas, any avenue left open to bridge the separation inherent in being is a 
capitulation to the Sinngebung. Levinas endeavours to block recourse to the Sinngebung 
through an emphasis on language. This is evinced in Levinas’ contention that separation 
is first and foremost exhibited through language. Language, in Levinas’ account, 
exemplifies expression and signification. In language separation is not bridged but rather 
amplified. Language is the vehicle whereby an(other) signifies in a fashion which 
preempts the very possibility of the Sinngebung. This preemption is made possible as 
language signals meaning from an(other) source, before meaning can be intuited and 
shaped through intentionality. In this fashion, Levinasian language usurps totalizing 
epistemological models through the radical separation intoned in the chasm separating 
being, and the “otherwise than being”. Levinas carefully defines the significance of 
expression in the section of Totality and Infinity entitled “Ethics and the Face”.  
This bond between expression and responsibility, this ethical condition or 
essence of language, this function of language prior to all disclosure of being and 
its cold splendor, permits us to extract language from subjection to a preexistent 
thought, where it would have but the servile function of translating that 
preexistent thought on the outside, or of universalizing its interior movements… 
Preexisting the disclosure of being in general taken as basis of knowledge and as 
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meaning of being is the relation with the existent that expresses himself; 
preexisting the plane of ontology is the ethical plane. (Levinas 1961, 200-201)  
   
The question of ethics will be taken up in the proceeding chapters. However, at 
this juncture, it is important to limit the discussion to the implications that Levinas’ 
assertions hold for the description of language and philosophy. Levinas’ critique of 
intuition and intentionality is significant because it puts into question the scope of what it 
is possible to know through the myopia inherent in separation. Levinas renders the ideal 
of a total, unified, “panoramic” epistemology not only absurd, but indeed dangerous. 
Levinas’ arguments make it clear that to achieve such an ideal would necessitate a violent 
subjugation of difference via the silencing of the expression of the other which presents 
the only feasible way to ignore separation. In Richard Cohen’s forward to Emmanuel 
Levinas’ second masterwork, Otherwise than Being, Cohen asserts that while Totality 
and Infinity focused upon “ethical alterity”, Otherwise than Being is concerned with 
“ethical subjectivity” (Levinas 1974, xii).  
Levinas made it abundantly clear in Totality and Infinity that the alterity of the 
other is unconditional. The extent of the separation between the I and the other is not 
something that can be described as possessing a quality. Subjectivity, however, is a more 
intimate trope directly related to the thinking agent. Commensurately, a shift in Levinas’ 
language takes place between Totality and Infinity and Otherwise than Being. Levinas 
moves from a speculative discourse describing the “infinity of expression to the 
inexhaustible response of the self as saying” (Levinas 1974, xiii). The question of 
language looms large in Otherwise than Being. Levinas also evinced a strong concern for 
language in Totality and Infinity. However, it is clear that in Otherwise than Being he is 
more urgently occupied with delineating how the language of ontology, thematization, 
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and being, is influenced by the plane he characterizes as “otherwise” to, and “beyond” 
being.  
In Totality and Infinity Levinas argued that responsibility structures language. 
However, Levinas remained silent on the subject of how we are able to talk about this 
relation, “founded” in the ethical dimension which is “otherwise” than being, which one 
would conclude is beyond our comprehension. How do we talk about the ethical while 
respecting the impossibility of reducing ethics to knowledge? I believe Levinas provides 
a possible framework for this difficult endeavour in his elaboration of time and 
temporalization, wherein he discusses “diachrony”, a concept which is helpful for 
thinking about philosophy, ethics, subjectivity and language.  
 In “diachrony” Levinas introduced a trope allowing for an awareness of an 
“otherwise than being”, without any commensurate claim regarding an essential content. 
Levinas draws an important distinction between the “otherwise than being”, and the 
simple negation of “not being”. It is crucial that “otherwise” not be confused with the 
negation of being, as negation only ever creates an interval which is immediately filled in 
by being. Levinas lays out this scheme in the first chapter of Otherwise than Being, 
wherein he presents a description of  “l’il y a” or, the “there is”. Levinas states that “The 
there is fills the void left by the negation of being” (Levinas 1974, 4). This is positively 
portrayed as the “conatus of beings” (ibid).  
Conatus facilitates a description of the persistence of being upon the “ontological 
plane” wherein the struggle between egoisms is played out as “each against all, in the 
multiplicity of allergic egoisms which are at war with one another and are thus together” 
(ibid). This offers a stunning exposition of totality as a strange mode of “togetherness” 
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founded in the “extreme synchronism of war” (ibid). Levinas’ discussion here establishes 
the specter of “synchronism”, against which he can play off the concept of “diachrony”. 
In “synchronism” Levinas finds a trope well suited to the metaphorical structure of the 
conatus which fuels the desire for a totalizing epistemology. The “synchronism of war” 
even extends into the respite of peace, wherein open conflict is transmuted by 
“calculation, mediation and politics” into a new form of struggle in the realm of 
“exchange and commerce” (ibid). 
 Levinas’ argument focuses upon the trope of “synchrony” in being, where even 
the negation of being is merely the perpetuation of “essence”. To understand what is 
“otherwise” than being, yet somehow signified in it, requires the possibility of 
“diachrony”. “Diachrony” is that which signals “a lapse of time that does not return, a 
diachrony refractory to all synchronization, a transcending diachrony” (Levinas 1974, 9). 
This “lapse” is signified by a rift which upsets the normative understanding of time, 
memory and knowledge as components in a reciprocal system making possible the 
“recuperation of all divergencies, through retention, memory and history…nothing is lost, 
everything is presented or represented, everything is consigned and lends itself to 
inscription, or is synthesized or, as Heidegger would say, assembled” (ibid). The 
diachronic may be described as disrupting intuition and intentionality through loss. 
Levinas uses the trope of the “diachronic” to signal an “anarchical passed”. The anarchic 
in Levinas’ theory is understood as transcendent with respect to the present; signaled 
within the present but not in any way related to the present as an origin, or within the 
reciprocity of an “ontological relation” (ibid).  
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Levinas’ description of diachrony is central to what he sets out as the task of 
philosophy. Levinas asserts that “the pre-original element of saying (the anarchical, the 
non-original, as we designate it) can be led to betray itself by showing itself in a theme.” 
Levinas focuses upon language in Otherwise than Being as the vehicle through which the 
aforementioned betrayal might be “reduced” (Levinas 1974, 7). There is a small but 
important passage in footnote five of chapter one of Otherwise than Being which sheds 
light on Levinas’ discussion of language and philosophy. In it, Levinas describes how 
“logic interrupted by the structures of what is beyond being which show themselves in it 
does not confer a dialectical structure to philosophical propositions. It is the superlative, 
more than the negation of categories, which interrupts systems, as though the logical 
order and the being it succeeds in espousing retained the superlative which exceeds them. 
In subjectivity the superlative is the exorbitance of a null site” (Levinas 1974, 187).  
In this passage Levinas begins to strip away the façade of totality which colours 
the synchronic perspective offered by the vision/intuition model discussed above. 
Levinas’ notion of the “superlative” places limits upon what can be synchronized by 
vision/intuition. As that which is “otherwise than being”, cannot be represented in a 
“dialectical structure”. The “otherwise than being” which Levinas motions toward is at 
once beyond articulation, yet echoed in accounts nevertheless. The vision/intuition model 
rejects the possibility of something other than being that is not negation, i.e. not being, 
which is still a party to the dialectic of being. Levinas’ arguments are challenging in part 
because they hinge upon allusions to that which is “otherwise than being”, and so 
naturally resists any attempt at logical analysis. In Levinas’ work philosophy is returned 
to the scandal of skepticism. Herein lays the challenge for using a Levinasian concept of 
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language in the practice of philosophy. The crux of the challenge rests in apprehending 
how a language steeped in thematization, which always threatens to pour over into 
reification, might still be helpful for describing experiences. In skepticism, Levinas offers 
us an example of a discourse capable of unsaying itself. 
Can this saying and this being unsaid be assembled, can they be at the 
same time? In fact to require this simultaneity is already to reduce being’s other to 
being and not being. We must stay with the extreme situation of a diachronic 
thought. Skepticism, at the dawn of philosophy, set forth and betrayed the 
diachrony of this very conveying and betraying. To conceive the otherwise than 
being requires, perhaps, as much audacity as skepticism shows, when it does not 
hesitate to affirm the impossibility of statement while venturing to realize this 
impossibility by the very statement of this impossibility. If, after the innumerable 
“irrefutable” refutations which logical thought sets against it, skepticism has the 
gall to return (and it always returns as philosophy’s illegitimate child), it is 
because in the contradiction which logic sees in it the “at the same time” of the 
contradictories is missing, because a secret diachrony commands this ambiguous 
or enigmatic way of speaking, and because in general signification signifies 
beyond synchrony, beyond essence.  (Levinas 1974, 7)   
Levinas argues strongly in Totality and Infinity that the other defies 
representation. If we accept the premise of ethics as first philosophy then we are 
compelled to re-imagine the work properly understood as philosophical. The task is no 
longer to conceive of an object, which would then be represented, synthesized, and 
synchronized within a totalizing model of epistemology. Rather, Levinas asks that we 
restrict our articulations to a description of a trace. This requires the development of a 
vocabulary for describing the trace.
9
 In posing the question “Does the beyond being 
which philosophy states, and states by reason of the very transcendence of the beyond, 
fall unavoidably into the forms of the ancillary statement?” (Levinas 1974, 7)  Levinas 
                                                 
9
 Jacque Derrida evinced similar concerns regarding language in his theory of deconstructionism. See 
Jacques Derrida’s Of Grammatology (1976) John Hopkins University Press. 
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attaches the trope of transcendence to his theory. Consequently, any consideration of a 
possible vocabulary for describing the trace necessitates a reflection on transcendence.     
Levinas’ use of the term transcendence in Otherwise than Being does not hue to 
either a traditionally theological, nor an idealist interpretation. In these classical 
frameworks transcendence often signifies the human agent as achieving either oneness 
with a divine, or access to a world consciousness. In both scenarios the agent ascends to a 
higher state of consciousness. Levinas’ notion of transcendence differs from these 
paradigms. Levinas uses transcendence to allude to the trace of the “beyond” which 
echoes in the “said”. It is the trace of the “beyond” which troubles agents’ “psyches”.  
The said shows, but betrays (shows by betraying) the dieresis, the disorder 
of the psyche which animates the consciousness of, and which, in the 
philosophical order of the said, is called transcendence. But it is not in the said 
that the psyche signifies, even though it is manifested there. Signification is the 
one-for-the-other which characterizes an identity that does not coincide with 
itself… The psyche or animation is the way a relationship between uneven terms, 
without any common time, arrives at relationship. Non-objectifiable, non-
contemporaneous, it can only signify non-indifference. An animate body or an 
incarnate identity is the signifyingness of this non-indifference. (Levinas 1974, 
70-71) 
In this passage Levinas sketches the broad outlines for a philosophical language 
describing the “relation without relation” between being and the “beyond”. As agents, we 
are irreconcilably separated from any absolute presence to, or totalizing knowledge of, 
both other beings and the saying which subtends the said. Yet, despite this separation, we 
can in no way be said to be indifferent toward these unknown others. The condition of 
non-indifference is central to why I find Levinas’ depiction of the job of philosophy so 
important. Levinas explicitly invokes philosophy as the frame of his inquiry. Further, he 
grounds philosophy in its primary mode of engagement represented by the simple 
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“what?”, in the “origin of all thought…[going] back to ontology, to the understanding of 
the being of entities, the understanding of essence” (Levinas 1974, 24). Yet, the “what?” 
is articulated by an (animate/incarnated) agent. Based on this model of embodied inquiry 
I contend that the “what?”, and thus philosophy, are rooted in non-indifference.     
 One of the dangers represented by naturalist philosophy is that the quest for a 
disengaged perspective actively resists non-indifference. In Levinas’ philosophy, 
however, there is no point at which the agent, or their inquiry (the “what?”), is 
disengaged from being. In Levinas, the activity of philosophy is entrenched in 
engagement, in the question “what?”  Following Levinas, we must accept that philosophy 
will always remain embedded within being, and that consequently, all philosophical 
argument represents only the thematization of being. That in asking “what?” we 
acknowledge that the “silent coming and going from question to response, with which 
Plato characterized thought, already refers to a plot in which is tied up the node of 
subjectivity, by the other commanding the same” (Levinas 1974, 25).    
 Naturalist philosophy is invested in a concept of the manifestation of being which 
is always a relationship predicated on being present. Subjectivity, in the Levinasian 
sense, disrupts the ideal of presence through the trope of diachrony, the “otherwise than 
being”, and the an-archical past which is signified by the metaphor of the trace. Levinas 
imposes diachrony upon subjectivity. The troubling of the “psyche” which diachrony 
engenders also conditions the “what?” of philosophy. In this tenor, the “what?” of 
philosophy begins inquiry with a recognition of the “other in the same” (ibid) Levinas 
asserts that philosophy, as questioning, evinces how in subjectivity the other “disturbs” 
the peace of the same, causes a “restlessness”, “an-archical” to consciousness, signified 
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only by questioning. However, as soon as an answer is constructed the subject is back 
again dealing in themes wherein “A word is a nomination, as much as a denomination, a 
consecrating of the “this as this” or a “this as that”…a kerygma at the bottom of a fiat” 
(Levinas 1974, 36). However, the questioning itself might occasion a lapse in the 
persistence of being, a hedge against the desire for disengagement.  
In asking “what?” the synchronism of thematization is disrupted. Before a suitable 
theme can be supplied to repair the schism in synchronization, Levinas asserts that, the 
lapse engendered by questioning “bears witness to an extreme passivity of saying behind 
the saying that becomes a simple correlative of the said - the passivity of exposure to 
suffering and trauma, which the present work aims to thematize” (Levinas 1974, 189 ft. 
note 25).  
 This passage evinces two critical features of Levinas’ project. The first is that, as 
a philosopher, Levinas explicitly recognizes his work as thematization. Yet, he still holds 
out hope that philosophy can somewhat mitigate the necessary corruption and betrayal of 
the “saying” inscribed in the “said”. Levinas believes philosophy can help in the partial 
“unsaying of the said” (Levinas 1974, 181); attending to the trace within language while 
securing against its reification in a totalizing epistemology. This is demonstrated in 
Levinas’ statement that it is necessary that “the saying call for philosophy in order that 
the light that occurs not congeal into essence what is beyond essence, and that the 
hypostasis of an eon not be set up as an idol” (Levinas 1974, 44). Philosophy can 
accomplish this task through careful attention to diachrony. Thus, preventing the said 
from synthesizing the echo of the saying into the presence of speech, writing, and the plot 




In this chapter I have endeavoured to frame a comparative, and complimentary, 
discussion of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s and Emmanuel Levinas’ respective descriptions of 
language, critiques of epistemology, and visions for philosophy. The conclusion of this 
discussion is not meant to lead to a harmonious synthesis of their observations. Nor, 
would I deign to claim that mine is a definitive presentation of their respective views of 
the subjects at hand. Rather, what I seek to tease out of this discussion is a prism through 
which the reader can approach the philosophical arguments which follow in the 
proceeding chapters.  
From Wittgenstein we have received a vision of languages as grammatically 
particular to the forms of life within which they are commensurable. Levinas, in turn, has 
presented us with a theory of language which challenges the monological tenor of 
totalizing epistemological models. Wittgenstein emphasizes pluralism; Levinas 
commands our attention toward asymmetry. I contend that both Wittgenstein and Levinas 
offer examples of limited, revisable, fragmented and particular philosophical 
vocabularies. At this point it is important to note that neither Wittgenstein nor Levinas 
perceived their inquiries as leading toward a nihilistic view of philosophy and language; 
quite the opposite, in fact. Following Levinas and Wittgenstein, I add my voice to the call 
to abandon the quixotic quest to defeat ambiguity, and thus know the world objectively 
(to possess it). 
In surrendering the aspiration toward total knowledge, western philosophers 
would effectively liberate themselves from the Sisyphean task of designing elaborate 
epistemologies which, inevitably, roll back over their architects whenever inevitable 
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paradoxes are encountered. Languages are composed of metaphors and tropes. We live in 
languages. The tropes and metaphors which structure our understanding of our different 
forms of experience are dynamic, and to a greater or lesser extent, opaque. Languages are 
embedded in the experiences they describe, and thus can never attain to the disengaged 
presence required to objectively assign essential meanings to experiences as said. To 
surrender the aspiration toward totalizing epistemologies is to gain the richness of 
particular, nuanced, and limited descriptive vocabularies. It is to gain access to a whole 
palette of potentially divergent meanings rather than having to champion one or another 
ultimate meaning for good and for all. In this respect, I argue that the visions of language 
and philosophy presented in the works of Levinas and Wittgenstein represent an 
optimistic and hopeful direction for western philosophy. 
 The understanding of languages as composed of tropes and metaphors, all the way 
down, as it were, also affords space for the re-imagination of vocabularies marginalized 
in western philosophical discourse. One such vocabulary is that of religious languages. I 
must make it clear that I am in no way arguing for a return (which would be impossible in 
any case) to some orthodox, pre-Enlightenment dogmatic grammar. Rather, in 
approaching the understanding of languages as metaphorical, we may avoid the pitfalls of 
essentialism. This is not to say that for some, perhaps many religious agents, the theistic 
content in their descriptions of their experiences is suddenly bereft of meaning. Only that 
said meaning is not an essential content. It is imperative that philosophers recognize that 
languages are intractably embedded within the particular experiences they seek to 
describe, while commensurately able to express a plurality of different meanings 
depending upon the circumstances of their articulation. Under this rubric, religious 
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languages are strengthened. This strength derives from their being understood as 
providing a descriptive vocabulary which strongly resonates with the experiences of 
agents without seeking to lay claim to any expressive exclusivity. The same 
understanding applies to other forms of life; sciences both natural and social, sports, 
theater, etc.  
As long as no totalizing claim is attached to a particular language we ought to 
respect its suitability for describing a particular form of life based on its actual usage 
among agents. It is also important that I address the notion of permeability between 
different languages which is observed in the use of analogies. This crossing-over of 
tropes and metaphors is a great resource for philosophy, as philosophical languages thrive 
on the borrowing of tropes and metaphors from the wide gamut of diverse languages. 
On Fideism 
 I am aware that my discussion of the particularity of languages, and my focus on 
religious languages, hints at what Kai Nielsen and others have coined Wittgensteinian 
fideism. In anticipation of this critique, I will briefly address Nielsen’s concerns. The 
matter of Wittgensteinian fideism emerged in a 1967 article of the same name written by 
Nielsen. In the piece Nielsen argued that philosophers of religion have employed 
Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language to perpetuate a fideistic defense of religious belief. 
Nielsen asserts that when subjected to an analysis within the “overall universe of 
discourse of which religious discourse is a part, it may still be found that religious 
discourse, like discourse about fairies, is incoherent” (Nielsen and Phillips 2005, 35). 
Further, Nielsen asserts that only through an artificial “compartmentalization” of what he 
dubs “God-talk” is religious belief saved from having to provide a critical account of its 
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content. Nielsen concludes that “In this way religious discourse is a kind of protected 
discourse; it is sui generis” (Nielsen and Phillips 2005, 56). Hence, the alleged fideism. 
Nielsen’s essay constituted the opening salvo in a debate which spanned many years and 
saw the production of much philosophical argument on both sides.  
 The opposition to Nielsen’s critique was championed by the philosopher of 
religions D.Z. Phillips. Phillips disputed Nielsen’s argument and advanced a critique of 
what he claimed formed the assumptions upon which Nielsen’s analysis was predicated. 
Phillips accused Nielsen of misunderstanding Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language by 
requiring that “a critical account” be part and parcel of religious discourse. Phillips 
grounded his charge in Nielsen’s own endorsement of Wittgenstein’s “desire to be open 
to the conceptual and grammatical variety to be found in our discourse” (Nielsen and 
Phillips 2005, 83). Phillips makes a good case that Wittgensteinian philosophy sets out a 
task of elucidating human practices through engaged contemplation and the articulation 
of better descriptions.  
 In this framework, there is no requirement for discourses to include justification 
arguments qua “critical account”. According to Phillips, Wittgensteinians properly 
understood, follow Wittgenstein’s claim “that what we need to meet our philosophical 
puzzlement already lies before us. We are not awaiting new information. Nothing is 
hidden. It is in that sense only that philosophy leaves everything where it is” (Nielsen and 
Phillips 2005, 87-88). Commensurately, philosophers of religion who follow this credo 
are bound to reflect on religious discourse within the parameters of its grammatical 
particularity. This does not preclude comparison or analogy with other discourse, only 
that the coherence of the discourse does not depend upon a universally comprehensible 
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“critical account”/justification.  Following Phillips, religious discourse can be critiqued 
but it cannot be dismissed as incoherent based on the notion of an overarching, universal 
criteria of coherency. Such a universal standard, governing all of our different “language 
games”,  requires recourse to what I argue is the violence inherent in totalizing 
epistemological models.  
 The notions of universality, coherency/incoherency, and the particularity of 
different discourses are central to what I perceive as the thoroughgoing misunderstanding 
which plagues the debate over the specter of Wittgensteinian fideism. Phillips thinks he 
has caught Nielsen out in a paradox. Phillips attributes this to Nielsen’s 
acknowledgement that language possesses no absolute underlying logic, while 
simultaneously indicting religious discourse through an appeal to just such a standard. 
Far from a paradox, I perceive Nielsen to be bringing to light the ambiguity which 
characterizes the permeability of different discourses.  
 I do not believe that Phillips’ portrayal of Nielsen as caught out in a paradox is 
accurate. Nielsen supports the Wittgensteinian disavowal of a linguistic meta-logic. 
However, this does not intuit that Nielsen’s framing discourse as existing in an “overall 
universe” is totally wrongheaded. In confusing these two distinct notions as mutually 
exclusive, Phillips fails to recognize the contingencies of our collective lived experiences. 
I contend that we do operate within a “universe of discourse(s)” wherein our statements 
are held to a variety of particular criteria, native to the “rules” of the language games 
involved. Nielsen’s mistake is not in recognizing the “universe” of discourses, but rather 
apprehending in it an essential and universal criterion of coherence.  
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 The character of the universal criterion upon which Nielsen bases his appeal for 
coherency can be elucidated through the terms he uses to portray religious discourse as 
incoherent. His main argument rests on verificationist grounds, despite his protestations 
otherwise. This is borne out in Nielsen’s claim “that I have found a common criterion for 
factual significance – for making a true or false claim about the world – and a general 
method for assessing beliefs of any kind, to wit, wide and general reflective equilibrium” 
(Nielsen and Phillips 2005, 123). Nielsen’s invocation of the need for “factual” evidence 
leading to “true” or “false” conclusions evinces an empirical approach to the analysis of 
discourses. Nielsen’s “method” affords an insight into how the heterogeneity of different 
discourses may be reified based upon the reduction to a homogenous taxonomy rooted in 
“a common criterion for factual significance”. On these grounds I feel that it is 
reasonable to include Nielsen within the camp of philosophical naturalism.  
 Phillips’ critique of Nielsen’s arguments also highlights Nielsen’s pre – 
occupation with a metaphysical and foundational view of religious discourse. A view 
which Phillips convincingly portrays as extraneous given that Wittgensteinian 
philosophers are not in the business of investigating justifications, but rather seek to 
describe “what already lies before us” (Nielsen and Phillips 2005, 88). In pursuing this 
critique Phillips remains faithful to Wittgenstein’s emphasis on the limited, descriptive 
role of philosophical inquiry. Upholding Wittgenstein’s refusal to, “look for proofs for 
the existence of God.”, or, “to look for philosophical foundations and justifications for 
religious belief” (Nielsen and Phillips 2005, 40).  
 In turning away from the grammar of justification, and verification, D.Z. Phillips 
orients the contemporary practice of the philosophy of religions in the west toward a 
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concern with “what already lies before us”. Religious discourses are readily observable in 
use across myriad cultures. The agents who engage in these discourses range from the 
devoutly orthodox to the avowedly secular. In certain contexts, the tropes and metaphors 
native to religious discourses may offer agents the most helpful language to describe the 
feelings engendered by a given experience. Commensurately, I argue that for certain 
problems encountered in moral philosophy, religious discourses can offer particularly 
helpful descriptive vocabularies. As demonstrated by Emmanuel Levinas in his re-
imagining of phenomenology and ethics, religious vocabularies evince a unique capacity 
for describing the more numinous features of being. Likewise, certain religious tropes can 
help remind us of the finite limits of agency.  
 The philosopher attuned to the vision of language I have outlined in this chapter 
has recourse to a broad descriptive vocabulary for contributing to the unceasing 
discussion regarding the good life in the west. Equipped with a keen understanding of the 
genealogy of the tropes and metaphors particular to a given language game, said 
philosopher is also in a position to avoid what critics such as Fredric Jameson, have 
lamented is the “disappearance of a sense of history, the way in which our entire 
contemporary social system has little by little begun to lose its capacity to retain its own 
past” (Jameson 1983, 125). A menace Jameson labels “historical amnesia” (ibid).  
 The philosopher who abides by the understanding of language which I have 
argued for would be well aware of the historical implications attached to specific forms 
of narrative. However, such philosophers would also reject any essential claims 
traditionally conveyed through said narratives. In this sense, the tropes and metaphors 
borrowed from religious vocabularies could be used to provide descriptive interpretations 
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of moral and ethical problems, emphasizing the finitude of the agent in the face of the 
abundance of all that is other. In this fashion, religious tropes and metaphors can be used 
to discuss moral and ethical questions in a manner which guards against any description 
being resolved into a totalized epistemological model.  
 To be sure, the risk always exists that any language may be used in a totalizing 
mode. However, if we take seriously the insights advanced in our exploration of the ideas 
regarding language and philosophy advanced in the respective works of Levinas and 
Wittgenstein, I contend that we might guard against the ever-present danger of slipping 
into a totalizing tone. It is with this critical attitude in mind that I embark upon my (very 
particular) discussion, critique, and re-imagining of the moral philosophy of Charles 





















             Chapter Two 
 
Sources of Sources 
 
What do I mean by a moral ideal? I mean a picture of what a better or 
higher mode of life would be, where “better” and “higher” are defined not in 
terms of what we happen to desire or need, but offer a standard of what we ought 
to desire. (Taylor 1991b, 16) 
 
Any consideration of the good life necessarily includes attention toward the moral 
ideal, or ideals, which command one’s fealty, and around which one feels their life must 
gravitate in order to be understood as authentic. So says the moral theory advanced in the 
philosophical work of Charles Taylor regarding the conditions which frame reflection 
upon the moral character of one’s life (Taylor 1989b, 74). I have no doubt the passage 
quoted above would elicit hot debate from proponents of oppositional schools of moral 
philosophy. Pragmatists could charge that the statement is idealistic and naïve, out of 
touch with the contingencies of experience. Commensurately, proceduralists might 
denounce it as too abstract, noting the absence of a determinate arithmetic for ethical 
calculations. Finally, humanists may well be troubled by use of the term “moral ideal” 
which could be inferred as suggesting a source other than human.  
Charles Taylor recognized the potential backlash that such a “picture” of moral 
thinking might illicit. Consequently, he went to great lengths to address all of these points 
of contention in laying out his model of moral identity development in his seminal work, 
Sources of the Self: The Making of Modern Identity. My aim in this chapter of my 
dissertation is to elucidate the relationship between the concepts of meaning, knowledge, 
language and identity, which inform Taylor’s project in Sources of the Self. Toward this 
end, I will examine the various philosophical figures whose theories informed Taylor’s 
project in Sources of the Self.  I will bolster my presentation with a detailed consideration 
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of the secondary literature pertinent to an analysis of Taylor’s philosophical arguments, 
and his general philosophical disposition. This exercise will tender what I apprehend to 
be the sources for Sources, as it were. 
In order to properly grasp what is at stake in Taylor’s moral philosophy we must 
take up his arguments as they are presented in the first part of Sources of the Self, 
“Identity and the Good”. In light of the title of my dissertation it will come as no great 
shock that the element of Taylor’s theory that I find most compelling, is his concept of 
the “best account”. A trope Taylor borrows from Alasdair MacIntyre (Taylor 1995, 52). 
Taylor transforms the “best account” into the “best account principle” (Taylor 1989b, 
74), which I contend constitutes the fulcrum around which the whole moral theory 
advanced in Sources turns. Uniquely, in the whole corpus of Taylor’s philosophical 
writings, it is only in the first part of Sources that Taylor presents a really lucid 
description of the “best account principle” as it pertains to a universal vision of moral 
ontology and the self (ibid).  
The division between the first and second parts of Sources is a familiar theme in 
any discussion of Sources of the Self, as it was a separation first proposed in the preface 
of the tome by the author himself. Taylor sets up Sources as an “attempt to articulate and 
write a history of the modern identity” (Taylor 1989b, ix). Taylor explains that his 
writing about the history of the modern agent is necessitated by the dearth of substantive 
considerations of the “grandeur et misère” pervading the transition to modernity and the 
development of the modern self (Taylor 1989b, x). To remedy what Taylor perceives as a 
blind spot in the history of ideas, he proposes in Sources to “define the modern identity in 
describing its genesis” (ibid). This is no small task, and the sheer breadth of the book 
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combined with the astoundingly attentive tone of its descriptive prose, attests to the 
difficulty of Taylor’s endeavour. Yet, there is a disingenuous note at play in Taylor’s 
prefatory comments.  
In describing the raison d'être of Sources as a philosophical and historical 
investigation into the makings of modern identity, Taylor claims that the first part of the 
book, “Identity and the Good” (which is entirely occupied with theoretical arguments and 
critiques of contemporary moral philosophy) was necessitated as a mere base for the 
historical work which unfolds in the subsequent parts of the book. These parts, two 
through five, deal respectively with “Inwardness”, “The Affirmation of Ordinary Life”, 
“The Voice of Nature”, and “Subtler Languages”. Taylor explains: 
because my entire way of proceeding involves mapping connections between 
senses of the self and moral visions, between identity and the good, I didn’t feel I 
could launch into this study without some preliminary discussion of these links. 
This seemed all the more necessary in that moral philosophies dominant today 
tend to obscure these connections. In order to see them, we have to appreciate the 
place of the good, in more than one sense, in our moral outlook and life. But this 
is what contemporary moral philosophies have most trouble admitting. The book 
therefore begins with a section which tries to make the case very briefly for a 
picture of the relation between self and morals, which I then draw on in the rest of 
the work. Those who are utterly bored by modern philosophy might want to skip 
part I. Those who are bored by history, if by some mistake they find this work in 
their hands, should read nothing else. (ibid)  
 
 Oddly, Taylor suggests that the first part of Sources might be “skipped” by those 
of a purely historical bent. Yet, Taylor’s own reasoning for including “Identity and the 
Good”  in Sources, indeed for inaugurating the project with it, puts the lie to his casual 
suggestion that one need not deal with it before proceeding to the “main body of the 
book” (ibid). Clearly, the philosophical critique and argument advanced by Taylor in 
“Identity and the Good” is integral for appreciating the whole of the project. Further, I 
argue that the theoretical content explored in “Identity and the Good” constitutes the most 
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important part of Taylor’s work in writing Sources of the Self. I would even suggest that, 
the historical content presented in the latter parts of the book, actually function as a 
historical basis for the arguments and critiques conducted by Taylor in the first part of 
Sources.  
To bear this out one need only tease out the obvious rhetorical content in Taylor’s 
preamble. Taylor claims that the theoretical discussion carried out in “Identity and the 
Good” is necessitated by the way in which “moral philosophies dominant today tend to 
obscure” (ibid) the connections, which Taylor asserts, exist between what he terms, 
matter-of-factly, “identity and the good”. Taylor claims that it is due to this obfuscation 
in modern philosophy that he is forced to commence his historical project “with a section 
which tries to make the case very briefly for a picture of the relation between self and 
morals, which I then draw on in the rest of the work” (ibid). Here, it is not clear whether 
Taylor is being willfully deceitful, or overly cunning. The investigation into the relation 
between the “self and morals” has fuelled the greater part of his philosophical life, and 
“Identity and the Good” represents, what I contend, to be Taylor’s most thoroughgoing 
theoretical discourse on the subject; so why sell it so short? Taylor suggests that part one 
can be approached separately form the rest of the book, and vice-versa. Yet, Taylor’s 
own reasoning for writing part one indicates that this cannot possibly be the case.  
Nevertheless, for all his muddying of the importance of the first part of Sources, 
the critique and argument carried out therein neither lacks for clarity, nor pulls any 
punches. It is in my opinion and, at the risk of sounding sycophantic, a philosophical tour 
de force. I will spend considerable time in this chapter assembling a model of Taylor’s 
moral philosophy through a review of his critiques, interpretations, and arguments, as 
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they appear in a variety of his essays. This review will help the reader approaching 
Sources of the Self unequipped with a genealogy of Taylor’s own sources to understand  
the profound importance of the relationship between “identity and the good” in Taylor’s 
philosophy. 
Following upon the theme of the previous chapter, it seems fitting that we embark 
upon our exploration of Taylor’s thought with some prefatory remarks regarding Taylor’s 
perspectives on language and philosophy. Several years after the publication of Sources 
of the Self, a collection of Taylor’s essays appeared under the title Philosophical 
Arguments. Although these essays were first published in a variety of different venues, 
some prior to the completion of Sources and some after, their assemblage in one 
compendium has proven very helpful for delineating Taylor’s stance on certain aspects of 
language theory and philosophical inquiry. Despite the remarkably lucid and flowing 
style of Taylor’s prose, reading Sources can, occasionally, prove quite vexing. Taylor has 
a habit of raising certain philosophical themes, and then demurring from their analysis. 
The result is that Taylor’s position on a variety of philosophical topics, ranging from 
phenomenology to religion, is often very opaque. However, the essays collected in 
Philosophical Arguments offer an excellent resource for elucidating Taylor’s 
philosophical disposition. I believe that no reading of Sources of the Self is complete 
without a commensurate reading of Philosophical Arguments.  
In this spirit, let us set out on an exploration of what I consider to be the key 
essays from this collection necessary for framing Taylor’s work in Sources. A student of 
philosophy taking even the most cursory look through the table of contents in 
Philosophical Arguments cannot help but notice three names included in the titles of the 
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essays. Two of these names belong to heavyweights of 20
th
 century western philosophy, 
Martin Heidegger and Ludwig Wittgenstein. The third is that of an often overlooked 18
th
 
century thinker, Johann Gottfried Herder. Once immersed in the essays themselves, the 
reader will encounter other philosophers whose work has strongly influenced Taylor’s 
thought; philosophers such as Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Immanuel Kant, and 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty. Together, these thinkers represent what I consider to be (to 
varying degrees) the most significant influences upon Taylor’s thinking in “Identity and 
the Good”.    
On Herder 
 One of the main themes of the moral theory Taylor advances in “Identity and the 
Good” is the tremendous power and importance of articulation (Taylor 1989b, 9-11). The 
significance which Taylor places upon articulation in Sources is rooted in his overarching 
concern with the linguistic dimension of phenomenology. According to Taylor, the 
philosopher who revolutionized the inquiry into the contours and vicissitudes of language 
in the west is Johann Gottfried Herder. It is Herder, Taylor claims, who functions as the 
“hinge figure who originates a fundamentally different way of thinking about language 
and meaning” (Taylor 1995, 79). Taylor devotes an entire essay to the significance of 
Herder’s expressivist contribution to western thought. The title of Taylor’s essay, “The 
Importance of Herder”, speaks to the esteem within which he holds this often overlooked 
thinker. Herder’s expressivism does not constitute a systematic theory. It is rather, a 
critical response to the arguments concerning the origins of language advanced by the 
likes of his fellow 18
th
 century philosopher Étienne Bonnot de Condillac. The main 
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themes of Herder’s expressivist approach to language are background, situatedness, and 
reflection. 
Herder’s first important insight was to see that expression constitutes the 
linguistic dimension. This emerged from his understanding of linguistic thought 
as situated. Reflection arises in an animal form that is already dealing with the 
world around it. Language comes about as a new, reflective stance toward things. 
It arises among our earlier stances toward objects of desire or fear, to things 
figuring as obstacles, supports, and the like. Our stances are literally bodily 
attitudes or actions on or toward objects. The new stance can’t be in its origins 
entirely unconnected with bodily posture or action. But it can’t be an action just 
like the others, since those are definable outside the linguistic dimension. It has to 
be seen rather as an expressive action, one that both actualizes this stance of 
reflection and also presents it to others in public space. It brings about the stance 
whereby we relate to things in the linguistic dimension. (Taylor 1995, 92)    
 
Addressing Taylor’s essay on Herder is essential for understanding the concept of 
articulation underlying Taylor’s use of the term in Sources; as expressing “the moral 
intuitions I have, by what I am morally moved by” (Taylor 1989b, 73). A consideration 
of Herder’s influence upon Taylor is also important to comprehend how Taylor, trained 
in the Anglo-American philosophical tradition, comes to include intuitive feeling as a 
core component in his moral philosophy. After all, it was still rather unseemly in the 
1950’s and 1960’s for an Oxford man to delve too enthusiastically into the romantic 
musings of the Sturm und Drang. With regard to Taylor’s Germanic proclivities, it must 
be noted that he never defected from the post-Enlightenment analytic tradition. Rather, he 
managed to tentatively straddle the channel between England and the Continent. 
Somewhat unconventionally, Taylor assumed what Nicholas H. Smith described as the 
role of “the leading analytic exponent of Continental philosophy”(Smith 2002, 10). Thus, 
the question becomes; what element in Herder’s expressivist philosophy is it that Taylor 
found so compelling?  
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The importance of Herder, for Taylor’s development, stems from what Taylor 
believes is the indirect, yet profound influence, which expressivism comes to exert upon 
Ludwig Wittgenstein’s observations in Philosophical Investigations. A celebrated text 
which emerged over a century after Herder’s own works had been largely consigned to 
the margins of western philosophical memory. As an Oxford trained philosopher, the 
roots of Taylor’s appreciation for Wittgenstein’s work are not so difficult to discern. 
Wittgenstein had a presence at neighboring Cambridge, on and off, for much of his 
tumultuous scholarly career. Further, while attending Oxford, Taylor studied under 
Wittgenstein’s one time student, and devoted literary trustee and translator, G.E.M. 
Anscombe. Like Taylor, Wittgenstein’s work overlapped the analytic/continental divide. 
However, unlike Taylor, Wittgenstein might better be characterized as having undertaken 
a conversion. Wittgenstein’s transformation is evinced by his shift from a genre of logical 
fundamentalism in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, to something more in line with 
Herder’s expressivist sentiment in his posthumous Philosophical Investigations.  
In “The Importance of Herder” Taylor endeavours to construct a genealogical 
relationship between Wittgenstein and Herder (Taylor 1995, 90). Taylor fleshes out this 
relationship in his essay regarding the latter’s insights upon the engaged agency 
necessary for grasping the meaning of linguistic utterances, i.e. an outside, disengaged 
observer cannot divine the meanings conveyed within a non-native language simply 
through observing the nominal assignation carried out between a word and an object. 
Taylor details how Herder’s critique of Étienne Bonnot de Condillac’s parable regarding 
the origin of language takes for granted the a priori existence of an expressive framework 
of meaning (Taylor 1995, 81). In short, Taylor asserts that, while lacking rigour, Herder’s 
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critique nevertheless provides western philosophy with the concept of an existent 
background from which engaged, reflective agents draw linguistic meaning.  
No one has come even close to explaining the origin of language. But by focusing 
on the framework understanding which language requires, Herder opened a new 
domain of insights into its nature. These have enabled us to get a better grasp of 
the essential conditions of language…  
What Herder is doing, I want to claim, anticipates (and perhaps distantly 
influences, through many intermediaries) what Wittgenstein does when he lays 
out the background understanding we need to grasp an “ostensive definition.” 
What Wittgenstein’s opponent takes as quite unproblematic and simple turns out 
to be complex and not necessarily present. Appreciating this blows the opponent’s 
theory of meaning out of the water. (Taylor 1995, 83) 
  
Taylor picks up the thread of expressivism in his own theory, asserting that 
humans are made unique by our existence within what he dubs the “linguistic dimension” 
(Taylor 1995, 84). With the concept of the “linguistic dimension” Taylor is laying the 
groundwork for an argument against an objectivist “signaling” approach to understanding 
language. Taylor uses the example of chimpanzee language experiments to illustrate the 
difference between the achievement of corollary signalization, and the nuanced 
expression of meaningful sentiment. According to Taylor, in the “linguistic dimension” 
the sense of “rightness” (or as he puts it “le mot juste”), is not reducible to a successful 
communication of signal for response/reward, as is the case in chimpanzee language 
training (ibid). To use the appropriate words to express one’s emotions evince a field of 
referential meaning far more complex and abstract than the binary calculus at the core of 
a reductionist theory of language such as that advanced in the Augustinian genre of 
representationalism.
10
 I argue that reflection upon the process whereby moral agents 
arrive at an expression of their feelings, capable of attaining the status of “le mot juste”, 
                                                 
10
 Taylor explains that the Augustinian model “can be defined in terms of its “designative” approach to the 
question of meaning. Words get their meaning from being used to designate objects. What they designate is 
their meaning.” (Taylor 1995, 80) 
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constitutes a main pillar of Taylor’s project in Sources of the Self. Taylor is riveted by the 
notion of investigating the relationship which exists between the background of 
meanings, and the linguistic dimension. Taylor desires to chart the path of meaning from 
background to foreground, observable in the activity of articulation. A process which, I 
contend, Taylor sees as vital for the development of increasingly lucid, profound, and 
moving moral accounts on the part of agents. 
One of the most important and universally recognized consequences of 
Herder’s discovery was a certain holism of meaning. A word has meaning only 
within a lexicon and a context of language practices, which are ultimately 
embedded in a form of life. In our day Wittgenstein’s is the most celebrated 
formulation of a thesis of this kind. (Taylor 1995, 93) 
  
In another of his essays collected in Philosophical Arguments, “Explanation and 
Practical Reason”, Taylor describes how moral arguments can only sway an audience 
toward positions which are comprehensible against the background of their own 
experiences. Here, Taylor is riffing off of a concept borrowed from Martin Heidegger 
known as “pre-understanding” (Taylor 1995, 48). I will return to the concept of 
background further on in my discussion of Taylor and epistemology. At present, what is 
important to grasp, is that Taylor roots the comprehensibility of moves in discourse 
against a background understanding embedded within particular forms of life.  
The task is not to convince those who are undividedly and unconfusedly attached 
to one first principle that they ought to shift to an entirely different one. So 
described, it is impossible. Rather, we are always trying to show that granted what 
our interlocutors already accept, they cannot but attribute to the acts or policies in 
dispute the significance we are urging. (Taylor 1995, 48) 
 
Here Taylor is making a case against foundationalism in moral philosophy using 
the move from pre to post Galilean science as an example of rational intellectual 
transitions based on appeals to “our implicit understanding of our form of life” (Taylor 
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1995, 49). The notion of transitions will prove an important facet of my analysis of the 
epistemological structure underlying Taylor’s theory. However, for the task at hand, it is 
most helpful to focus on Taylor’s use of Wittgenstein’s phrase to describe how we 
advance, and receive, theoretical arguments through languages commensurable within 
our shared forms of life.  
Taylor argues that understanding is conveyed through languages which are 
inextricably bound up within the shared background held in common within our forms of 
life. Taylor takes a strong stance resisting what he describes as the disengaged agency 
characteristic of certain modes of modern thought in the west. In his essay “Lichtung or 
Lebensform: Parallels between Heidegger and Wittgenstein”, Taylor undertakes a 
comparative examination of the two philosophers respective views regarding the 
situatedness of agents within particular conceptual spheres. Employing aspects of 
Wittgensteinian and Heideggerian theories, Taylor develops a vision of language as the 
primary means through which the menace of disengaged reasoning can be combatted, and 
the substantiveness of engaged agency avowed.  
I have been drawing Wittgenstein and Heidegger together in these pages, seeing 
their philosophies as parallel attacks on the disengaged picture of the mind. Both 
put forward against this an account of engaged agency. Heidegger speaks of 
“finitude” in his account of human being (Dasein). Wittgenstein places the 
meanings of our words in the context of intelligibility of knowledge, thought, and 
meaning. Both propose some notion of background; and, more, both articulate 
some part of this background whose neglect has allowed the disengaged view to 
seem plausible. Articulation plays a crucial part in their argumentative strategy; it 
is central to the innovating force of their philosophy.  (Taylor 1995, 75) 
 
Those familiar with Taylor’s oeuvres may remark upon my emphasising the 
influence of Herder’s thought upon Taylor’s theory, rather than that of the much more 
celebrated figure of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. No doubt, the omission of Hegel’s 
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influence from an intellectual biography of Charles Taylor would be insupportable. 
However, my purpose in this section of my dissertation is to outline what I contend to be 
the most important sources of philosophical inspiration pertinent to Taylor’s moral theory 
as he laid it out in “Identity and the Good”. The presence of Hegelian themes, such as 
concepts of universality and integral being, are clearly present is Taylor’s theory. Yet, 
these tropes are not, in my estimation, as important as the expressivist theme which 
Taylor’s distills from Herder’s body of work.  
Indeed, in what is widely acclaimed as Taylor’s first scholarly masterwork, Hegel, 
Taylor makes a point of conveying (albeit with an economy of words) the tremendous 
importance for western philosophy of Herder’s expressivism. In Hegel, Taylor undertakes 
a painstakingly detailed examination of the eponymous philosopher’s epochal impact 
upon western philosophy. Taylor describes Hegel’s remarkable synthesis of ideas forging 
a philosophy exhibiting elements derived from both the rigid rationalism of 
Enlightenment thought, and the surging sentiment of the Romantic revolt.  
He [Hegel] was pitiless towards Romantic visions of the power of fantasy 
and endless creativity. He insisted that the final synthesis be one which reason 
could encompass. But at the same time he had a conception of the subject as 
essentially activity, and infinite activity. The solution lay in his conception of 
infinity, which incorporated the finite, and which returned to itself like a 
circle...Hegel agrees as he must with the main Romantic objection to Reason that 
it (or rather ‘understanding’ to use his own terminology) divides, analyses, 
individuates, kills. In other words, rational understanding is not possible without a 
clear consciousness of the distinction subject and object, self and other, the 
rational and the affective. And just because of this, Hegel will insist that the 
ultimate synthesis incorporate division as well as unity. (Taylor, 1975, 48) 
 
So high is Taylor’s regard for Hegel, that he dubs Hegel’s move toward this 
volatile reconciliation “the central and ‘mind blowing’ idea of the Hegelian system” 
(Taylor 1975, 49). Interestingly, however, for the reader concerned with elucidating the 
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background of Taylor’s arguments in “Identity and the Good”, it is the sparse passages in 
Hegel where Taylor discusses Herder that prove most helpful. In Sources, Taylor 
envisions moral agents as explicating “what makes sense of our moral responses” through 
the articulation of a “framework”. Taylor describes “frameworks” as providing “the 
background, explicit or implicit, for our moral judgements, intuitions, or reactions” 
(Taylor 1989b, 26). Taylor’s “framework” model strongly resonates with what Herder’s 
theory of expressivity suggests. That is, that language is embedded in an ephemeral 
background of meanings which are transformed through reflectively informed expression.  
The revolutionary idea implicit in Herder was that the development of new 
modes of expression enables us to have new feelings, more powerful or more 
refined, and certainly more self-aware. In being able to express our feelings, we 
give them a reflective dimension that transforms them. (Taylor 1995, 98) 
 
 I argue that the importance of Herder’s ideas for Taylor rests in their ability to 
resist the epistemological disengagement ingrained in what I have been calling, following 
Taylor, philosophical naturalism.
11
 It is the naturalist strain in western philosophy which 
Taylor apprehends as representing the most insidious threat to the expressive integrity 
celebrated in Herder’s thought. The naturalist temper absorbs the brunt of Taylor’s 
critique in Sources (Taylor 1989b, 79). However, the seeds of that critique are sown in 
the first chapter of Hegel, alongside a rough prototype description of the moral agent 
which reaches fruition over a decade later in Sources. The gist of the naturalist 
epistemology which Taylor wishes to confront is outlined in his account of how Herder’s 
theoretical innovations disturbed the “thoroughly ‘objectifying’” rules evinced by “the 
theories of linguistic meaning which run from Hobbes through to Condillac [which] see 
                                                 
11
 See chapter one, page 16 of this dissertation. 
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meaningfulness as an external relation which certain marks, sounds, things or ideas 
(representations) have for us” (Taylor 1975, 14). 
 In “Identity and the Good” Taylor works to develop a description of agency 
which highlights the core elements of Herder’s insights regarding embedded, reflective 
expression. Like both Hegel and Herder, Taylor’s work can be, to some degree, 
characterized as an effort to repair the damaging legacy of Cartesian dualism. 
Consequently, I argue that one cannot grasp what is at stake in the vision of the self 
advanced by Taylor in Sources without understanding the elements of embedded, 
reflective expression advanced in Herder’s philosophy.  
Hence the Herderian idea that my humanity is something unique, not equivalent 
to yours, and this unique quality can only be revealed in my life itself. ‘Each man 
has his own measure, as it were an accord peculiar to him of all his feelings to 
each other’. The idea is not just that men are different; this was hardly new; it was 
rather that the differences define the unique form that each of us is called on to 
realize. The differences take on moral import; so that the question could arise for 
the first time whether a given form of life was an authentic expression of certain 
individuals or people. This is the new dimension added by a theory of self-
realization. 
Thus the notion of human life as expression sees this not only as the 
realization of purposes but also as the clarification of these purposes. It is not only 
the fulfilment of life but also the clarification of meaning. In the course of living 
adequately I not only fulfil my humanity but clarify what my humanity is about. 
As such a clarification my life-form is not just the fulfilment of purpose but the 
embodiment of meaning, the expression of an idea. (Taylor 1975, 16-17) 
 
This rather lengthy quote brings to the fore several important themes which 
underlie Taylor’s project in Sources. In no particular order, these themes are moral 
import, authenticity, clarification, living adequately (a value added Socratic model) and 
fulfilment. These themes must be framed within the “linguistic dimension” which Taylor 
believes encompasses our lives as conscious agents. Hence, adhering to Taylor’s 
conceptual picture of language, it is evident that expression (or articulation) offers agents 
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a conduit for clarifying the background elements of meaning which resonate within them 
as morally important. Overarching this whole chain of significance and signification is 
the somewhat Socratic question of “living adequately”, and the distinctly modern 
imperative to realize an authentic identity.  
On The Linguistic Dimension 
Although Taylor never explicitly tenders a theory of language in his work, he 
does employ a subtle and nuanced reading of Wittgenstein, Herder, and Heidegger to 
map out the dimensions of what he apprehends to be the “linguistic dimension”. I 
contend that the delicate character of Taylor’s hermeneutic approach is necessitated by 
the radical nature of the linguistic claims Taylor ultimately makes. What becomes 
apparent in the various texts which Taylor has produced dealing to greater or lesser 
degrees with concepts of language, meaning and agency, is that Taylor believes a force of 
attraction emanates from the background of the “linguistic dimension”. Furthermore, 
Taylor suggests that this force places claims upon us as conscious agents. Taylor is 
careful not to give this force a name, which would constitute an objectifying gesture 
apropos to the naturalist ideology he is arguing against. Rather, Taylor employs the 
tropes of worthiness and desire to communicate the magnetism at play in the “linguistic 
dimension”.  
Only language beings can identify things as worthy of desire or aversion. For such 
identifications raise issues of intrinsic rightness. They involve a characterization 
of things which is not reducible simply to the way we treat them as objects of 
desire or aversion. They involve a recognition beyond that: they ought to be 
treated in one way or another. (Taylor 1995, 106) 
 
 It is very important to pay attention to the use of italics in this passage. Taylor 
emphasises the notion of worth which intuits meaningfulness, substance, allure, and the 
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verb ought with all its attendant senses of dutifulness, responsibility, perhaps even 
command. Taylor’s use of italics to drive home the import of what he contends are 
definitive conditions of linguistic being elucidate the scope of his disagreement with the 
objectifying worldview characteristic of naturalism. In Taylor’s estimation, categories of 
meaning (such as love, justice, loyalty etc.), which emerge from the background of 
shared meanings through articulation convey their own strong sense of worthiness which 
exists distinct from the vicissitudes of the context of their expression.  
In short, language beings are compelled to use certain terms to express a desired 
sense of meaning, and their articulations can never exhaust the potential of the meanings 
expressed. Thus, for Taylor, there are plenty of paths toward le mot juste, but no one has 
rights to le mot final. Furthermore, as languages convey meanings which, according to 
Taylor, express inherent qualities of worth it becomes apparent that to “move from 
nonlinguistic to linguistic agency is to move to a world in which a new kind of issue is at 
play, a right use of signs which is not reducible to task-rightness” (Taylor 1995, 105). 
The question is then, what are the conditions which govern the “right use of signs”? It is 
my contention that, for Taylor, one condition for measuring the right use of a sign is the 
degree of clarification of the background it provides for articulating an authentic account 
of one’s moral identity; an account in tune with, and worthy of, the ideals which one feels 
one ought to live up to.   
On Moral Realism and Non-Realism 
Through a careful reading of Taylor’s essays dealing with the approaches to 
language and philosophy in Herder, Hegel, Wittgenstein and Heidegger, one can begin to 
assemble the component parts of the theoretical model advanced in Sources. From Herder 
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comes the emphasis on expression, from Hegel a vision of symmetrical agency, from 
Wittgenstein an elucidated description of background as forms of life, and from 
Heidegger a constitutive description of language as Lichtung, a clearing wherein we 
apprehend that “ours is a world in which things have worth, in which there are goods in 
the strong sense: things worth pursuing” (Taylor 1995, 113). Much like the philosophers 
Taylor draws inspiration from, his work defies easy classification. At best, we might 
describe Taylor’s blending of elements from romantic, Enlightenment, theistic and 
analytic traditions, coupled with his staunch anti-naturalism, as evincing a genre of moral 
realism.
12
 I am well aware that characterizing Taylor as a moral realist raises a variety of 
questions regarding what this realism might look like. Is it akin to a variety of humanism; 
or, perhaps, a dissimulated deism?  
I believe that Taylor himself offers the most lucid description of what I am 
labeling his moral realism. In the course of an attack he launches upon the objectifying 
bent of naturalism in the second chapter of Sources, Taylor paints a fairly clear picture of 
what he apprehends to be morally real. 
Our value terms purport to give us insight into what it is to live in the universe as 
a human being, and this is a quite different matter from that which physical 
science claims to reveal and explain. This reality is, of course, dependent on us, in 
the sense that a condition for its existence is our existence. But once granted that 
we exist, it is no more a subjective projection than what physics deals with. 
(Taylor 1989b, 59) 
 
Taylor proceeds to clearly state that what he is contesting is the influence of a “naturalist   
inspired metaphysical picture, say, of humans as objects of science, or as part of a 
disenchanted universe” (ibid). I will return to this section later on when I take up Taylor’s 
arguments in Sources. However, this brief foray into the text is helpful for elucidating the 
                                                 
12
 I am not alone in describing Taylor as a “moral realist”; see Melissa A. Orlie’s “Taylor and Feminism” 
pg. 162, note 29, in Charles Taylor, ed. Ruth Abbey. 2004. Cambridge University Press 
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nature of the moral realism to which Taylor subscribes. Furthermore, this passage 
reinforces the now familiar current of anti-naturalism central to Taylor’s philosophic 
enterprise.  
As we have seen, Taylor’s critical attitude toward philosophical naturalism can be 
discerned in a great many of his works. However, it is in his essay “Overcoming 
Epistemology” that I would argue Taylor launches his most powerful attack against 
naturalism. The title of this essay is as close to being bombastic as Taylor ever comes in 
his writing. The reader can feel the heat of the argument against the naturalist paradigm 
waft off the pages of this essay. Polemical is not an adjective commonly attached to 
Taylor’s writing. However, in regard to this essay it does, at times, seem appropriate. I 
will take this opportunity to re-affirm my own esteem for the use of rhetoric in 
philosophical argument and disclose that I find Taylor’s execution of his argument in 
“Overcoming Epistemology” quite powerful, yet not unproblematic.  
In this essay Taylor describes the contemporary state of epistemology, as a 
discipline of moral philosophy, as being in a “bad way” (Taylor 1995, 1). Taylor 
distinguishes between the pre-dominance which a positivistic, or objectivist, 
epistemological model enjoyed in the analytic universe of Anglo-Saxon philosophy, 
against the phenomenological challenge which enjoyed popularity on the Continent 
(ibid). Taylor explains that the concept of knowledge as constituting an empirically 
objective field amenable to a disengaged, rational inquiry inaugurated by Descartes and 
refined by Locke and Kant, has begun to be regarded as profoundly mistaken by various 
camps in western philosophy (Taylor 1995, 2).  
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Following Taylor’s diagnosis, he explores the substance of the revolt against what 
he describes, rather broadly, as the epistemological tradition. Taylor turns to Richard 
Rorty’s famous description of epistemology in his book Philosophy and the Mirror of 
Nature as a “foundational enterprise” (ibid). Taylor examines the underlying 
philosophical aspirations which Rorty’s critical description of epistemology conveys. 
However, Taylor does not accept that the way to overcome epistemology simply involves 
setting aside foundationalist aspirations. Taylor outlines how epistemology can also be 
critically interpreted in a way that “focuses not so much on foundationalism as on the 
understanding of knowledge that made it possible” (Taylor 1995, 2-3). Taylor presents 
this mode of understanding as knowledge defined as a “correct representation of an 
independent reality. In its original form, it saw knowledge as the inner depiction of an 
outer reality” (Taylor 1995, 3). The original form being that derived from Descartes’ 
meditations. Taylor believes that a serious critique of epistemology needs to go further 
than the mere indictment of foundationalism. For Taylor, a critical investigation of 
epistemology requires the substantive consideration of the form of knowledge 
foundationalism presupposes. 
  The reason why some thinkers prefer to focus on this interpretation, rather 
than merely on the foundationalist ambitions that are ultimately (as Quine has 
shown) detachable from it, is that it is bound up with very influential and often 
not fully articulated notions about science and about the nature of human agency. 
Through these it connects with certain central moral and spiritual ideas of the 
modern age. If one’s aim is, in challenging the primacy of epistemology, to 
challenge these ideas as well, then one has to take it up in this wider—or deeper—
focus, and not simply show the vanity of the foundational enterprise. (ibid)  
 
 In charting a course for overcoming epistemology, Taylor undertakes precisely 
the type of critical challenge to what he considers the vague moral and spiritual ideas and 





 century of a “new mechanistic science”, and the upheaval this worldview 
portended for the traditional Platonic and Aristotelian ontic model (ibid). Taylor outlines 
how philosophers, such as Locke, transposed the mechanistic model from the emergent 
natural sciences into philosophical argument in order to craft a representationalist 
episteme wherein knowledge “hangs on a certain relation holding between what is “out 
there” and certain inner states that this external reality causes in us” (Taylor 1995, 4). 
 In usurping the Greek notion of ideas and forms, the champions of a Newtonian 
worldview advanced the Cartesian divorce of mind from matter. The effect of this 
disengagement bestowed upon the naturalist agent a, supposed, objective capacity to 
examine not only natural phenomena, but also “the contents of his own mind” (ibid). 
Endowed with such oversight the naturalist agent is able to, through a rigorous 
intellectual discipline, rationally weigh the evidence for given representational 
propositions about reality, and arrive at a clear, certain, and verifiable outcome. Taylor 
claims that the new representational episteme born of the 17
th
 century philosophical 
adoption of the mechanistic worldview, constructed by the then burgeoning natural 
sciences, intuits a moral ideal venerating “dignity and freedom”. Taylor asserts that this 
ideal has become entrenched in contemporary western thought. Helpfully, Taylor lays out 
a three pronged description of the content of the ideal he discerns as underlying the mode 
of understanding native to the disengaged rational and representational model. 
The first is the picture of the subject as ideally disengaged, that is, as free 
and rational to the extent that he has fully distinguished himself from the natural 
and social worlds, so that his identity is no longer to be defined in terms of what 
lies outside him in these worlds. The second, which flows from this, is a punctual 
view of the self, ideally ready as free and rational to treat these worlds—and even 
some of the features of his own character—instrumentally, as subject to change 
and reorganizing in order the better to secure the welfare of himself and others. 
The third is the social consequence of the first two: an atomistic construal of 
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society as constituted by, or ultimately to be explained in terms of, individual 
purposes. (Taylor 1995, 7) 
 
    In “Overcoming Epistemology” Taylor treats this description as applicable to 
epistemology tout court. However, read against the previously quoted passage from 
Sources, wherein Taylor challenges the assumptions of the “naturalist inspired 
metaphysical picture” (Taylor 1989b, 59), it becomes apparent that “Overcoming 
Epistemology”, could well have been titled overcoming naturalism. “Overcoming 
Epistemology” originally appeared in After Philosophy: End or Transformation. This 
1987 all-star compendium of 20
th
 century philosophers offered a variety of approaches to 
answering the titular question. The question of whether philosophy was facing its end, or 
a transformation, helps to elucidate what Taylor sought to accomplish in “Overcoming 
Epistemology”. I also believe this question can help to frame Taylor’s more detailed 
critique of naturalism executed in Sources.  
In “Overcoming Epistemology” was Taylor addressing the “End” of philosophy, 
or auguring for a “Transformation” of its normative mode of understanding? One need 
not delve too deeply into Taylor’s works to ascertain that he would reject outright the 
notion of an end of philosophy. In light of this, it is apparent that Taylor’s arguments in 
“Overcoming Philosophy” are transformative in nature. The question then becomes 
transformation into what? What mode of understanding does Taylor apprehend as more 
worthy for the furtherance of the philosophical enterprise in the west? 
 Taylor begins to shape an alternative to the disengaged model of understanding in 
“Overcoming Epistemology”. Through a review of what he terms the “classic critiques of 
epistemology” advanced by the now familiar voices of Hegel, Heidegger, and 
Wittgenstein (as well as Maurice Merleau-Ponty, whose importance to Taylor I will 
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explore later on) Taylor directly challenges the premise of rational disengagement central 
to representational understanding. Taylor re-visits Heidegger’s concept of Dasein, 
asserting that, to arrive at the very idea of rational disengagement requires the taking up 
of a representational understanding embedded in phenomenal existence which, ipso facto, 
is to acknowledge our position as worldly agents  
Once we take this point, then the entire epistemological position is undermined. 
Obviously foundationalism goes, since our representations of things—the kinds of 
objects we pick out as whole, enduring entities—are grounded in the way we deal 
with those things. These dealings are largely inarticulate, and the project of 
articulating them fully is an essentially incoherent one, just because any 
articulative project would itself rely on a background or horizon of nonexplicit 
engagement with the world. (Taylor, 1995, 11) 
  
Taylor’s claim to have undermined the representationalist paradigm rests upon a mode of 
understanding human agency as embedded in the world. Taylor is advocating a 
phenomenological approach to knowledge which takes seriously the notion of 
embodiment and embeddedness in the world.  
Hubert L. Dreyfus provides a finely detailed examination of what he refers to as 
Taylor’s “(anti-) epistemology” in an essay of the same name. Dreyfus’ work focuses 
upon the disagreement between Taylor and his opponents over the notion of mediation as 
a component of knowledge claims. Dreyfus provides an excellent summary of Taylor’s 
position contra that of his opponents. 
Taylor argues that no mental representations, be they sense data, visual 
experiences, or intentional content, and so forth, mediate our relation to everyday 
reality… Taylor’s goal is to reveal the inner/outer structure of all epistemologies, 
even recent would-be anti-epistemologies, and to present and defend an opposed 
view, a view that denies that the inner/outer dichotomy in any form correctly 
describes our basic relation to reality. (Dreyfus 2004, 53) 
 
Taylor, in Dreyfus’ account, offers up a phenomenological account wherein the agent has 
no recourse to any mediating or intervening buffer with experience; they are always, 
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already engaged in the world. This engagement is a characteristic of agents’ embodiment. 
Dreyfus is careful to point out how Taylor depends upon a concept of embodiment 
derived from the theory of Samuel Todes, set against aspects of Merleau-Ponty’s “être au 
monde”, Heidegger’s Dasein, and Wittgenstein’s notion of background (Dreyfus 2004, 
54). What emerges is a model of embodiment wherein the agent is understood as a 
perceptual being who orients themself in the world in large part through a, taken for 
granted, sense of “embedded knowing” (Dreyfus 2004, 56). Thus, all understanding is 
necessarily rooted in our embodied nature.
13
 Further, “embedded knowing” not only 
precludes the possibility of disengaged reasoning, but also the “coherentist” model of 
knowledge consisting “solely of beliefs that are justified by other beliefs” (ibid).  
Here Taylor is challenging not only the non-realist naturalists, but also 
pragmatists, such as Richard Rorty. Rorty and Taylor enjoyed a long correspondence 
debating facets of epistemology and ontology. Rorty’s main critique of Taylor centers on 
Taylor’s construal of the intrinsic meaning of objects in the world independent from 
human description. Rorty explains his differences with Taylor in typically witty style in 
his essay “Taylor on truth” (which appeared in a volume of essays edited by James Tully 
which I will examine in greater detail later on). In this essay Rorty ultimately concludes, 
true to his philosophical convictions, that he must pragmatically “hang on to the moral 
impetus” while “dropping the very idea of ontology” (Rorty 1994, 33). Taylor could 
never follow Rorty down this path as ontology represents a central theme in Taylor’s 
model of moral agency. In the introduction to Taylor’s “Overcoming Epistemology” in 
                                                 
13
 In the course of my dissertation I will expand upon the concept of embodiment in Taylor’s work, paying 
particular attention to the influence of Merleau-Ponty. 
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After Philosophy the editors provide a good description of the type of agent Taylor’s 
model pre-supposes.  
To “overcome epistemology” means not only to give up foundationalist ambitions 
(as Quine, for instance has done) but also to develop a deeper and more adequate 
conception of human agency (something Quine’s behaviorism does not do). The 
path to this conception leads through a “kind of transcendental argument” that 
discloses the indispensable conditions of experiencing a world, that is, of 
intentionality… It reveals that we are first and foremost embodied agents in a 
natural and social world. Our propositional knowledge of this world is grounded 
in our dealings with it; and there can be no question of totally objectifying the 
prior grasp we have of it as agents within it. The task of philosophy is an 
unending one of articulating elements of this largely unarticulated background, of 
disclosing what it involves, thus making partial detachment and revision 
possible…It leads to a better, deeper, and more valid understanding of what we 
are as knowing, speaking, and acting subjects, and thereby provides insight into 
the anthropological questions that often underlie our moral concerns. In this sense 
it is a continuation-through-transformation of the idea of philosophical self-
responsibility based on philosophical self-clarification. (Baynes, Bohman, and 
McCarthy 1987, 461-462) 
 
 This astute description serves not only to covey Taylor’s aims in writing 
“Overcoming Epistemology” it also serves as, a perhaps unwitting, introduction to 
Taylor’s motives for writing Sources of the Self.  A great deal is stated in the above 
passage that requires unpacking. Doubtless, we are now familiar with the 
phenomenological tradition to which Taylor subscribes borrowing from Heidegger, 
Wittgenstein and Merleau-Ponty. Consequently, we are also well acquainted with the 
disengaged models of knowledge constructed by Descartes, Locke, Husserl et al. that 
Taylor is writing against. However, the character of Taylor’s own model of 
understanding knowledge remains to some degree, opaque. We have Dreyfus’ portrayal 
of Taylor’s “(anti-) epistemology” to consider. However, I argue that Dreyfus is overly 
concerned with the disagreement between Rorty and Taylor over mediation and reality, 
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ignoring the “anthropological questions that often underlie our moral concerns” alluded 
to by the editors of After Philosophy (Baynes, Bohman, and McCarthy 1987, 462).  
It is readily apparent that Taylor’s model of understanding revolves around 
embodied existence. However, how does the embodied agent, equipped with “embedded 
knowing”, come to a “better, deeper, and more valid understanding” of their “moral 
concerns” through “self-clarification” (ibid). What exactly does this “self-clarification” 
involve? Taylor provides some indication in another of his essays entitled “Explanation 
and Practical Reason”, originally published in 1989, (the same year which saw the 
publication of Sources) which echoes the idea of transformation in the sub-title of After 
Philosophy; only here Taylor describes these clarification moves as “transitions”.  
On Transitions 
At this juncture it is important that I clarify a position. I do not accept Taylor’s 
overly-broad argument concerning the need to overcome epistemology. Taylor’s 
campaign against epistemology is, I contend, neither sustainable as a philosophical 
endeavour, nor a particularly accurate depiction of what Taylor actually argues for in his 
essay. Based on our review of both Taylor’s own claims, as well as the secondary 
literature pertinent to the topic, I assert that what Taylor wishes to overcome is a specific 
strand of epistemology native to philosophical naturalism. I do not wish to contest the 
claim that the roots of modern modes of epistemology, predominant in the west, spring 
from Descartes’ long ago meditation. However, to move from this genealogical analysis 
to a definition of epistemology as Cartesian, in both root and branch, is a bridge too far. 
The term epistemology has, in contemporary scholarly usage, come to be understood as 
dealing with a plethora of different conceptions of knowledge and understanding. This is 
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evinced by the dissensus regarding a definition of the term outlined in the preceding 
chapter. In light of the pervasive use of, and heterogeneous meanings conveyed by the 
term epistemology in modern western philosophy, I believe Taylor’s quest to overcome it 
to be at best quixotic, and at worst, disingenuous. It is on these grounds that I suggest we 
might add a word to the original title of the essay which will give us a better grasp of 
what is at stake for Taylor in his arguments; “Overcoming [bad] Epistemology”.  
Following Taylor’s own claims, it is evident that what he is proposing is not that 
we replace a representationalist model of knowledge with a brand of neo-scepticism, but 
rather that we embrace an embodied, and engaged model of understanding as the basis 
for acquiring knowledge. Dreyfus provides a good example of Taylor’s alternative to the 
representational and disengaged models of knowledge in his discussion of Taylor’s 
attempt to bolster the “powerful critique of dualist epistemology mounted by John 
McDowell” (Dreyfus 2004, 57).  
Taylor, therefore, seeks to show how an account of the basic levels of 
perception and the epistemic skills involved in forming a belief would enable 
McDowell to understand that there are degrees of perceptual support beneath 
rational justification – that our propositionally formed beliefs can only arise on 
the basis of a more basic skillful contact with the world that is prepropositional 
and in part even preconceptual.  
Taylor agrees with McDowell that reasoning is an exercise of a norm – 
guided  capacity; it is thus an exercise of spontaneity in us, or otherwise put, of 
freedom… 
Taylor agrees with McDowell that if we want to see how constraint and 
spontaneity come together, we have to find this in perception. But Taylor insists 
that to  do so, we have to bring out how our ability to form beliefs like “the 
picture is crooked” draw on preconceptual epistemic skills. (Dreyfus 2004, 58) 
 
 Understanding the relationships Taylor envisions existing between the 
preconceptual, perception, spontaneity, and reason, is central to grasping Taylor’s 
understanding of knowledge. Or, what I argue is best understood as Taylor’s own 
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epistemological paradigm. To be sure, my use of the term epistemology in regard to 
Taylor’s theory of knowledge is bound to raise some hackles. However, I firmly believe 
that my analysis will bear out the fact that a rose by any other name is still a rose, and so 
it is also with epistemology.  
In Taylor’s essay “Explanation and Practical Reason” he once again takes up his 
now familiar challenge to the representationalist model of understanding knowledge, 
which he persists in calling epistemology, full stop. However, Taylor adds to his 
challenge a dimension concerning what he feels is the misuse (or abuse) of reason to 
perpetuate moral scepticism. Taylor elaborates upon this as the “widespread belief that 
moral positions can’t be argued, that moral differences can’t be arbitrated by reason, that 
when it comes to moral values, we all just ultimately have to plump for the ones which 
feel best to us” (Taylor 1995, 34). Taylor portrays this as a sort of “subjectivism” (ibid). 
In this brief summary of what he apprehends to colour the contemporary moral 
perspective in the west, Taylor reveals his own deep malaise regarding modernity. For 
Taylor, the notion that moral understanding is purely a matter of personal feeling, and 
that one’s ideas about the good hold no truck with either rational reflection or strong 
argument, sounds the death knell for a substantive picture of “practical reason”.  
To accept what Taylor derides as “subjectivism” is, he claims, to accept that 
differences regarding moral attitudes are incommensurable with rational disputation. 
Taylor rejects the scepticism inherent in what he apprehends to be the “subjectivist” 
vision of moral atomism, arguing that it is based on a misconception of what it means to 
rationally disprove a given moral attitude. Taylor elucidates what he considers the 
wrongheaded view of reason as the notion that one must advance “facts or principles” 
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which an opponent cannot but accept as proof of their being wrong (Taylor 1995, 35). 
The imprint of the empirical model of proof is clearly in evidence in what Taylor 
considers the “wrong view of practical reason” (ibid). Taylor is arguing that the mode of 
reasoning at work in the proof arguments of naturalist philosophy has confused the use of 
practical reasoning in philosophical discourse. In trying to emulate the positivistic 
grounds of argument native to the empirical form of reason inaugurated by Newton et al. 
naturalist philosophers have alienated agents from the use of practical reasoning 
appropriate to moral deliberation. Taylor casts the use of practical reason in moral affairs 
as a process of “strong evaluation”.  
The opposition to this naturalist reduction has come from a philosophical 
stance  that might in a broad sense be called “phenomenological.” By this I mean 
a focus on our  actual practices of moral deliberation, debate, understanding. The 
attempt is to show, in  one way or another, that the vocabularies we need to 
explain human thought, action, feeling, or to explicate, analyze, justify ourselves 
or each other, or to deliberate on what to do, all inescapably rely on strong 
evaluation. Or put negatively, that the attempt to separate out a language of 
neutral description, which combined with commitments or pro/con attitudes might 
recapture and make sense of our actual explanations, analyses, or deliberations 
leads to failure and will always lead to failure. (Taylor 1995, 38-39) 
 
 Strong evaluation is the title Taylor applies to his concept of an engaged and 
embodied model of rational reflection. Taylor uses strong evaluation to refer to a process 
whereby moral intuitions regarding the worthiness of an idea, object, or action, are 
subjected to a process of practical reasoning by the engaged agent embedded in the 
world. Here, the influence of Heidegger and Wittgenstein is especially evident. Taylor’s 
concept of strong evaluation depends upon a notion of being in the world which marries 
preconceptual embodiment (borrowed from Heidegger’s “pre-understanding”), with 
conscious perception in an epistemological system that makes practical reason possible; 
allowing that “Within a human situation inescapably characterized in strongly evaluative 
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terms, we can see how argument aimed at self-clarification might in principle at least 
bring agreement” (ibid). Taylor is engaged in a phenomenological argument. However, 
he adds to this argument a dimension wherein the intrinsic worth of an action, object or 
idea, impinges upon our reasoning process, and in some sense demands our attention.  
According to Taylor we can’t help but be moved by the worthiness of some idea, 
or course of action, as better than another. Further, this compelling feeling of worth is 
first experienced “preconceptually”. Aspects of this position are not uncommon in the 
history of western philosophy. Plato’s forms, the Romantics emotivism, are relevant for 
understanding Taylor. Heidegger’s pre-understanding, and Wittgenstein’s forms of life, 
also evince elements which resonate with Taylor’s theory. Taylor, however, is not overly 
concerned with explaining or describing the character of the preconceptual intuition 
itself. Taylor seems content to use the body of thought developed by the aforementioned 
philosophers as a basis for launching his own project. As a consequence of this, any 
probing analysis of the precise character of the moral intuition in Taylor’s theory returns 
us to the sources he himself draws upon for inspiration. Thus, taking the preconceptual 
intuition as an a priori given, Taylor advances an argument calling for a sophisticated 
theory of moral articulation.  
we are led to recognize a human constant: a mode of understanding of a given 
domain D, which consists in our ability to make our way about and effect our 
purposes in D. We might borrow a term from Heidegger, and call this 
understanding as we originally have it prior to explication or scientific discovery 
“pre-understanding.” One of the directions of increasing knowledge of which we 
are capable consists in making this pre-understanding explicit, and then in 
extending our grasp of the connections which underlie our ability to deal with the 
world as we do. Knowledge of this kind is intrinsically linked with increased 
ability to effect our purposes, with the acquisition of potential recipes for more 
effective practice. In some cases, it is virtually impossible to extend such 
knowledge without making new recipes available; and an extension of our 
practical capacities is therefore a reliable criterion of increasing knowledge.  
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Because of these links between understanding and practical ability, we 
cannot deny whatever increases our capacities its title as a gain in knowledge in 
some sense. (Taylor 1995, 48) 
  
Argument 
In this passage, Taylor forges the connection between the preconceptual intuition 
(which in itself remains rather muddy), the force of attraction, or worth, of non-subjective 
goods (subjective being understood according to Taylor’s definition described above), 
rational reflection configured by Taylor as a process of strong evaluation, and articulation 
in the form of an explication of this background constituting an increase in knowledge 
concerning our being in the world. Taylor refers to this increase in knowledge leading 
from a less lucid understanding to a more lucid understanding, “effecting our purposes” 
in the world, as a “transition” (Taylor 1995, 47). The model described above, coupled 
with the action oriented descriptor “transition”, represent the grounds upon which I argue 
that Taylor advances his own epistemological paradigm; one I will call transitional 
epistemology.  
Taylor is championing a theory of knowledge based upon what he terms practical 
reason, which he roots in an engaged and embedded picture of embodied agency contra 
the representational and disengaged models of knowledge and agency trumpeted by 
philosophical naturalists. The fundamental difference between Taylor and his opponents 
can be summarized as the contrast between an understanding of knowledge oriented 
toward engaged agency (Taylor), and an understanding of knowledge oriented toward 
disengaged agency (naturalists). From this flows the further disagreement over moral 
realism versus anti-realism etc. Nevertheless, the model which Taylor counter poses to 
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that of the naturalists remains best described as an epistemological theory, as it seeks to 
explain the process by which human beings make epistemic gains in knowledge.  
Of course this epistemological model does not float freely about; it is anchored to 
Taylor’s suppositions concerning moral agency. Taylor frames agents’ transitions to 
more lucid understandings against the background of their embeddedness in the world. 
Paralleling his epistemological critique, Taylor employs the background trope to launch 
an attack on what he considers the naturalist ontological model. In his essay, “Lichtung or 
Lebensform: Parallels between Heidegger and Wittgenstein”, Taylor asserts that the 
naturalist subscription to a disengaged concept of agency implies a monological vision of 
being. 
The disengaged view is irresistibly monological, because the explicit 
knowledge it focuses on must consist of input and processing, which can only 
take place in individuals. Once we underpin it with a mechanistic account, 
monologicality is reinforced by the thought that all this must be going on within 
individual organisms. But once we see the crucial role of the background, we are 
liberated from this perspective. The background understanding we share, 
interwoven with our practices and ways of relating, isn’t necessarily something 
we partake in as individuals. That is, it can be part of the background 
understanding of a certain practice or meaning that it is not mine but ours; and it 
can indeed be “ours” in a number of ways: as something intensely shared, which 
binds a community; or as something quite impersonal, where we act just as 
“anyone” does. Bringing in the background allows us to articulate the ways in 
which our form of agency is nonmonological, in which the seat of certain 
practices and understandings is precisely not the individual but one of the 
common spaces between. (Taylor 1995, 76-77)  
 
Taylor’s reference to the “common spaces between” points to the common ground 
for reasoning and argument which he ascertains to be lacking in the naturalist 
monological model of ontology. In contrast to the naturalist model, wherein reasoning is 
conducted in a disengaged fashion, Taylor’s model of reasoning depends in large part 
upon the shared terrain of a “common” background of meanings. It is against this 
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background, and within “common spaces”, that engaged agents make transitions to better 
understandings which allow for the conduct of better lives. Here is where the moral and 
spiritual impetus begins to be felt in Taylor’s arguments.  
A central tenet of what I am calling Taylor’s transitional epistemology is that 
agents are persistently engaged with sources of erudition which must be disclosed 
through language. Thus, for Taylor, agents are cast (following Heidegger) as existing in 
“a world in which things have worth, in which there are goods in the strong sense: things 
worth pursuing” (Taylor 1995, 113). It is in the pursuit of these, at times competing, 
goods that agents develop moral identities through the transitional clarification of “self-
reading”, accomplished through strong evaluation (Taylor 1995, 52).   
Combined with the stress Taylor places on the narrative component, detailed in 
the passages quoted above, what emerges from this process is advancement in self-
understanding articulated as a better account of moral identity. As noted at the beginning 
of this chapter the notion of an epistemic gain as a “best account” is one which Taylor 
borrowed from Alasdair MacIntyre (Taylor 1995, 52). Taylor uses the trope of the “best 
account” to deploy a genre of dynamic and open knowledge claim combining a strong 
sense of rational adjudication and reflection, with a keen sense of tentativeness. This has 
the effect of leaving the door open to further transitions toward better accounts.  
It is crucial to transition arguments that they make a more modest claim. 
They are inherently comparative. The claim is not that Y is correct simpliciter but 
just that whatever is “ultimately true,” Y is better than X. It is, one might say, less 
false. The argument is thus specifically addressed to the holders of X. Its message 
is: whatever else turns out to be true, you can improve your epistemic position by 
moving from X to Y; this step is a gain. But nothing need follow from this for the 
holders of third, independent positions. Above all, there is no claim to the effect 
that Y is the ultimate resting point of inquiry. The transition claim here is 
perfectly compatible with a further one which might one day be established, 




Based upon our examination of Taylor’s philosophical influences and arguments 
we can discern how his concept of the “best account principle” emerged from his critique 
of naturalism, coupled with his interpretations of aspects from the works of Heidegger, 
Wittgenstein, Herder, Hegel, Merleau-Ponty et al. Understanding the philosophical 
background of Taylor’s thinking provides a framework for studying the roles which 
language, meaning, and morality, play in the model of moral agency he constructs in 
“Identity and the Good”. Furnished with this genealogy of Taylor’s thought we will move 
on, in the next chapter, to a more penetrating investigation of Taylor’s description of the 
“best account”, and the moral theory which underlies it, in Sources of the Self.  
   
   






















The most reliable moral view is not one that would be grounded quite outside our 
intuitions but one that is grounded on our strongest intuitions, where these have 
successfully met the challenge of proposed transitions away from them.                                                                                                                                  
                                                                                                    (Taylor 1989b, 75) 
In this chapter of my dissertation I will undertake an exploration of the 
terminology pertinent to understanding what is at issue vis-à-vis the description of moral 
agency built into Taylor’s concept of the “best account principle”. I will also address the 
paucity of secondary work which specifically undertakes a serious consideration of the 
“best account principle”, and the directions in moral philosophy such a consideration 
might make possible. Finally, I will conclude the chapter posing a series of critical 
questions pertaining to the “picture” of morality and selfhood advanced by Taylor in 
Sources of the Self. This critical intervention will form the basis for the arguments that I 
will advance in the subsequent chapters of my dissertation.  
In Sources of the Self Charles Taylor’s voice is clear, methodical, and possessing 
of a certain charming demeanor that leaves an impression of effortless grace, and a 
complete lack of affectation. On the whole, Sources is written in a masterly style which is 
emblematic of Taylor’s prose when he is at his best. The sweeping arc of intellectual 
history covered by Taylor in Sources is nothing less than prodigious. Although often 
teasingly referred to as a “big” book, it is actually quite a feat that Taylor managed to 
cover so succinctly the development of the modern idea of the self in just one volume; 
thick though it may be. Further, the thesis upon which the book is based, that “Selfhood 
and the good, or in another way selfhood and morality, turn out to be inextricably 
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intertwined themes” (Taylor 1989b, 3). remains a persistent presence throughout all the 
different parts, both theoretical and historical.  
In Sources, Taylor advances a description of engaged moral agency wherein 
reflection upon, and expression of, the moral goods which agents discern to command 
their love and respect, allows for transitions to increasingly authentic self-realization. 
Taylor contrasts his description of engaged moral agency with a painstaking historical 
description of the development of the dominant naturalist, atomistic model of agency, and 
the disengaged self it has borne into contemporary moral philosophy.  
Much contemporary moral philosophy, particularly but not only in the English 
speaking world, has given such a narrow focus to morality that some of the 
crucial connections I want to draw here are incomprehensible in its terms. This 
moral philosophy has tended to focus on what it is right to do rather than on what 
it is good to be, on defining the content of obligation rather than the nature of the 
good life; and it has no conceptual place left for a notion of the good as the object 
of our love or allegiance or, as Iris Murdoch portrayed in her work, as the 
privileged focus of our attention or will. This philosophy has accredited a 
cramped and truncated view of morality in a  narrow sense, as well as of the 
whole range of issues involved in the attempt to live the best possible life, and this 
not only among professional philosophers, but with a wider public. (ibid)    
 
Given our familiarity with Taylor’s philosophical temperament, no great mystery 
surrounds which western philosophical tradition he impugns as accrediting a “cramped 
and truncated view of morality”. The “obstacle” obstructing the commensurability of 
Taylor’s theoretical extrapolation of the integral relationship between the self and the 
good, is the disengaged tone of naturalist philosophical language. Taylor states as much 
later on in the first part of Sources in his description (which we have already 
encountered
14
) of the “naturalist-inspired metaphysical picture, say, of humans as objects 
of science, or as part of a disenchanted universe” (Taylor 1989b, 59). This description is 
important because it exemplifies the genre of language which Taylor feels puts up a wall 
                                                 
14
 See chapter two pgs.73-74 of this dissertation for my first use of the quotation. 
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between agents and the moral sources with which he believes they must engage in order 
to develop a healthy moral identity.  
On Malaise 
The notion of health represents an underlying theme in Sources. In Taylor’s 
thinking, the atomistic, disengaged model of agency, which grows out of a language 
governed by naturalist representational epistemology, breeds what Taylor has persistently 
referred to as a “malaise”. Taylor’s diagnosis of a “malaise” afflicting modernity is best 
documented in the series of Massey lectures which he delivered on the Canadian 
Broadcasting Corporation’s radio program Ideas in 1991. These lectures were entitled 
“The Malaise of Modernity”, and were subsequently published in a slim volume.15 The 
disturbing specter of a malaise afflicting modernity, and more particularly modern 
agents, raises the question; what species of malady are we dealing with? An answer to 
this question may arise through an examination of a passage from the latter half of 
Sources, which is meant to be the province only of those readers of a historical bent.  
The notion of a malaise appears in part four of Sources “The Voice of Nature”. In 
the course of laying out the legacy of what Taylor elsewhere quite pithily described as the 
“great intramural debate of the last two centuries, pitting the philosophy of the 
Enlightenment against the various forms of Romantic Opposition” (Taylor 1989b, 101), 
he takes up the “debate” as it plays out over competing ecological worldviews. To the 
descendants of the “Romantic religions of nature” Taylor ascribes a powerful sense of 
human beings as woven into nature; body, mind, and soul. To the keepers of the 
Enlightenment dictums of rational objectivism, Taylor ascribes an instrumental 
                                                 
15
 This volume appeared under two different titles; The Malaise of Modernity (in Canada), and The Ethics 
of Authenticity (in the United States). 
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methodology of controlling nature as an objectified field; from which humans are in a 
sense separated by virtue of our capacity for disengaged reasoning. Taylor portrays these 
rival accounts of the relationship between humans and the natural world as a 
confrontation over “spiritual outlooks”.  
This dispute between spiritual outlooks is deeply embedded in the inner 
conflicts of advanced industrial, capitalist societies. Instrumental reason plays 
such a large role in their institutions and practices that whatever shakes our 
confidence in it as a spiritual stance also causes a deep malaise in contemporary 
advanced societies. (Taylor 1989b, 384) 
 
 This brief allusion to a “deep malaise in contemporary advanced societies” 
provides some clues as to what sort of condition we are dealing with. In this section of 
Sources Taylor references his use of the term malaise to his 1985, two volume work, 
Philosophy and the Human Sciences. While Taylor links the mores of modern consumer 
culture with a certain sense of malaise in the essay “Legitimation Crisis?” from that 
collection, the notion of malaise is, at best, sketchy at that point in Taylor’s thought. 
However, in this part of Sources he ties the emergence of this malaise with the faltering 
of a worldview rooted in the disengaged, representational understanding of knowledge 
and language native to naturalist philosophy. Hence, the malaise is at least to some 
degree tied to a way of speaking about the world. What Taylor suggests is that when the 
objectifying grammar of naturalist language, which stresses instrumental reasoning, is 
challenged, agents become disoriented, ill at ease in the world. I argue that Taylor 
apprehends a cure for this malaise in the form of what I termed above his transitional 
epistemology. The allure of naturalist, disengaged language is strong, however. Thus, 
Taylor must develop a language capable of expressing his concept of knowledge rooted 
in engaged agency and practical reasoning, which can hold its ground in contemporary 
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moral discourse. In tendering the “best account principle”, I contend Taylor advances just 
such a language, and that to some extent, Sources of the Self constitutes a vehicle for its 
dissemination.  
Throughout Sources Taylor conveys an ever-present concern for repairing the 
detrimental effects which naturalist thinking have wrought on the understanding of 
engaged agents, embedded in the space of moral questions (Taylor 1989b, 25-29). Early 
on, Taylor describes his work in Sources as containing “an important element of 
retrieval” (Taylor 1989b, 4). This raises the question; what is it he is attempting to 
retrieve? Taylor’s arguments never veer toward the pedantic, and although he has self-
identified as a Roman Catholic, his discussions betray no particularly dogmatic agenda. 
Taylor himself states in Sources that the lion’s share of his “effort in Part I will be 
directed towards enlarging our range of legitimate moral descriptions, and in some cases 
retrieving modes of thought and description which have misguidedly been made to seem 
problematic” (Taylor 1989b, 3). Taylor goes on to reiterate the refrain oft encountered in 
his works regarding the necessity of recognizing and articulating the moral obligations 
which emanate from the background of our languages (ibid).  
Taylor also includes an investigation of “what lies behind some of the moral and 
spiritual intuitions of our contemporaries” in his mandate for part one of Sources (Taylor 
1989b, 4). In defining what the notion of “moral and spiritual intuitions” encompasses, 
Taylor combines senses of respect for other’s dignity with an imperative concern for the 
dignity agents attribute to their own lives as meaningful. In locating notions of dignity 
and meaning under the umbrella of “moral and spiritual intuitions” Taylor bumps up 
against what he terms the “affirmation of ordinary life”.  Taylor discusses how the rise of 
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the “affirmation of ordinary life” in the west coincided with the development of an 
increasingly atomistic and utilitarian concept of human agency. 
The notion that the life of production and reproduction, of work and the family, is 
the main locus of the good life flies in the face of what were originally the 
dominant distinctions of our civilization. For both the warrior ethic and the 
Platonic, ordinary life in this sense is part of the lower range, part of what 
contrasts with the incomparably higher. The affirmation of ordinary life therefore 
involves a polemical stance towards these traditional views with their implied 
elitism. This was true of the Reformation theologies, which are the main source of 
the drive to this affirmation in modern times.  
It is this polemical stance, carried over and transposed in secular guise, 
which powers the reductive views like utilitarianism which want to denounce all 
qualitative distinctions. They are all accused, just as the honour ethic or the 
monastic ethic of supererogation was earlier, of wrongly and perversely 
downgrading ordinary life, of failing to see that our destiny lies here in production 
and reproduction and not in some alleged higher sphere, of being blind to the 
dignity and worth of ordinary human desire and fulfillment. (Taylor 1989b, 23)  
 
On the “Affirmation of Ordinary Life” 
Does this passage reveal Taylor’s real ambitions? Is he an inveterate elitist? Does 
he yearn for the re-enchantment of the universe, and the restoration of philosophers such 
as himself, to the esteem of those living the “incomparably higher” life of reflection? Not 
quite. Taylor is no Neo-Romantic. His sympathies rest somewhere in between what he 
sees as the “great intra-mural divide” in modern western thought. Taylor plainly values 
the intellectual liberation from the fatalistic worldview indigenous to pre-Enlightenment 
cosmology. Further, a central component of Taylor’s project involves the development of 
a practical model for moral reasoning. The dominant place which reason occupies in 
Taylor’s theory is, in itself, adequate proof that Taylor is not seeking to provoke a new 
age of Sturm und Drang. Indeed, Taylor’s work in Sources may even be described as 
helping agents to articulate “the worth of ordinary human desire and fulfillment” as 
powerful moral sources.  
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So then, we might ask, if Taylor values “the worth of ordinary human desire and 
fulfillment” why is he critical of the “affirmation of ordinary life”? At the heart of 
Taylor’s critique of the “affirmation of ordinary life” is the renunciation of “qualitative 
distinction” it involves. In “reducing” dignity to a utilitarian valuation of the “life of 
production and reproduction, of work and the family” Taylor believes that the 
“affirmation of ordinary life, while necessarily denouncing certain distinctions, itself 
amounts to one; else it has no meaning at all” (ibid). Taylor’s resistance to the 
“affirmation of ordinary life” is not based on a sentimental view of pre-modern hierarchy. 
Rather, it is rooted in the way that such an “affirmation” limits the possible sources of 
dignity to a utilitarian measure of one’s “manner of living ordinary life” (ibid). The 
naturalist sense of dignity espoused in the “affirmation of ordinary life” is completely at 
odds with Taylor’s moral theory; wherein a variety of “qualitative distinctions” are 
evinced by agents spelling out “what it is that we presuppose when we judge that a 
certain form of life is truly worthwhile, or place our dignity in a certain achievement or 
status, or define our moral obligations in a certain manner” (Taylor 1989b, 26).     
Taylor’s critique of the “affirmation of ordinary life” is, ultimately, one front in 
his campaign against the various forms of disengaged rationalism and utilitarianism 
spawned in the west by figures such as Claude Adrien Helvétius, Denis Diderot, Holbach, 
Jeremy Bentham et al. Indeed, Taylor devotes chapter nineteen in the fourth part of 
Sources to a historical critique of the emergence of the naturalist philosophical 
worldviews which fuelled the radical Enlightenment. In this section of Sources, Taylor 
lays bare his disdain for the intellectual foundations of contemporary forms of disengaged 
reason established through theories native to the radical Enlightenment, such as 
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utilitarianism, as well as what he deigns the modern ideological descendants of 
materialist orthodoxy, such as Marxism. Taylor charges that these philosophies are 
polemical through and through, and that their tautological nature renders them 
intellectually “parasitic” (Taylor 1989b, 339).  
Yet, as vehement as Taylor’s critique of the utilitarian and disengaged models of 
reasoning and agency may be, he never loses sight of the profound intellectual progress 
which Enlightenment thought made possible. In Hegel, Taylor lauds the freedom which 
emerged from the Enlightenment’s initial usurpation of reified ancien régime power 
structures, built upon the lottery of hierarchical birth and the exploitation inherent in rigid 
custom. It is evident that Taylor appreciates the social, political and intellectual progress 
made possible under the banner of Enlightenment thinking. However, his appreciation is 
tempered by a keen awareness of the loss of the common horizons of meaning within 
which agents had oriented themselves toward ideals of the good appropriate to their 
social and spiritual stations (Taylor 1989b, 26).  
Here we begin to approach the core of Taylor’s mission of retrieval in Sources. In 
overthrowing the pre-modern paradigm of teleological thought, Taylor believes an 
integral aspect of human agency was lost. In Taylor’s moral theory agents orient 
themselves in the space of moral questions about what it is good to be through qualitative 
distinctions regarding which goods are most morally compelling. Following Taylor, the 
frameworks which emerge based upon the distinctions made between moral goods by 
agents are not arbitrary. Taylor argues that the goods which agents find most compelling 
are those which empower them as moral agents. Following Taylor, agents do not orient 
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themselves in the space of moral questions based upon disengaged reflection, nor are 
agents free to simply “do without frameworks altogether” (ibid).  
In Sources, Taylor details how pre-modern moral frameworks were consigned to 
the rubbish bin of western thought by what he calls the “reductive thesis” of naturalism. It 
must be noted that Taylor does not lament the loss of the superstitious, or classist content 
of pre-modern moral frameworks. Rather, Taylor feels that the wholesale de-legitimation 
of moral frameworks tout court has led to the suppression of a basic dimension of moral 
agency; the relationship between “identity and the good”. 
On the “Reductive Thesis” 
 The “reductive thesis” which Taylor identifies as the cause of this suppression is 
a facet of the (bad) epistemology of naturalism. According to Taylor, the “reductive 
thesis” rejects claims about moral ontology on an empirical basis (Taylor 1989b, 19). 
Taylor portrays the naturalists as subscribing to a, putatively, pure utilitarian view. The 
general principle of this utilitarian view consists of the belief that moral actions and 
reactions can be calculated through disengaged reasoning. In this utilitarian model, the 
power to act morally is tied to the power of disengaged agency. Thus, for the utilitarian, 
moral ideals (or in Taylor’s parlance goods) exert no power vis à vis agents; they are 
simply variables in an equation.  
Taylor makes a point in Sources of first examining an ad hominem critique of the 
naturalists’ “reductive thesis”. Taylor points out that even a reductive worldview exists 
within a space of moral questions wherein ideas of what is good possess power. In the 
case of naturalism, the orienting ideals might be described as those of objectivity and 
disengaged agency. Taylor asserts that the “reductive thesis” is itself evidence of the way 
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that naturalists operate with a “sense of qualitative distinction” about what is worthwhile 
(Taylor 1989b, 21). However, Taylor is quick to elucidate how the “sense of qualitative 
distinctions” which agents use to orient themselves within the space of moral questions 
may be either “spelled out in a highly explicit way, in a philosophically formulated 
ontology or anthropology”, or commensurately, it may be so thoroughly sublimated as to 
appear as though the agents live without any framework whatsoever; a condition Taylor 
claims is “always untrue” (ibid).  
 As sharp as the ad hominem critique is, Taylor feels that it falls short in presenting 
how indispensable frameworks are for agents in their development and articulation of, 
robust moral identities.  Taylor concludes that the ad hominem argument falls short by 
allowing for the potential that some individuals may do without frameworks all-together. 
If Taylor’s arguments are to overcome the naturalist “reductive thesis”, he must establish 
how frameworks are a necessarily universal feature of moral agency.  
I want to defend the strong thesis that doing without frameworks is utterly 
impossible for us; otherwise put, that the horizons within which we live our lives 
and which make sense of them have to include these strong qualitative 
discriminations. Moreover, this is not meant just as a contingently true 
psychological fact about human beings, which could perhaps turn out one day not 
to hold for some exceptional individual or new type, some superman of 
disengaged objectification. Rather the claim is that living within such strongly 
qualified horizons is constitutive of human agency, that stepping outside these 
limits would be tantamount to stepping outside what we would recognize as 
integral, that is, undamaged human personhood. (Taylor 1989b, 27) 
 
Taylor takes pains here to drive home the claim that frameworks are indispensable 
to “undamaged human personhood”. Taylor goes on to describe how the space of moral 
questions in which agents frameworks take shape is also the space within which agents 
measure their dignity through the reflective process of strong evaluation
16
. Weighing up 
                                                 
16
 See chapter two pg. 81 of this dissertation for the description of strong evaluation. 
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of their sense of their lives as meaningful based on their proximity to their visions of 
what it is good to be.  
To know who I am is a species of knowing where I stand. My identity is defined 
by the commitments and identifications which provide the frame or horizon 
within which I can try to determine from case to case what is good, or valuable, or 
what ought to be done, or what I endorse or oppose. In other words, it is the 
horizon within which I am capable of taking a stand. (ibid) 
 
 Taylor develops a picture of engaged agency, embedded in a definite moral 
ontology, wherein agents interact in a reciprocal fashion with moral goods through the 
exercise of practical reason and expressive articulation.  Thus, moral goods only possess 
practical meaning in so far as human beings engage with and articulate them (Taylor 
1989b, 58-59). Conversely, the vigor of a given agent’s moral identity depends upon the 
extent to which said agent acknowledges, reflects upon, and articulates the goods they 
identify as most empowering.  
In his essay “Taylor, “History,” and the History of Philosophy” Terry Pinkard 
provides an excellent synopsis of the “realism” which characterizes the relationship 
between moral goods and rational reflection in Taylor’s moral theory. Pinkard describes 
Taylor’s view that “The goods toward which we orient ourselves are real, even if they 
depend on the existence of humans for them to be goods; they are not mere projections 
that we force onto the world” (Pinkard 2004, 195). Pinkard goes on to illustrate how, for 
Taylor, reasoning about these goods is an ongoing process. “To incorporate those goods 
into our ways of living, moreover, means that we must reason about them. We must see 
to what else such an incorporation commits us (or to what else it inclines us or for which 
it offers additional motivation), and we are often thereby called to evaluate and reevaluate 
that orientation as it is being lived out” (Pinkard 2004, 196).  
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Pinkard helps us to understand that while frameworks are essential elements in 
Taylor’s moral theory, they are not to be treated as static in and of themselves. The 
ongoing “evaluation and reevaluation” of the place of goods within the frameworks that 
orient us in the space of moral questions, is part and parcel of Taylor’s model of practical 
reasoning and engaged agency . Taylor’s rendering of moral agency evinces a strong self-
determining character. Taylor paints a much more involved portrait of moral agency than 
does the utilitarian model advanced in philosophical naturalism. In Sources, Taylor 
advances a model of moral agency which balances moral realism with practical 
reasoning.   
Understanding Taylor’s thesis concerning the essential role which frameworks 
play in helping agents navigate the space of moral questions regarding what it is good to 
be, is crucial for illuminating Taylor’s concern for a healthy, dignified model of moral 
identity development. Taylor believes that frameworks constitute a fundamental 
dimension for the development of coherent moral identities, and that the naturalist 
“reductive thesis” which denies the legitimacy of frameworks can lead agents into the 
throes of an “identity crisis” (Taylor 1989b, 27). Following Taylor, any attempt to forego 
frameworks would necessarily set agents upon a “painful and frightening experience” 
(Taylor 1989b, 28). It would do damage to their “personhood” (Taylor 1989b, 27). A 
symptom of this damage is apparent in the modern misapprehension of dignity rooted in 
the naturalist idealization of the power of disengaged reasoning. Contra the naturalist 
concept of a dignified, disengaged agent, Taylor claims that dignity is derived from the 
strength of our engagement with our frameworks which allow us to know “where we 
stand” in the space of moral questions (ibid).  
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 Taylor’s claim here hinges upon the acceptance that the space of moral questions 
and the frameworks we use to navigate it are “ontologically basic” (Taylor 1989b, 29). In 
this instance, it is helpful to turn toward a Heideggerian interpretation of Taylor’s moral 
ontology. Heidegger’s concept of Geworfenheit (throwness) signifies agents finding 
themselves thrown into situations without any a priori understanding of their 
circumstances (Heidegger 2010, 131). This element of Heidegger’s theory helps to clarify 
Taylor’s notion of embeddedness. I argue that in Taylor’s moral theory, agency begins in 
a state of throwness, and that the condition of being thrown into the space of moral 
questions is what kick-starts practical reasoning. Further, I contend that for Taylor this 
represents a universal condition.  
One orients oneself in a space which exists independently of one’s success or 
failure in finding one’s bearings, which moreover, makes the task of finding these 
bearings inescapable.” (Taylor 1989b, 30)  
 
The universalizing tone of Taylor’s assertion regarding the inescapability of 
having to find one’s “bearings” in the space of moral questions, coupled with our review 
of some of the basic tenets of his moral theory (i.e. frameworks, qualitative distinctions, 
etc.), evinces what Taylor describes as an account of identity that is “not only a 
phenomenological account but an exploration of the limits of the conceivable in human 
life, an account of its ‘transcendental conditions’” (Taylor 1989b, 32). In light of this 
statement we can surmise that Taylor’s phenomenological/transcendental account of 
identity rests upon the supposition of our existing in an inescapable space of moral 
questions (ibid). Further, we can deduce that dignity in this model of identity depends in 
part upon the clarity of the frameworks we develop for reasoning about what it is good to 
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be. But what does this process of engaged “practical reasoning” look like? And what 
about it is particularly moral?  
The character of the “practical reasoning” central to Taylor’s moral theory can be 
elucidated through a consideration of what I have termed Taylor’s transitional 
epistemology.
17
 Taylor insists that “The issue of our condition can never be exhausted for 
us by what we are, because we are always also changing and becoming” (Taylor 1989b, 
46-47). If we combine this claim with his description in his essay “Explanation and 
Practical Reason”, regarding how agents can adjudicate what constitutes an advance in 
understanding, a “gain” in knowledge, without relying upon the naturalist 
representational paradigm; we can begin to sketch the outlines of Taylor’s “practical 
reasoning”. 
What I want to take from this is the notion that we can sometimes arbitrate 
between positions by portraying transitions as gains or losses, even where what 
we normally understand as decision through criteria- qua externally defined 
standards- is impossible. (Taylor 1995, 42) 
 
 Taylor’s notion of arbitrating “between positions” speaks directly to his concept 
of agents weighing goods in the space of moral questions. Further, Taylor’s assertion that 
agents understand this arbitration according to a rubric of “gains” and “losses”, leading to 
an “advance in knowledge” (ibid), evinces how “practical reasoning” is reasoning 
through transitions.  However, I contend that what makes these transitions morally 
important in Taylor’s theory is their articulation. 
In another of his essays, “Heidegger, Language, and Ecology”, Taylor undertakes 
a discussion of the philosophical history of expression with an eye toward demonstrating 
what was so radical about Heidegger’s thoughts on the subject. I believe that Taylor’s 
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 See chapter two pgs. 83-85 of this dissertation for my introduction of transitional epistemology. 
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esteem for Heidegger’s conception of expression bolsters my argument regarding the 
relationship between a transitional epistemology and articulation underlying Taylor’s 
model of “practical reasoning”.  
Through language, a world is disclosed; a world in which features are 
located, which is also a locus of strong goods, of objects of the specifically human 
emotions, and of human relations. (Taylor 1995, 120) 
 
For Taylor, strong goods represent the beacons for our orientation in the space of 
moral questions. Further, the firmness of our stances in the space of moral questions is 
only as powerful as the clarity of our reflections upon, and articulations of, these goods. 
Taylor makes this point is his examination of self-narrative in Sources, wherein he ties 
agents’ orientation in the space of moral questions to the notion of their understanding 
their lives as an “unfolding story” (Taylor 1989b, 47). In order to narrate this story agents 
depend upon reflection and articulation. However, the conduit between strong evaluation 
and articulation is not as binary as it may seem at first glance in Taylor’s theory. Taylor 
places a great emphasis on the “human relations” which structure, shape, resist and 
continually inform our experiences as moral agents. To fully appreciate the significance 
of human relations in Taylor’s theorization of moral identity development it is necessary 
to examine his notion of the modern self. It behooves us to add the historical descriptor 
“modern” in this instance, as Taylor has been very careful to contextualize his study as 
dealing with the modern concept of the self, while steering away from the portrayal of 
reflection as a unique attribute of modern agency. However, Taylor does insist that “Only 
in modern western culture have we begun to speak of the human person as “the self,” and 




What I am suggesting is that we see ourselves as selves, because our 
morally important self-descriptions push us in this direction or, alternatively, 
because we identify ourselves with this kind of description. (Taylor 1991a, 305) 
 
 This genre of self-description is, Taylor claims, unique to modernity. As 
demonstrated above, Taylor presents the notion of an identity unencumbered by a 
fatalistic teleology as a unique development of post-Enlightenment languages. Taylor 
reveres the ways in which our modern languages of self-description express freedom 
from social, political and theological determinism. For Taylor, this freedom is integral to 
understanding the ongoing process of agents’ transitional movements toward increasingly 
lucid accounts of the strong goods empowering their moral identities. What begins to 
emerge here are the contours of Taylor’s moral theory as unique to modernity. Taylor’s 
concern with the ties that bind language and articulation to the background of moral 
experience, and the power of agents to construct frameworks within which to orient 
themselves in the space of moral questions, depends upon the modern western way of 
speaking of the “human person as “the self,” and of people as having and being selves” 
(Taylor 1991a, 304).  
On the Importance of Conversation 
There is another crucial characteristic of Taylor’s vision of the modern self which 
sets it apart from both pre-modern deterministic models of agency, and the radically 
disengaged agent envisioned by modern philosophical naturalists. This facet of the self is 
best elucidated in the title of an essay from which the two short passages above are 
drawn; “The Dialogical Self”. In this essay Taylor makes the statement that “Human 
beings are constituted in conversation” (Taylor 1991a, 314). Taylor also invokes the work 
of the Russian scholar Mikhail Bakhtin in calling for an understanding of language 
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adequate to a description of the way in which the self partly arises in conversation. 
Without diverging too far from our discussion of Taylor’s theory proper, I believe it 
helpful to try and parse out what Taylor found so important in Bakhtin’s ruminations on 
language.  
In an essay entitled “Discourse in the Novel”, Bakhtin champions the modern 
multi-vocal novel as an authentic style of poetic expression contra the exclusive 
dominance of the univocal expression of classical poetry. Bakhtin proffers the novel as a 
model of modern, pluralistic expression “multiform in style and variform in speech and 
voice” (Bakhtin 1981, 261). This model contrasts sharply with the idealized terrain of the 
pre-modern epic poem which speaks with a singular teleological voice. In arguing against 
the parochial unity of the pre-modern, epic voice, Bakhtin develops the trope of 
“heteroglossia”. Bakhtin’s aim in using the term “heteroglossia” is to convey a sense of 
the unlimited diversity of meanings at play in the linguistic background against which we 
frame our social and cultural experience. Bakhtin does not deny that quotidian life 
requires linguistic stability. However, Bakhtin asserts that the stability of meanings is 
limited to their historical manifestation in dialogue, thus rendering them always 
susceptible to change. This view resonates strongly with aspects of Taylor’s notion of 
articulation.  
 In his essay, Bakhtin describes how the dialogues presented in the novel are 
always built upon the ideological and linguistic character of their set period. Thus, a 
“unitary language is not something given [dan] but is always in essence posited [zadan] 
— and at every moment of its linguistic life it is opposed to the realities of heteroglossia” 
(Bakhtin 1981, 270). This evinces how coherency is as finite as those human beings who 
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struggle to achieve and maintain its auspices. The contention that the de-fault state of 
language is heteroglossic usurps the ahistorical tone of the pre-modern epic and the 
essentialism of its governing metaphysic. The assertion that our purchase upon coherency 
is fleeting, and our norms and conventions destined to be consigned to the category of the 
antiquated and incoherent, confronts us with what Bakhtin identifies as the “processes of 
decentralization and disunification” integral to the idea of “living language” (Bakhtin 
1981, 272).  
The vitality inherent in Bakhtin’s description of language as a living force, helps 
to illuminate what we encounter in Taylor’s description of the importance of articulation. 
For Bakhtin “responsive understanding is a fundamental force” (Bakhtin 1981, 280). 
Thus, we can infer that articulation depends upon active, engaged, attention and response. 
Passive understanding leads to dialogic stagnation, as it only absorbs the “utterance”, 
without helping contribute to the elucidation of “background” understanding. Taylor 
suggests that the self is constituted, partly, in conversation, Bakhtin shows us how.  
Bakhtin’s emphasis upon engaged articulation and the threat of stagnation 
resonates strongly with Taylor’s fretting about the malaise of modernity, and its roots in 
the torpor inherent in the naturalist model of disengaged agency. Bakhtin’s concept of 
discourse hinges upon the idea that exchange necessarily involves borrowing. Further, the 
second syllable in ex-change gains importance as that which is borrowed is always then 
changed. Using the novel as the stage for playing this out, Bakhtin describes how “The 
prose writer makes use of words that are already populated with the social intentions of 
others and compels them to serve his own new intentions” (Bakhtin 1981, 299-300). The 
notion of “social intentions” resonates with the idea of a “background” against which our 
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claims gain, or diminish, in coherency. While Bakhtin champions the strong sense of our 
language being pregnant with meanings not native to our own self-consciousness, he does 
not set discourse in a vacuum. What prevents reification in Bakhtin’s theory is his 
emphasis on change.  The novelist, a uniquely modern figure, engages in a hermeneutic 
of dialogical action. They articulate their own account against the background of other 
accounts, while simultaneously borrowing from those other accounts to shape their own.  
Bakhtin usurps the metaphysical stability of an idealized epic language with the 
dissonance of heteroglossia. Yet, he does not condemn us to the fate of Babel, forever 
confounded in the face of our multi–vocal reality. Rather, the dynamic nature of his 
pluralistic model prevents the exhaustion of metaphors and the instantiation of ultimate 
truths, endemic to totalizing metaphysical models. Bakhtin makes it quite clear that 
discourse is always beset by tensions that resist final consensus. Bakhtin describes how 
the “prose art presumes a deliberate feeling for the historical and social concreteness of 
living discourse, as well as its relativity, a feeling for its participation in historical 
becoming and in social struggle; it deals with discourse that is still warm from that 
struggle and hostility” (Bakhtin 1981, 331). Bakhtin’s description here disrupts both the 
telos of the pre-modern epic, as well as the disengaged ethos of naturalist reasoning.  
The allure of Bakhtin, for Taylor, rests in Bakhtin’s depiction of subjects as 
continuously engaged in a constitutive practice involving the articulation of visions of 
meaning drawn from a diffuse and undefined background. Bakhtin’s influence upon 
Taylor’s description of the importance of human relations and conversation for the 
development of moral identity, is strongly evinced in Taylor’s argument regarding “webs 
of interlocution.” Here Taylor attacks the atomism he believes central to the naturalists’ 
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representational epistemology. Taylor does not mention Bakhtin in laying out his case for 
the necessity of inter-relation in the constitution of the self. Nevertheless, I argue that 
Bakhtin’s sentiments regarding “living language” can be discerned coursing just beneath 
the surface of Taylor’s assertion that “I cannot clarify what I feel until I talk about it with 
certain special partner(s)” (Taylor 1989b, 36). 
I am a self only in relation to certain interlocutors: in one way in relation to those  
conversation partners who were essential to my achieving self-definition; in 
another in relation to those who are now crucial to my continuing grasp of 
languages of self-understanding—and, of course, these classes may overlap. A 
self exists only within what I call ‘webs of interlocution’. (ibid)  
 
Taylor advances the notion of the dialogical self in other works as well. In The 
Ethics of Authenticity Taylor develops a highly lucid description of how agents acquire 
the necessary language to construct identities through a process of exchange which, for 
Taylor, represents a fundamental aspect of being human (Taylor 1991b, 32-33). In 
stressing the nuanced and subtle spiritual and moral power of expressive language, and its 
constitutive place in the emergence of the self in conversation, Taylor builds a very 
different model of the necessity of interlocution from any found in the social sciences. In 
his essay “The Dialogical Self” Taylor dismisses the dialectical picture which frames a 
social scientific view of exchange as a legacy of George Herbert Mead’s “very 
impoverished behaviorist ontology…[which] seemed to be a brilliant way to make room 
for something like reflexivity while remaining within the austere bounds of a scientific 
approach” (Taylor 1991a, 312). Taylor’s notion of the constitutive necessity of 
interlocution for the development of identity differs from that of the behavioral model in 
another important fashion. Alongside the importance which Taylor places upon our 
ongoing relationships with others, (i.e. parents, friends, lovers, et al.) in the continuing 
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process of identity development, he includes relationships with “non-human” goods. 
Taylor also extends the bounds of what we consider legitimate sources of interlocution 
outside of the “given historical community” (Taylor 1989b, 37).  
In Sources, Taylor places significant importance upon the way in which agents 
learn “languages of moral and spiritual discernment by being brought into an ongoing 
conversation by those who bring us up” (Taylor 1989b, 35). Taylor also asserts that the 
moral and spiritual meanings conveyed through language are only comprehensible in the 
“common space” of conversation (ibid). Here Taylor is reiterating Wittgenstein’s familiar 
dictum regarding the impossibility of private languages. However, Taylor apprehends 
identity as dialogical in two dimensions, one based upon the agent’s orientation to strong 
goods, and the other rooted in the agent’s position within a “language community” 
(Taylor 1989b, 36). These dimensions are inseparable in Taylor’s reckoning, and form 
the background against which agents understand themselves and their world through the 
“transcendental condition of interlocution” (Taylor 1989b, 38-39).  Taylor’s description 
of the embedded character of all agents in “language communities”, with attendant 
historically and culturally particular vocabularies, is not a new revelation.  
On the “Sovereignty of the Good” 
As I discussed in the first chapter of this dissertation, Ludwig Wittgenstein 
undertook a much more sophisticated investigation of language along the same lines 
decades earlier, and Taylor readily acknowledges Wittgenstein as a major influence upon 
his own ideas about language and community (Taylor 1989b, 38). However, Taylor’s 
inclusion of agents’ engagement with strong goods as an integral aspect of identity 
development and articulation, adds a different element to the role of language in his 
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moral theory, and thus, requires some elaboration. Fergus Kerr undertook a probing 
examination of the role which goods play in Taylor’s moral philosophy in his essay “The 
Self and the Good: Taylor’s Moral Ontology”.  
 In the introduction to his essay Kerr juxtaposes Taylor’s project with the 
movement within analytic philosophy in Oxford in the 1950’s which sought to re-
envision an ethical paradigm harkening back to that of the Greeks, seeking to act as a 
bulwark against both “Kantian deontology” and “utilitarianism” (Kerr 2004, 84). Kerr 
attributes this quest to a group of female philosophers with whom Taylor would have 
been well acquainted; his supervisor at Oxford G.E.M. Anscombe,  Phillipa Foot, and Iris 
Murdoch, whose notion of the good Taylor discusses at key points in “Identity and the 
Good”. It is evident that Taylor shares this group’s concern with the predominance of 
naturalist epistemology in western thought, if not their quest to return to Platonic or 
Aristotelian ethics. “That is to say, he wants to open up a nonanthropocentric perspective 
on the good, to allow us to see the “sovereignty of the good” over the moral agent” (ibid). 
Kerr’s turn of Murdoch’s phrase “the sovereignty of the good” in describing just how 
radical a departure Taylor’s notion of the good is from the naturalist paradigm, is 
important. Murdoch’s influence upon Taylor should not be underestimated. Although 
Taylor does acknowledge his debt to Murdoch in a note (Taylor 1989b, 534), his limited 
discussion of her actual theory in Sources belies her importance to his work.   
 Iris Murdoch’s short, yet provocative monograph, entitled The Sovereignty of 
Good which appeared in 1970 presses a neo-Platonic argument for the apprehension of a 
“general metaphysical background to morals” (Murdoch 1970, 42). Like Taylor, 
Murdoch is a moral realist in the strong sense of goods commanding the love and respect 
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of human beings. Unlike Taylor, however, Murdoch is an avowed disciple of Plato and 
makes no bones about her philosophy flying the “banner” of the classic Greek schema of 
metaphysics. Much like Taylor, Murdoch invokes religious vocabulary in her discussion 
of a substantive approach to moral discourse, floating the metaphor of secular prayer as a 
mode of giving attention to the love of the good, in the way that religious prayer focuses 
upon an expression of a love of god (Murdoch 1970, 55). However, to really grasp the 
influence which Murdoch’s work has had upon Taylor’s thinking, we must examine 
Murdoch’s critique of the superficiality of the picture which naturalist thinking paints of 
disengaged agency, and her own emphasis upon the necessity of re-discovering the inner 
dimension of moral feeling. Murdoch advances a concise and extremely lucid description 
of the naturalist epistemology wherein “There is only outward activity, ergo only outward 
moral activity, and what we call inward activity is merely the shadow of this cast back 
into the mind” (Murdoch 1970, 21). Murdoch follows this with the bitingly rhetorical 
“why worry? As Kant said, what we are commanded to do is to love our neighbor in a 
practical and not a pathological sense” (ibid). Murdoch then goes on to point out why she 
finds this attitude so disturbing.  
This is one of those exasperating moments in philosophy when one seems 
to be being relentlessly prevented from saying something which one is irresistibly 
impelled to say. (ibid)             
 
Murdoch’s arguments foreshadow Taylor’s assertion that moderns live in the pall 
of an insidious moral malaise. This is most keenly felt when reading Murdoch’s assertion 
that the “newspeak” of “modern ethics” exiles the expression of certain values from the 
field of reasonable moral discourse (Murdoch 1970, 2). Here, Murdoch alludes to the 
incoherence which expressions of the love for the good, or in Platonic terms, the love of 
109 
 
the ideas, encounter in contemporary naturalist philosophy. When Murdoch cites the 
focus upon the practical duty to treat the neighbor ethically as a matter of will derived 
from moral law, she highlights the style of procedural reasoning which pervades much of 
modern moral discourse in the west. Further, Murdoch’s statement that the conventions 
of modern philosophical discourse prevent agents from saying what they are “irresistibly 
impelled to say”, resonates with a claim Taylor makes in Sources regarding the 
indispensability of certain terms in agents’ articulations. 
What better measure of reality do we have in human affairs than those terms 
which on critical reflection and after correction of the errors we can detect make 
the best sense of our lives? ‘Making the best sense’ here includes not only 
offering the best, most realistic orientation about the good but also allowing us 
best to understand and make sense of the actions and feelings of ourselves and 
others. For our language of deliberation is continuous with our language of 
assessment, and this with the language in which we explain what people do and 
feel. (Taylor 1989b, 57) 
  
This passage from Sources also evinces aspects of what I have been arguing 
should be understood as Taylor’s transitional epistemology. Taylor refers to the “critical 
reflection” of terms used for describing one’s vision of the good, as well as the 
“correction of the errors” which may obfuscate one’s orientation to strong goods in the 
space of moral questions. Here Taylor is picking up on Murdoch’s emphasis upon the 
inner dimension of morality, to which he adds a mode of practical reasoning which 
allows for the refinement of moral feelings and their articulation in a coherent narrative 
structure, the “best account”.  
I argue that what lies at the heart of Murdoch’s and Taylor’s respective projects is 
a powerful desire to redress what they apprehend to be the damage done to a holistic 
sense of moral agency via the naturalist rejection of an essential concern for the care of 
the soul, (or in Taylorian terms, the self) in contemporary western philosophy. The sense 
110 
 
is that the naturalist model of disengaged agency has obscured the connections between 
agents and the goods that command their love and attention. Murdoch hoped that her 
critique of the superficiality endemic to “modern ethics”, and her retrieval of the inner 
modes of moral feeling, would re-enliven a philosophical view which communicates “the 
energy and passion of the soul in its search for the good, the force that joins us to the 
world through good” (Murdoch 1970, 102).  
Murdoch’s portrayal of the good as a sovereign force commanding the allegiance 
of subjects, along with her insistence that the inner dimension of morality must be re-
introduced to contemporary moral philosophy, resounds in Taylor’s tone throughout 
Sources. The retrieval of a vocabulary capable of taking account of the inner dimension 
of morality, and the link which such a reflective exercise has with the care of the self, is 
particularly important for Taylor’s model of the development of moral identity in 
Sources. Although Taylor cannot follow Murdoch in her unwavering commitment to a 
Platonic metaphysical worldview, he does draw upon her picture of the inner dimension 
of moral agency in developing a unique notion of moral authenticity as a legitimate 
concern of the self. The self Taylor envisions is capable of submitting her moral 
intuitions to the strong evaluation of rational reflection and engaging in the continual 
refinement, and articulation, of the strong goods which help them to take a dignified and 
meaningful stance in the space of moral questions. This echoes in some respects 
Murdoch’s argument regarding unified moral agency. 
As moral agents we have to try to see justly, to overcome prejudice, to avoid 
temptation, to control and curb imagination, to direct reflection. Man is not a 
combination of an impersonal rational thinker and a personal will. He is a unified 
being who sees, and who desires in accordance with what he sees, and who has 
some continual slight control over the direction and focus of his vision. 
                                                                                                   (Murdoch 1970, 40)                                                              
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This passage suggests that Murdoch is attempting to tread the same middle path 
between the sentimental indulgence of Romanticism, and the absolutist rationalism of the 
Radical Enlightenment, that Taylor seeks to navigate in Sources. Like Taylor, Murdoch 
does not see human beings as disengaged minds with morality added, dependent on 
context. However, for all that Taylor shares with Murdoch, there are important ways in 
which Taylor diverges from Murdoch’s vision. I have already mentioned Taylor’s 
eschewing the genre of Platonic metaphysics against which Murdoch builds her 
arguments (Taylor 1989b, 96). However, the crucial difference between Taylor’s model 
of moral agency and that of Murdoch’s is Taylor’s adamancy regarding the necessity of 
agents articulating authentic accounts of moral identity. For her part, Murdoch only 
invokes authenticity as one example of the sovereign concepts which modern philosophy 
foists upon moral language in abeyance of a substantive discussion of virtues (Murdoch 
1970, 58). Indeed, Murdoch’s attitude toward the use of the term authenticity in modern 
moral discourse is indicative of what Taylor contends is a misapprehension of its 
importance in developing a modern ethos. Taylor thought the misunderstanding of 
authenticity so dire that he devoted his Massey lectures to addressing what he feels is the 
confusion around the ethics of authenticity and the role this confusion plays in what he 
claims is the malaise of modernity.  
As discussed earlier, these lectures led to the publication of The Ethics of 
Authenticity wherein Taylor’s stated aim is the investigation of what he claims are the 
feelings of “loss” which haunt modern subjects in the west (Taylor 1991b, 1). Taylor 
traces the sense of loss, or malaise, to what he terms the “narrowing” of meaning, 
whereby the “heroic” social standards of pre-modern idealism gave way to an atomistic 
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pre-occupation with the individual, “a centering on the self, which both flattens and 
narrows our lives, makes them poorer in meaning, and less concerned with others or 
society” (Taylor 1991b, 4).  
Taylor claims that the anxiety over this “narrowing” has been exacerbated in the 
latter half of the twentieth-century. Taylor diagnoses three malaises as afflicting moderns. 
The first malaise Taylor presents is that of individualism and the commensurate feeling 
of a parochial, narcissistic self-regard. To this he adds the disenchantment of the human 
cosmos and the rise of instrumental reason (ibid), and finally, the predominance of what 
Alexis de Tocqueville called the “tutelary power” of the state and the decline of citizen 
oversight and involvement in the governing of their own affairs (Taylor 1991b, 9). For 
the purposes of the work at hand, I will concentrate on the first malaise as it represents 
the prime moral pathology which Taylor is attempting to redress in Sources. Further, the 
malaise of radical individualism is by far the most well elucidated of the three malaises 
Taylor diagnoses, and is the one most directly connected to his interest in authenticity.  
 Taylor sets out to unwind what he feels to be the confusion surrounding 
authenticity in modern discourse by examining the contemporary school of cultural 
critics, represented by authors such as Allan Bloom, who attack the “facile relativism” 
they perceive as endemic among contemporary subjects (Taylor 1991b, 13-14). Taylor 
lays out the moral topography underlying what Bloom and others reckon to be a vapid 
worldview based upon the idiom “to each, their own”.   
In other words, the relativism was itself an offshoot of a form of 
individualism, whose principle is something like this: everyone has a right to 
develop their own form of life, grounded on their own sense of what is really 
important or of value. People are called upon to be true to themselves and to seek 




determine for him-or herself. No one else can or should try to dictate its content.  
                                                                                                                (Taylor 1991b, 14)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
 
What emerges from Taylor’s description here is a sense of existential 
libertarianism. Taylor confesses that he is not all-together unsympathetic to the critique 
of the modern valorization of self-fulfilment.  However, he cannot follow critics like Bell 
in an outright denunciation of contemporary moral culture. Taylor argues that secreted 
within the modern fetishization of individualism resides a “powerful moral ideal”. The 
ideal which Taylor discerns as exercising an animating force within the modern 
expression of individualism (an expression Taylor acknowledges may be “debased and 
travestied”) is the ideal of authenticity (Taylor 1991b, 15). Taylor is quite specific about 
what sort of authenticity he is invoking. Taylor cites Lionel Trilling’s description of 
authenticity as a concept indigenous to modernity, in differentiation to the more classic 
concept of sincerity, in his appropriately titled book Sincerity and Authenticity (Taylor 
1991b, 15-16). Further, Taylor explicitly defines for us what he intends in using the term, 
moral ideal. The passage should be familiar to readers as I employed it in the heading of 
the last chapter, and in light of our study of Taylor’s philosophical orientation, I feel it 
now bears repeating. 
What do I mean by a moral ideal? I mean a picture of what a better or 
higher mode of life would be, where “better” and “higher” are defined not in 
terms of what we happen to desire or need, but offer a standard of what we ought 
to desire. (Taylor 1991b, 16) 
 
On Sincerity and Authenticity 
Here we are provided a snapshot of Taylor’s whole moral theory. Taylor believes 
that through attentiveness to our moral intuitions, and our subsequently putting those 
intuitions under the rational reflective lens of strong evaluation, we can move toward a 
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“better” understanding of ourselves as moral agents. The first step upon this road, 
according to Taylor, rests in acknowledging the claim which certain goods make upon us 
as moral agents. In this we can begin to understand what Taylor has in mind when he 
describes “a standard of what we ought to desire” (ibid). By engaging in this quest, 
Taylor asserts that subjects can move toward an increasingly more authentic moral 
identity; a more authentic understanding of self. The conduit for authenticity, according 
to Taylor, is articulation. Taylor asserts that it is only through articulation that our self-
understandings gain moral force. Taylor is careful to note that he apprehends articulation 
to be an ongoing task, and a task which can only be performed amongst other selves 
(Taylor 1989b, 34-35).  
We are selves only in that certain issues matter for us. What I am as a self, my 
identity, is essentially defined by the way things have significance for me. And as 
has been widely discussed, these things have significance for me, and the issue of 
my identity is worked out, only through a language of interpretation which I have 
come to accept as a valid articulation of these issues. To ask what a person is, in 
abstraction from his or her self-interpretations, is to ask a fundamentally 
misguided question, one to which there couldn’t in principle be an answer…But 
the self’s interpretations can never be fully explicit. Full articulacy is an 
impossibility. The language we have come to accept articulates the issues of the 
good for us. But we cannot have fully articulated what we are taking as given, 
what we are simply counting with, in using this language. We can, of course, try 
to increase our understanding of what is implicit in our moral and evaluative 
languages. (Taylor 1989b, 34) 
 
Taylor’s almost casual suggestion that we can “try to increase our understanding 
of what is implicit in our moral and evaluative languages” belies the tremendous weight 
that this epistemic effort bears within his moral philosophy. In his essay “Overcoming 
Epistemology”, Taylor tendered just such a critical, reflective effort as an alternative to 
the (bad) epistemology of naturalist philosophy (Taylor 1995, 14). Taylor reiterates this 
stance in another of his essays, “Explanation and Practical Reason” (also discussed 
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earlier) wherein he described how gains in understanding can be represented as 
transitions (Taylor 1995, 42). It is my contention that Taylor’s interpretation of 
authenticity fits hand in glove with his notion of transitioning toward better 
understandings of the good. To wit, Taylor’s assertion above, that, “What I am as a self, 
my identity, is essentially defined by the way things have significance for me” (Taylor 
1989b, 34), becomes discernible as the progressive transition toward a more authentic 
moral identity through “self-interpretation”.  
Taylor’s desire to develop a lucid description of authenticity as a substantive 
moral ideal, a description capable of combatting both the shallowness of atomistic self-
fulfilment, as well as the outright dismissal of critics such as Bloom, is evident in the 
conclusion of Sources. In the last few pages of Sources Taylor begins to rehearse the 
argument which came to full fruition two years later in his Massey Lectures. In his 
concluding remarks in Sources regarding “The Conflicts of Modernity”, Taylor briefly 
touches upon the contemporary cult of self-fulfilment and its roots within Romantic 
expressivism, by way of American Transcendentalism. However, while pointing out the 
myopic focus upon subjective values such an attitude may endorse, Taylor cautions that a 
concomitant rejection of “self-realization” would be unnecessarily hasty, and perhaps 
damaging, to a holistic sense of moral identity. Taylor premises this cautiousness upon 
the argument that “our normal understanding of self-realization presupposes that some 
things are important beyond the self, that there are some goods or purposes the furthering 
of which has significance for us and which hence can provide the significance a fulfilling 
life needs” (Taylor 1989b, 507).  
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In The Ethics of Authenticity Taylor continues to tread carefully between 
advancing authenticity as a moral ideal integral for understanding the topography of 
modern moral identity development, while commensurately distinguishing between self-
realization and self-fulfillment. Taylor devotes an important note
18
 in The Ethics of 
Authenticity to an elaboration of the distinction between the readings of individualism as, 
on one hand, a “moral ideal”, and on the other an “amoral phenomenon” (Taylor 1991b, 
125-126).  
Taylor’s citing of Trilling’s take on authenticity from Sincerity and Authenticity 
as helpful for his own work in The Ethics of Authenticity (Taylor 1991b, 15), makes a 
brief examination of Trilling’s discussion relevant. Taylor places a great onus upon the 
potential moral idealism nascent in the modern emergence of individualism, over and 
above the atomistic manifestation of various “amoral” versions of radical individualism. 
Trilling’s presentation of sincerity contre authenticity offers us a clue as to how Taylor 
discerns between the two potentialities resting within individualism. 
Society requires of us that we present ourselves as being sincere, and the most 
efficacious way of satisfying this demand is to see to it that we really are sincere, 
that we actually are what we want our community to know we are. In short, we 
play the role of being ourselves, we sincerely act the part of the sincere person, 
with the result that a judgment may be passed upon our sincerity that it is not 
authentic. (Trilling 1971, 11) 
  
Trilling’s portrayal of sincerity bears the hallmarks of a genre of procedural 
behaviorism governed by utilitarian concerns. This represents a combination Taylor 
apprehends as the root cause of so much of modern malaise. To align one’s identity and 
actions with societal demands that we be perceived as “sincere”, and to follow a style of  
role-playing as “the most efficacious way of satisfying” said demand, risks what Taylor 
                                                 
18
 Note 17  
117 
 
refers to as “mutilation” of the self (Taylor 1989b, 520-521). Trilling casts sincerity as 
playing to the audience of society. For Taylor such an act would require the repressing, or 
repudiation, of any strongly intuited goods which did not coincide with the given 
parameters of societal mores. In Sources, Taylor employs the trope of “selective 
blindness” to describe what he contends to be our “stifling” of “some of the deepest and 
most powerful spiritual aspirations that humans have conceived” in a bid to conform to 
societal standards (Taylor 1989b, 520). Taylor concludes that the toll upon moral subjects 
of denying strongly felt moral goods is akin to an act of “mutilation”.  
We have read so many goods out of our official story, we have buried their power 
so deep beneath layers of philosophical rationale, that they are in danger of 
stifling. Or rather, since they are our goods, human goods, we are stifling. (ibid)  
 
Taylor’s claim here is that to stifle the goods we intuit as integral to our vision of 
living a good life, is tantamount to stifling ourselves as human beings. Turning once 
again to Lionel Trilling’s discussion in Sincerity and Authenticity, we can determine how 
Taylor’s interpretation of authenticity as a moral ideal, an ideal geared toward “self-
realization”, is viewed by Taylor as a way out of the malaise of modernity caused by the 
stifling of our powerful moral sources and authentic self-understanding.  
The word ‘authenticity’ comes so readily to the tongue these days and in 
so many connections that it may very well resist such efforts of definition as I 
shall later make, but I think that for the present, I can rely on its suggesting a 
more strenuous moral experience than ‘sincerity’ does, a more exigent conception 
of the self and of what being true to it consists in, a wider reference to the 
universe and man’s place in it, and a less acceptant and genial view of the social 
circumstances of life. (Trilling 1971, 11)  
     
Taylor, like Trilling allows that authenticity may be defined in many ways. Yet, 
they both include within their descriptions of authenticity, a strong moral component. 
Trilling’s suggestion of a “strenuous moral experience” meshes well with Taylor’s claim 
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that “authenticity points us towards a more self-responsible form of life. It allows us to 
live (potentially) a fuller and more differentiated life, because more fully appropriated as 
our own” (Taylor 1991b, 74). Taylor acknowledges the potential pitfall that lurks within 
the ethic of authenticity, wherein one may easily fall into the amoral self-fulfillment of 
radical individualism. Yet, Taylor persists in arguing that the risk is worth it. That we 
must not defer to the convenient dismissal of authenticity as disguised relativism, but 
instead engage in the “work of retrieval, that we identify and articulate the higher ideal 
behind the more or less debased practices, and then criticize these practices from the 
standpoint of their own motivating ideal” (Taylor 1991b, 72).  
On Retrieval 
The trope of retrieval is a favourite of Taylor’s. It appears in several of his various 
works, and as noted earlier, it is invoked to characterize an “important element” in 
Sources (Taylor 1989b, 4). Just how important an element the “work of retrieval” 
constitutes in Sources is not apparent until the outline I have been drawing of Taylor’s 
moral theory comes more fully into view. As I have demonstrated, Taylor’s moral theory 
depends upon powerful connections established through the strong (rational) evaluation 
of intuited moral goods, allowing for the construction of frameworks within which agents 
orient themselves toward increasingly proximal positions relative to the horizons of their 
visions of the good life. The movement of agents within the space of moral questions is 
accomplished through transitions from less lucid to more lucid understandings of the 
goods which command their love and respect (Taylor 1989b, 78). The imperative to 
engage in such a “work of retrieval” only makes sense, of course, if one is sympathetic to 
Taylor’s diagnosis of malaise. 
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The intention of this work was one of retrieval, an attempt to uncover 
buried goods through rearticulation—and thereby to make these sources again 
empower, to bring the air back again into the half-collapsed lungs of the spirit. 
(Taylor 1989b, 520)  
 
In an essay entitled “The Person”, Taylor states in the course of a discussion of 
the linguistic dimension of significance and the establishment of standards that, “The 
standard needs to be focused in language” (Taylor, 1985a, 272). What is included in such 
a “focusing” in language is helpfully elaborated by Fergus Kerr as “the kind of personal 
recognition of some good for human beings which springs from some other than purely 
human source, for which Taylor has been arguing all along, has to be spelled out in 
instances of ordinary everyday discriminations” (Kerr 2004, 102). Thus, following 
Taylor, the power of goods as beacons for orienting our(selves) within the space of moral 
questions depends upon the degree to which we, as moral agents, articulate the meanings 
we intuit as made manifest through our acknowledgement of the significance they have 
for us; “The central notion here is that articulation can bring us closer to the good as a 
moral source, can give it power” (Taylor 1989b, 92).  
Using Bernard Williams’ examination of value terms from his work Ethics and 
the Limits of Philosophy as a jumping off point, Taylor describes, in Sources, the ways in 
which “descriptive meaning” is inextricably bound up with “evaluation” in our 
understanding of value terms. Taylor’s argument asserts that the background against 
which our value statements make sense requires a combination of both the “descriptive 
meaning” commensurable within the “webs of interlocution” which form our “language 
communities”, along with individual “qualitative discriminations” derived from the 
process of “strong evaluation” determining the importance of a given value/ideal within 
the hierarchy of goods upon which each self’s moral identity is built (Taylor 1989b, 54).  
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The facet of Taylor’s value/ language argument which takes it from slightly 
unconventional to groundbreaking, rests in his portrayal of individual “qualitative 
discriminations” as based upon real, non-anthropocentric moral standards which make 
claims upon us (Kerr 2004, 100). This formulation flies in the face of the dominant 
naturalist grammar in the west, which draws hard and fast boundaries between objective 
and subjective claims and statements. The theory of language which Taylor advances in 
Sources represents his most lucid and complete argument against the representationalist 
epistemology undergirding naturalist grammar. However, Taylor’s argument regarding 
the descriptive/evaluative character of language is not only meant as a counter-measure to 
combat the alienating effects of contemporary naturalist languages which push utilitarian 
notions of morality; divorcing subjects from their own experiences and intuitions. Rather, 
Taylor’s theory of descriptive/evaluative language is crucial for his larger theorization 
concerning the integral relationship between moral identity and articulation. A 
relationship which, I contend, hinges upon the “best account principle”.  
The terms we select have to make sense across the whole range of both 
explanatory and life uses. The terms indispensable for the latter are part of the 
story that makes best sense of us, unless and until we can replace them with more 
clairvoyant substitutes. The result of this search for clairvoyance yields the best 
account we can give at any given time, and no epistemological or metaphysical 
considerations of a more general kind about science or nature can justify setting 
this aside. The best account in the above sense is trumps. Let me call this the BA 
principle. (Taylor 1989b, 58)   
 
Taylor’s description of the “best account principle” encompasses crucial aspects 
of what I have been calling his transitional epistemology. Taylor asserts that a substantive 
account of moral identity requires terms commensurable across both “explanatory and 
life uses.” Yet, he focuses upon the “terms indispensable for the latter”, i.e. “life uses”. I 
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contend that Taylor’s concept of “life uses” pertains to self-narrative, “the story that 
makes best sense of us.”   
In “Identity and the Good” Taylor firmly establishes the inescapably shared 
dimension of language, including the condition that agency depends first and foremost 
upon the acquisition of language through the ongoing “conversation” into which we are 
born (Taylor 1989b, 35). However, with the introduction of his concept of the “best 
account principle”, Taylor begins to hone his arguments down to a penetrating focus 
upon the connections between the good, language, and the self. Taylor hints at this turn, 
away from the public, and into the personal earlier on in Sources when, following his 
claim that agency depends upon our inauguration into an “ongoing conversation”, he 
asserts that based upon the foundation of “common language”, “I may develop an 
original way of understanding myself and human life, at least one which is in sharp 
disagreement with my family and background” (ibid). Taylor’s recognition that 
individuals’ accounts depend a priori upon a base in a “common language”, which pre-
exists their own articulations, allows Taylor to make his case for moral identity based 
upon a “search for clairvoyance [which] yields the best account we can give at any given 
time” (Taylor 1989b, 58), while remaining on the right side of Wittgenstein’s argument 
against the possibility of private languages.  
In pointing out Taylor’s shift from an examination of the descriptive and 
evaluative model of language to an increasing focus upon the connection between the 
evaluative mode of language and the development of individuals “best accounts” of 
moral identity, I am not trying to suggest that Taylor is hoodwinking the reader. After all, 
the title of Taylor’s work is Sources of the Self, not sources of the community. As such, it 
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is entirely appropriate that Taylor refine his arguments to address the consequences 
which his theory heralds for our understanding of the development of the self. In 
formulating the “best account principle” Taylor manages to weave together all the 
various threads of his arguments concerning language, epistemology, the good, malaise, 
authenticity, and the self. Further, Taylor’s use of the term “clairvoyance” in relation to 
the development of a “best account”  is particularly helpful for understanding how, what I 
have been calling Taylor’s transitional epistemology, allows agents in Taylor’s model to 
navigate these various threads.  
Taylor’s concept of the “best account” is that of an always tentative and revisable 
articulation of an agent’s strongly evaluated orientation toward their vision of what it is 
good to be. As such, it depends upon a base in the “common language” of description. 
Yet, it also accords with a uniquely authentic individual acknowledgement of the goods 
which agents intuitively sense as being empowering. The revisable nature of the “best 
account” recognizes the role which practical reason plays, and the possibility that agents 
can always transition toward a better understanding of their relative position to their 
strongly valued goods in the space of moral questions. Finally, as implied in its title, the 
“best account” is an articulation which meets Taylor’s requirement that we make sense of 
our lives through narrative (Taylor 1989b, 47).  
On Empowerment 
I contend an analysis of Taylor’s “best account principle” will evince how, in 
Taylorian theory, language plays a dual role in the development of moral identity. I have 
already established Taylor’s view of agency as founded within the “ongoing 
conversation”, and the “common language”, into which one is born. I will now 
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demonstrate how Taylor envisions the “evaluative” mode of language, composed of 
individual “best accounts”, as the means through which agents develop a robust sense of 
an authentic and dignified self. The differentiation here is between basic agency and the 
holistic sense of self venerated in Taylor’s moral theory. Following Taylor, the “best 
account principle” enables agents to refine their vision of the good through a process 
which includes intuitive, rational, and expressive elements. Through an adherence to the 
“best account principle” agents can transition toward progressively more “clairvoyant” 
understandings of the goods which command their deep respect, loyalty, and love.  
Taylor’s model of “best account” allows agents to give increasingly sophisticated 
and clarified accounts which, at least partially, render their moral ideals more salient. The 
goods which previously lurked in the background are, through their articulation in a “best 
account”, brought to the forefront of agents’ understanding. When Taylor declares his 
work in Sources as “one of retrieval, an attempt to uncover buried goods through 
rearticulation—and thereby to make these sources again empower”, he is alluding to the 
way in which “best accounts” transform heretofore “buried goods” into now conversant 
objects of conscious knowledge (Taylor 1989b, 520). Via our moral intuition, and our 
capacity for rational reflection, Taylor contends that we are compelled to recognize the 
power of these goods. Further, Taylor states, echoing Socrates, that a substantive 
understanding of reason must include a core component of “linguistic articulacy”, and 
consequently, that “We aren’t full beings in this perspective until we can say what moves 
us, what our lives are built around” (Taylor 1989b, 92). Taylor construes the “best 
account” as so overwhelmingly central to the constitution of moral identity, and the 
commensurate sense of the “fullness” of being an authentic and dignified self, that he 
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argues in favour of a form of limited universalism. Indeed,  Taylor’s assertion that moral 
standards exist apart from our subjective desires, exerting a power over us and 
representing real milestones for our navigating life, would seem to firmly plant him in 
both the universalist, and realist camps. 
I must distinguish between two currents of universalism which course through 
Taylor’s work in Sources. The first form of universalism is a generalized form implicit in 
what Taylor asserts is his theoretical investigation of “moral intuitions which are 
uncommonly deep, powerful, and universal” (Taylor 1989b, 4). The second, and I argue 
more problematic, form of universalism, is that which pervades the paradigm of moral 
identity and articulation which Taylor develops in his concept of the “best account”. 
Granted, Taylor does not prescribe any mandatory, universal content which must be 
included in a “best account” to render it either legitimate or meaningful. The unique 
nature of a “best account” rests precisely in the individual “discriminations” which gird 
it, and the particular goods toward which it is oriented.  
The second current of universalism in Taylor’s work however, is not a matter of 
commonality between accounts, but rather the decree of universality which Taylor 
attributes to the self-understanding derived from a “best account”. The depiction of 
universalized self-understanding is tempered by Taylor’s consistent emphasis upon the 
possibility of transitioning to better understandings. Nevertheless, Taylor clearly states in 
his discussion of cross-cultural conflict rooted in the incommensurability of differing 
accounts that “there is no reason not to think of the goods we are trying to define and 
criticize as universal, provided we afford the same status to those of other societies we 
are trying to understand” (Taylor 1989b, 62).  
125 
 
Taylor qualifies this decree of universality by cautioning that upon reflection, or 
in comparison with other accounts, we may revise our understandings and thus transition 
toward new accounts. Yet, following Taylor, it is not the account which is understood as 
universal as much as the self-understanding which the account grants the agent. Thus, 
while accounts change, the notion of self-understanding rooted in a universal adherence 
to the “best account principle” does not. Understanding this second current of 
universalism in Taylor’s theory is crucial for apprehending the picture of the empowered 
self at the heart of his moral theory. The self for Taylor represents the fullest realization 
of moral intuition and practical reasoning. Further, according to Taylor, the more 
sophisticated and articulate one’s “best account” becomes, is directly related to the robust 
character of the self it supports. This is the antidote to the malaise of modernity which 
Taylor feels is stunting our moral faculties.  
Commensurately, the health of one’s moral identity depends upon the degree of 
(universalized) self-understanding conveyed through one’s “best account”. Again, I want 
to make it clear that Taylor allows that one may always transition to a better, “best 
account” in the face of a convincing critique, or an alternative reading of goods. 
However, once confirmed, Taylor strongly asserts that the self-understanding implicit in 
the expression of the hierarchy of goods, crowned by one’s “hypergood” (the crowning 
moral ideal in a personal hierarchy of goods) borne in the “best account” represents the 
sine qua non standard for orienting the self in the space of moral questions. 
We sense in the very experience of being moved by some higher good that we are 
moved by what is good in it rather than that it is valuable because of our reaction. 
We are moved by it seeing its point as something infinitely valuable. We 
experience our love for it as a well-founded love. Nothing that couldn’t move me 
in this way would count as a hypergood. Of course, I could be wrong. The whole 
thing could be just a projection of some quite ordinary desire which confers this 
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seemingly exalted status on some object, surrounds it with a halo of the higher. 
Indeed, I could be. But I also could be right. The only way to decide is by raising 
and facing this or that particular critique. Is there a transition out of my present 
belief which turns on an error- reducing move? Do I have to recognize, for 
instance, that previously unavowed fears and desires of a descreditable [sic] kind 
have been lending lustre  to this good, which it quite loses when these are factored 
out? What successfully resists all such critique is my (provisionally) best account. 
There is nothing better I could conceivably have to go on. Or my critics either for 
that matter. So says the BA principle. (Taylor 1989b, 74) 
 
Secondary Sources 
There has been curiously little serious analysis of Taylor’s “best account 
principle”. Although several scholars include a brief description of Taylor’s 
understanding of the “best account” in their examinations of his work, their treatment of 
the concept rarely delves further than offering summary descriptions of Taylor’s own 
construal of it in Sources. Perhaps most surprisingly, however, is that Taylor himself all 
but abandons his elucidation of the “best account principle” in his work after Sources. 
Amongst the community of scholars who follow and comment upon Taylor’s work, those 
explicitly interested in his moral theory are in a definite minority. A great deal more has 
been written concerning Taylor’s political theory (i.e. communitarianism, the politics of 
recognition), and his historical/anthropological approach to philosophy, than has been 
undertaken regarding his theoretical fusion of phenomenological and transcendental 
streams of moral philosophy.  
There is no great mystery, however, as to why Taylorian scholarship is so heavily 
weighted to the political-historical side. The reason so little analysis, comparatively, has 
been applied to Taylor’s moral theory, is in part, that Taylor himself has written so little 
about it, relative to the overall body of his work. Those of us who had held out hope that 
Taylor would someday re-visit the powerful and provocative exposition of moral theory 
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he presented in “Identity and the Good”, have had our hopes all but dashed with the 
publication of his most recent “really big book”, A Secular Age. In this tome, which 
appeared in 2007, Taylor confirmed his reputation as a leading scholar of the history of 
ideas. The consequence of Taylor’s demurral from any further focused exploration and 
elaboration of the moral theory he tendered in the first part of Sources, and which he has 
spent a good deal of time in other works writing around, is that we are left with only the 
commentary of a small band of scholars interested in this aspect of Taylor’s work to 
bolster our own analysis of the “best account principle”.  
Even a cursory review of the body of secondary literature pertaining to the 
thought of Charles Taylor will turn up the name of Ruth Abbey. Abbey has distinguished 
herself as an intellectual biographer of Taylor. Abbey has published two of the most 
important introductory volumes regarding Taylor’s philosophical arguments, in addition 
to proving her extreme resourcefulness as the curator of an internet based bibliographic 
database maintaining an exhaustive listing of all things Taylorian.
19
 Nevertheless, neither 
Abbey herself, in her introduction to Taylor’s Philosophy, Philosophy Now: Charles 
Taylor, nor any of the contributors to her edited volume of essays tackling major themes 
in Taylor’s work, appropriately titled Charles Taylor, have taken up a substantive 
investigation of the “best account principle”.  
This is not to say that Abbey has ignored the place of the “best account” in 
Taylor’s philosophy. Abbey has indeed addressed the presence of the “best account” in 
her own analysis of Taylor’s theory. However, her examination of the “best account” is 
primarily a re-iteration of what Taylor lays out in Sources, framed by an examination of 
Taylor’s notion of reason, and a description of him as a moral realist. Abbey outlines how 
                                                 
19
 Abbey’s Taylor database can be found at http://www3.nd.edu/~rabbey1/ 
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Taylor casts strong moral attachments to goods as a basic existential condition. She draws 
the line between Taylor and naturalists based upon Taylor’s challenging any depiction of 
morality as an “optional extra” (Taylor 1989b, 68). Abbey describes how Taylor 
“proceeds with an argument about necessity. He contends that in trying to explain moral 
life, we need to take seriously the fact that humans experience their moral world as he 
says they do. The best account of morality must be one that incorporates the fact that 
individuals experience goods as being worthy of their admiration and respect for reasons 
that do not depend on their choice of them” (Abbey 2000, 28).  
Much of what Abbey states helps to drive home the points covered earlier in this 
chapter regarding Taylor’s exposition of moral theory in “Identity and the Good”. One 
aspect of Abbey’s description does, however, beg closer inspection. When Abbey asserts 
that “The best account of morality must be one that incorporates the fact that individuals 
experience goods as being worthy of their admiration and respect for reasons that do not 
depend on their choice of them” (ibid), she seems to go further than Taylor does in 
casting the power of goods over moral agents. In particular, Abbey’s claim that subjects’ 
“admiration and respect” for goods is experienced without regard to their “choice of 
them” as being worthy is, I believe, quite thought-provoking. Abbey cites page fifty-eight 
of Sources to back up her assertion. However, in my reading, Taylor does not present so 
nearly an imperious description of the relationship between the self and goods. As I cited 
above, in my own examination of the “best account principle”, Taylor does argue that 
“The terms we select have to make sense across the whole range of both explanatory and 
life uses”, and that in that sense the “best account” is “trumps” (Taylor 1989b, 58). 
However, the sense in which the “best account” is “trumps” depends on a reciprocal 
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relationship between agents and goods. This is a far cry from Abbey’s portrayal of 
subjects as driven to a “best account” by goods “for reasons that do not depend on their 
choice of them”.  
Abbey’s picture of the relationship between agents and moral sources as 
involuntary appears to fly in the face of Taylor’s emphasis upon the inter-relatedness of 
“Selfhood and the good” and how they “turn out to be inextricably intertwined themes” 
(Taylor 1989b, 3). Further, Taylor’s emphasis upon the importance of articulation places 
the onus upon agents to give expression to their strongly felt goods, so as to give power 
to these goods and make them accessible in “language communities”. Here the power 
seems evenly divided between agents and goods, evinced by Taylor’s assertion that 
“articulation is a necessary condition of adhesion, without it these goods are not even 
options” (Taylor 1989b, 91).  
In counterpoint to Abbey’s interpretation of Taylor’s moral realism, I think it 
helpful to examine a more skeptical voice regarding Taylor’s arguments. In his article 
entitled, “Charles Taylor The malaises of modernity and the moral sources of the self”, 
which appeared in the journal Philosophy and Social Criticism, Gary Kitchen undertakes 
a highly detailed critique of Taylor’s moral theory. Kitchen probes the underlying 
rationale of several of Taylor’s concepts, including the “best account principle” and 
“strong evaluation”. Kitchen ultimately concludes that apart from Taylor’s “belief that 
the ‘quest’ for moral meaning inescapably demands that we must all orient ourselves to 
something which he calls ‘the good’ – akin, perhaps, to MacIntyre’s idea that the good 
life for man is the life spent seeking the good life for man – he gives no convincing 
explanation of why strong evaluations should be interpreted as expressing intuitions that 
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make ontological claims about our nature” (Kitchen 1999, 50). Kitchen’s reading of 
Taylor supplies a good deal of critical entries for probing what Taylor takes as given in 
his philosophical account. In this respect, Kitchen’s negative appraisal of the “best 
account principle”, although somewhat terse, does help to raise some questions regarding 
the character of Taylor’s concept of “best account”.  
Although Abbey may have overstated Taylor’s portrayal of agents in thrall to 
goods, there is, nevertheless, an unintentional critical merit in her depiction of the goods 
as imposing upon an agent’s free will. This specifically concerns Taylor’s somewhat 
opaque and hurried description of “hypergoods”. This is an aspect of Taylor’s theory 
which I will explore in more depth in the following chapter. However, for the time being, 
Abbey’s depiction of Taylor’s moral realism, alongside Kitchen’s skepticism, can serve 
to prompt a more critical attentiveness to what may underlie Taylor’s explicit 
theorizations.  
Abbey also undertakes a consideration of Taylor’s moral theory and the specter of 
epistemology. Abbey asks the same question I myself was driven to address regarding to 
what degree Taylor is actually “overcoming epistemology” (Abbey 2000, 188). Abbey 
concludes that “In contrast to the macro-level of foundationalism, Taylor’s approach to 
knowledge does not accord epistemology a primary position. In his preferred model, what 
matters primarily is not knowing about knowing, but knowing about being or doing: 
knowledge of ontology rather than of epistemology assumes priority” (Abbey 2000, 189). 
In drawing a hard line between “knowing about knowing” contra “knowing about being” 
I contend Abbey is splitting too fine a semantic hair. Taylor’s “best account principle” 
depends upon “transitions” from less lucid to more lucid accounts of moral identity. The 
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increase in lucidity depends upon agents obtaining ever deeper and more profound “self-
interpretations” of the sources around which they have built their frameworks for 
navigating the space of moral questions. Hence, I argue that Taylor’s emphasis upon the 
quest for increased “clairvoyance” through the refining of one’s “best account” does, in 
fact, include a concern for “knowing about knowing” which then transfigures into 
“knowing about being”.  
Taylor’s epistemological approach is radically different from the foundationalism 
of the naturalist model. However, as evinced in statements such as “The terms we select 
have to make sense across the whole range of both explanatory and life uses. The terms 
indispensable for the latter are part of the story that makes best sense of us, unless and 
until we can replace them with more clairvoyant substitutes” (Taylor 1989b, 58), Taylor 
wears his desire to know about knowing on his sleeve. In fact, in the collection of essays 
assembled by Abbey in Charles Taylor, Terry Pinkard, in his contribution “Taylor, 
“History,” and the History of Philosophy”, offers a helpful description of Taylor’s “best 
account principle” in relation to Taylor’s notion of rational “transitions” which supports 
my own line of argument on the matter.  
Pinkard invokes the “best account principle” in his discussion of Taylor’s 
historical-philosophical approach to the “transition” to the modern self; wherein Pinkard 
contends that “The upshot of any such philosophical history, however, has to be some 
account of what goods are real for us if we are to be in any kind of position to 
characterize some transitions as rational. It hinges, in Taylor’s view, on showing that 
some kinds of considerations are rational because they are unavoidable in the sense that 
attempts to do without them fail (either by rendering us incapable of fully being agents or 
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by surreptitiously smuggling back into our lives the very items they were claiming to be 
excluding)” (Pinkard 2004, 201). I find myself in agreement with Pinkard’s suggestion 
that, following Taylor, the “best account principle”, characterized by the movement of 
“transitions as rational”, constitutes a key element in measuring the fullness of one’s 
sense of self as dignified and authentic.  
Yet, despite Pinkard’s crisp description of Taylor’s “best account principle”, his’ 
remains an analysis primarily pre-occupied with an examination of Taylor’s historical-
philosophical narrative. There is no doubt that Pinkard offers interesting insights 
regarding the relationship between “best accounts” and the fullness of self, alongside an 
intriguing argument that Taylor’s model of the “best account” betrays him as a post-
Romantic, anti-Kantian, heir to Hegel (Pinkard 2004, 206-207). However, these 
assertions are tangential to Pinkard’s primary project which focuses upon the historical-
philosophical dimension of Taylor’s theory, and thus afford nothing in the way of a 
detailed investigation of the “best account principle” in itself. Thus, despite their detailed 
and comprehensive exploration of Charles Taylor’s varied philosophical endeavours, 
(which offer great support for the study of Taylorian theory), neither Ruth Abbey’s own 
analysis of Taylor’s thought, nor her edited collection of essays examining Taylor’s 
work, furnish us with a sustained and critical investigation of the “best account 
principle”.   
Another name often associated with commentary on Taylor’s philosophy is that of 
Nicholas H. Smith. In his text Charles Taylor: Meaning, Morals and Modernity, Smith 
offers a probing examination of Taylor’s overarching philosophical project. In this work 
Smith touches upon all of the significant facets of Taylor’s broad field of inquiries. 
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Smith, quite convincingly, argues that the impetus which drives Taylor’s theoretical 
endeavours derives from a statement made by a philosophical favourite of Taylor’s; 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty. Smith claims that Taylor’s project can best be defined as 
propelled by Merleau-Ponty’s statement in the introduction to Phenomenology of 
Perception that “Because we are in the world, we are condemned to meaning” (Merleau-
Ponty 1962, xix). Smith elaborates on the implications of Merleau-Ponty’s portrayal of 
being and meaning, asserting that “We are condemned to meaning in the sense that 
human life generally, and modern life in particular, is structured by inescapable layers of 
meaning or significance” (Smith 2002, 1). Smith’s reading of Taylor as oriented by a 
Merleau-Pontian account of meaning is helpful for further establishing the genealogy of 
Taylor’s outlook.  
The importance to Taylor of  Merleau-Ponty’s portrayal of the inescapably 
meaningful character of being is clear in the lines which follow Smith’s quote from  
Phenomenology of Perception. Merleau-Ponty argues that, in phenomenology, the poles 
of subjectivity and objectivity are bridged through rationality. 
Probably the chief gain from phenomenology is to have united extreme 
subjectivism and extreme objectivism in its notion of the world or of rationality. 
Rationality is precisely proportioned to the experiences in which it is disclosed. 
To say that there exists rationality is to say that perspectives blend, perceptions 
confirm each other, a meaning emerges. (Merleau-Ponty 1962, xix) 
 
One need not stretch the imagination too far to detect a certain harmony between the 
passage above and Taylor’s construal of the “best account principle”. Smith, however, 
does not draw such a comparison. Instead, Smith concentrates on Taylor’s hermeneutic 
approach and the phenomenological and linguistic influences evinced in his theoretical 
models. Although Smith does not afford us any substantive consideration of Taylor’s 
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notion of the “best account”, he does offer an excellent interpretation of the specter of 
unity which casts a long shadow over Taylor’s depiction of narrative agency and self-
realization.  
Smith distinguishes between Taylor’s dynamic picture of the “questing” self, the 
self who employs “narrative identity” to give meaningful direction to their life as oriented 
toward a horizon of the good, and the “punctual self” which Taylor ascribes to a Lockean 
portrayal of “an object to be known through its transparent presence to a consciousness 
reflecting on itself” (Smith 2002, 98). While Smith does not invoke the “best account 
principle” in this passage, I argue that it is helpful nonetheless, for understanding what is 
at stake for Taylor in the “best account”. Smith’s emphasis upon the sense of movement 
characteristic of Taylor’s conception of the self, reminds us that although Taylor 
attributes a powerful role to intuition and strong evaluation, at no point does he allow for 
any reification of identity to creep in to his theory of the self. Contra naturalist 
paradigms, Taylor’s model of the self is far too engaged in the exigencies of a life 
“condemned to meaning”, to ever mutate into the extra-existential, meta-perceptive, 
disengaged agent fancied by naturalist philosophers. In this respect, Smith’s work helps 
to demonstrate how Taylor’s emphasis on narrative, and its place in the ongoing construal 
of a “best account”, functions as a bulwark against naturalist disengagement.  
 The absence of any concerted investigation of Taylor’s “best account principle” is 
not restricted to the commentaries of Abbey and Smith. The habit of overlooking the 
“best account” seems to have been established from the very outset of critical responses 
to Taylor’s thought.  In the very first dedicated volume of essays examining Taylor’s 
arguments and ideas entitled Philosophy in an Age of Pluralism: The Philosophy of 
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Charles Taylor in Question, edited by James Tully and published in 1994, the “best 
account” is but sparsely considered over the course of thirteen different responses to 
Taylor’s philosophy.  
The most substantive discussion of the “best account” in this collection is 
undertaken by Michael L. Morgan in his essay “Religion, history and moral discourse”. 
For the most part Morgan reiterates much of Taylor’s description of the “best account” 
from Sources. Morgan employs the “best account” as a field in which to situate Taylor’s 
theistic tendencies and the ramifications of God constituting an orienting good, and thus a 
source for a subject’s “best account”. Based upon this extrapolation Morgan asserts that 
“In a way, then, Taylor’s account of articulacy, historical examination and practical 
reasoning serves as a vehicle of retrieval for religious discourse and religious 
commitment…Taylor’s account re-establishes the plausibility of the divine-human 
relationship as primary for our moral experience” (Morgan 1994, 54). Based upon this 
thesis, Morgan undertakes a comparative analysis juxtaposing Taylor’s philosophical 
disposition with the seminal presentation of the “I and Thou” in the work of Martin 
Buber (Morgan 1994, 59). Although in and of itself Morgan’s appraisal of the theistic 
possibilities allowed in Taylor’s theoretical model is tremendously interesting, it is, I 
contend, the response which Morgan’s essay elicits from Taylor which holds the most 
value for our present investigation.  
 Taylor’s reply to Morgan offers a rare “re-articulation” by Taylor of the “moral 
and spiritual” contours of agents’ “best accounts”. Regretfully, Taylor does not seize the 
opportunity granted by Morgan’s essay to further elucidate his understanding of the place 
and function of the “best account principle” in the development of the self. Thus, 
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Taylor’s response to Morgan essentially acts as a rehashing of his theorization in Sources. 
Nevertheless, Taylor’s re-visiting of “best account” does provide a sharpening of some 
elements of his original argument. On the matter of philosophical genre, Taylor’s reply 
re-iterates his position within a field of phenomenological and transcendental 
investigation; evinced by his statement that “What I believe in is what figures in my best 
account of the world, history, and my experience as a moral and spiritual being, but what 
figure in this account are experience-transcendent things” (Taylor 1994, 226). Taylor’s 
intent here is to demonstrate how “The God who figures in my account is not a function 
of my experience, although of course my belief in him, and access to him, is” (ibid). The 
degree of subtlety with which Taylor advances so powerful, and contentious, an argument 
for moral realism, is stunning.  
In addition to confirming his philosophical disposition, Taylor also re-states his 
emphasis upon the necessity of “language communities” for the development and 
continuing health of moral identity. The notion of “webs of interlocution” is echoed in 
Taylor’s assertion that “No one thinks totally alone…I think with, sometimes also 
against, but largely at least in the terms offered by my community” (Taylor 1994, 227).  
 Alongside his re-stating his stances on philosophy and language, Taylor offers 
two statements which help to clarify the picture of the self he envisions capable of 
articulating a “best account”. Taylor asserts that “My community, my history, exceptional 
models, and my own reflection, have all combined to offer me a language in which I 
make sense of all this” (ibid). This intuits a multi-dimensional model of the self. Taylor’s 
model of the self is one capable of making sense of and shaping myriad influences and 
intuitions into a coherent articulation of values. Following Taylor, this articulation is 
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always tentative and subject to revision. Nevertheless, the assembly of both intuited and 
experiential inputs by the self in Taylor’s theory evinces a powerful inner life.  
Alongside the picture of the inner resources Taylor ascribes to the self, he also 
offers, what I contend to be, an elaboration of some of the conditions of authenticity 
which he apprehends as integral to moral agency. This elaboration consists of his 
discussion of what counts toward a characterization of his religious account as modern. 
Taylor claims that, in addition to “facing up to the puzzlement of the plurality of religious 
and other outlooks”, his is “also modern in giving the epistemological foreground to our 
moral and spiritual experience” (ibid). Admittedly, Taylor does not mention authenticity 
in this passage. Nevertheless, it is my conviction that Taylor’s above mentioned 
definition can help to elucidate what he believes is at stake in the moral ideal of 
authenticity based upon the imperative to articulate a “best account” which conforms to 
the force of our moral and spiritual experiences.   
 Thus far, my examination of the body of secondary literature pertaining to the 
philosophy of Charles Taylor, has consciously steered clear of the large portion of 
commentary and response native to the bailiwick of political theory. My decision to 
eschew this domain of analysis rests upon my desire to focus on the moral component of 
his philosophy. Although there is no clear separation between matters of morality and 
politics either in Taylor’s work, or in life; for the purposes of this dissertation, some 
albeit artificial borders, must be drawn. With that said, however, there are political 
philosophers whose work I must address, owing to the fact that their observations relate 
to Taylor’s notion of “the best account”.  
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One such theorist, whose work on Taylor deserves mention, is Gustavo Morello. 
Although it would be unfair to restrict the description of his study of Taylor’s theories to 
the realm of political philosophy (as it includes a substantive consideration of the 
religious and secular dimensions of Taylor’s thought) with regard to the “best account 
principle” Morello’s insights are more in tune with political philosophy, than moral 
theory. Morello explicitly invokes the “best account” in his own socio-political 
theorization. In his article entitled, “Charles Taylor’s ‘imaginary’ and ‘best account’ in 
Latin America”, published, like Kitchen whom he cites, in the journal Philosophy and 
Social Criticism, Morello undertakes an investigation of Latin American modernity using 
a lens crafted through the combination of aspects of Taylor’s theory of modern social 
imaginaries, and the “best account” (Morello 2007, 618). Morello’s approach is both 
novel and intriguing, and it helps to raise some practical questions regarding the socio-
political effects of both individual and societal “strong evaluations”. Nevertheless, his 
conclusions are geared toward a better understanding of class, polity, power and 
recognition in Latin America, rather than an investigation of the “best account principle” 
in and of itself (Morello 2007, 637).  
The political implications of the “best account principle” are also explored in 
Charles Taylor’s reply to his one time student Daniel M. Weinstock regarding the 
character of “strong evaluation” tendered in Weinstock’s essay “The political theory of 
strong evaluation”, which also appeared in the Tully compendium. Taylor prefaces an 
argument against Weinstock’s “normative” portrayal of the character of “strong 
evaluation” (Weinstock 1994, 172), with a preamble addressing the matter of universality 
in his theory; “First, a quick word about ‘strong evaluation’. I think this is something like 
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a human universal, present in all but what we would clearly judge as very damaged 
human beings” (Taylor 1994, 249). Taylor’s claim that “strong evaluation” is “something 
like a human universal” comes frustratingly close to a declaration of the absolute 
necessity of “strong evaluation” in the development and maintenance of moral identity. 
From this point, it would only be a matter of connecting the theoretical dots to arrive at 
the conclusion that a “best account” is a universal requirement of moral agency. Although 
Taylor does not take this step in responding to Weinstock, his near endorsement of the 
universality of “strong evaluation”, and the threat of “damaged” selfhood in its absence, 
does call to mind Taylor’s connection of integral selfhood and articulation (Taylor 1989b, 
92).  
The implication of “something like” universality surrounding the capacity for 
“strong evaluation”, coupled with Taylor’s inference that “full being” depends in part 
upon the ability to articulate, what in Taylorian vocabulary must be considered a “best 
account”, raises questions concerning what standards of normative agency are implied in 
Taylor’s theoretical model of the self. The suggestion of universality, which colours some 
of Taylor’s theoretical arguments, represents a particular concern for Isaiah Berlin. Berlin 
has known Taylor as both a pupil and an interlocutor, and he makes some very salient 
points regarding Taylor’s not-so-latent universalism. Writing in the introduction to 
Tully’s volume of essays, Berlin spares little time asserting what he believes 
distinguishes Taylor’s philosophical approach.  
The chief difference between my outlook and that of Charles Taylor is that 
he is basically a teleologist – both as a Christian and as a Hegelian. He truly 
believes, as so many in the history of thought have done and still do, that human 
beings, and perhaps the entire universe, have a basic purpose – whether created by 
God, as religious Christians and Jews believe, or by nature, as Aristotle and his 
followers, and perhaps Hegel (whose attitude on this point seems to me somewhat 
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ambivalent), have taught. Consequently, everything that he has written is 
concerned with what people have believed, striven after, developed into, lived in 
light of, and, finally, the ultimate goals towards which human beings as such are 
by their very nature determined to move. (Berlin 1994, 1) 
 
  Berlin’s assessment strikes at the heart of Taylor’s vision. Yet, Berlin’s 
conclusion also strikes what I consider an off note. I heartily agree with Berlin’s 
description of Taylor as concerned with the questions of “what people have believed, 
striven after and developed into”. These queries are entirely appropriate to a historical, 
anthropological, philosophical inquiry into the sources of the self. Further, it would strain 
credulity to deny Taylor’s theistic disposition. However, to mount the charge of teleology 
against Taylor based on these premises does not, in my opinion, hold water. Taylor 
recognizes the power of goods as real sources for moral identity development, and 
articulation. Berlin senses “essentialism” at work in Taylor’s theory leading to 
accusations of soteriological determinism, a “march inexorably towards some single 
predestined goal” (Berlin 1994, 2). Further, Berlin ties Taylor’s early Marxist leanings 
into the providential typecasting of his theory. However, what Berlin ignores is the roll 
and character of the “best account” in Taylor’s philosophy. Taylor’s concept of the “best 
account” as a tentative, revisable articulation of an individual’s “strongly evaluated” 
moral intuitions leaves no room for the possibility of all selves marching toward a “single 
predestined goal”. Although I agree that a strong sense of universalism overarches 
Taylor’s philosophical endeavour, it is not the sort of facile teleology which Berlin 
ascribes to Taylor.  
Questions 
Despite Berlin’s over-reaching, his critique of Taylor does raise some salient 
points. I have already described how the tenor of universalism expressed in Taylor’s 
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theory operates on different levels. To add to this, there is the suggested portrayal in 
Taylor’s work of a universalized, normative self which requires serious investigation. 
Although Taylor adamantly insists upon the embodied nature of agents, he says nothing 
of gender. Taylor’s entire construal of embodiment focuses upon an analogical 
description of the space of moral questions, and physical space, but what of gendered 
experience in moral and physical space? The result is that the framework for moral 
identity development which Taylor constructs is, implicitly, neuter.  
In Taylor’s theorization of the development of the modern, western concept of the 
self, he counts as “one of the most basic aspirations of  human beings, the need to be 
connected to, or in contact with, what they see as good, or of crucial importance, or of 
fundamental value.” And he asks, “how could it be otherwise, once we see that this 
orientation in relation to the good is essential to being a functional human agent?” 
(Taylor 1989b, 42). How indeed? Taylor’s argument leaves little room for an alternative 
construal of the grounds for moral agency. In Taylor’s account, the work of self-
clarifying one’s relation to the moral sources/goods which most powerfully appeal to 
one’s sense of living an authentic life, is imperative to “being a functional human agent”. 
To wit, authentic selfhood, expressed through the “best account” is a universal 
requirement of “full being”. Viewed in the light of universality it appears that Taylor’s 
concept of the self is highly exclusive. It depends upon several conditions such as higher 
reasoning, a broad and sophisticated lexicon of terms for self-reporting, and not least, an 
acceptance of Taylor’s rather murky notion of moral intuition.  
Is there truly no way to conceive of a full sense of self aside from Taylor’s basic 
premise of a self-understood orientation to a self-interpreted good? Are there not shades 
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of narcissism in this picture of authentic selfhood? Could it not be “otherwise”? These 
and other questions beg exploration. In the following chapter we will examine what the 
ideas of scholars such as Jane Flax, Arto Laitinen, Philip J. Harold, and Emanuel Levinas 





































   
Concepts of understanding and meaning are not unproblematic. 
                                                                                         (Flax 1990, 12) 
 
 In this chapter we shall embark upon the critical investigation of and 
hermeneutical intervention into the moral theory advanced by Charles Taylor in Sources 
of the Self. Prior to launching upon the always contentious waters of critique and 
exegesis, I wish to borrow as a maxim for our journey the succinct and insightful 
statement above, made by Jane Flax in her work Thinking Fragments. Flax’s statement 
goes some way toward diffusing the tension which surrounds discussions, and critiques, 
of meaning and understanding, by placing all theorizations and claims regarding such, 
under the sign of the finite and the flawed.  
Following Flax, all theorists who brave the discourse surrounding the 
complexities of meaning and understanding are bound to exhibit blind spots regarding the 
content of their arguments, and the scope of their claims. Thus, it is inevitable that some 
portion of all theoretical expositions will be viewed as problematic by other participants 
in the wider discourse surrounding a given subject. This is the case concerning my 
reading of Taylor’s model of the self, moral agency, and his elaboration of the “best 
account principle”. The maxim I have adopted from Flax also makes me keenly aware 
that my own critique of Taylor will inevitably contain elements which will be received as 
problematic by other interlocutors. As such, I tender the following analysis as limited in 
scope to those features of Taylor’s work which I feel, based on my own reading, require 
either further elucidation, or substantial re-imagination. My goal in this chapter is to open 
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the door to a critical re-interpretation of Taylor’s model of moral agency, and the 
character of the relation to moral sources it suggests.  
 I will present my critique of Taylor’s model of moral agency from Sources on 
three fronts. I recognize that drawing borders between the inevitably intertwined facets of 
what is a rather far reaching theoretical paradigm is an artificial conceit. However, in the 
interests of clarity, such an exercise in dissection is, I argue, necessary. Taylor’s 
philosophical gambit in Sources is incredibly prodigious. Taylor manages to smoothly 
maneuver the reader from Aristotle and Plato, through Hobbes and Locke, right up to 
Foucault. Further, Taylor guides this philosophical tour in so competent and confident a 
manner that, at the end of Sources, the reader is hard pressed to find any gaps in his 
historical account of the development of the modern concept of the self. Consequently, 
most of the critique of Sources, as noted in the previous chapter, has focused upon the 
perceived teleological, and/or theistic motivations underlying Taylor’s project. These 
critiques are not without merit. That being said, I believe that the concentration upon 
these themes in Taylor’s work has left other important issues regarding his exposition all 
but unaddressed.  
Going forward, I will raise and examine these issues. The first prong of my 
critique will focus upon the neutered tone of Taylor’s concept of embodiment. 
Embodiment forms a crucial axis around which much of Taylor’s philosophy revolves. 
My critique will demonstrate how the notion of embodiment advanced by Taylor, which 
is firmly rooted in Taylor’s reading of Merleau-Ponty, suffers from a glaring inattention 
to matters of gender, ethnicity, and sexuality. The second thrust in my critique will 
grapple with the depiction of “full” being which Taylor alludes to in the moral theory he 
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advances in Sources. Taylor trades upon a Socratic notion of “fullness” in his discussion 
of the importance of articulation for moving agents closer to the good (Taylor 1989b, 92). 
Much of Taylor’s measure of “full being” relies upon practical reasoning and articulation, 
which constitute crucial facets of what I have termed his transitional epistemology. I will 
demonstrate how Taylor’s suggested criteria for measuring “fullness” of being, implicitly 
excludes whole classes of human beings. This exclusion is rooted in the sophisticated, 
articulate criteria which Taylor requires for moving toward ever more “full”, authentic, 
and dignified self-understanding. Taylor, perhaps unwittingly, sets up a normative 
standard of moral agency in Sources which requires serious questioning. Furthermore, 
Taylor’s description of the power and place occupied by “hypergoods” in an agent’s 
quest for authentic moral identity requires interrogation. The orientation to such awesome 
goods casts a somewhat troubling pall over the potentially single-minded devotion which 
“hypergoods” may elicit from agents whose frameworks are dominated by them.  
 Finally, I will conclude my critique with a consideration of the paradigm of 
moral identity, moral ontology, and the tenor of discourse which emerges from Taylor’s 
theory. I will argue that, while this depiction is intriguing, in regard to the lived 
experience of moderns in the west, Taylor’s moral argument (which exceeds the 
boundaries of either a strictly phenomenological or historical account of the self), 
requires re-consideration. Taylor not only describes the contours and concerns central to 
the modern western notions of the self, he advances a moral claim regarding the goodness 
and fullness of this concept. It is my aim to highlight the shortcomings of Taylor’s 
understanding of what constitutes the moral imperative. Specifically, I will argue that 
Taylor’s notion of the “best account principle” suffers from an excessive focus upon the 
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integrity of the self, which is endemic in post-Enlightenment western thought. I will 
illustrate how substituting a Levinasian concept of ethics, in place of Taylor’s own 
preoccupation with dignity and authenticity, may light the way toward a different sense 
of self, articulation, and what we imagine to be best. 
On Embodiment 
In the previous chapter we touched upon how the concept of embodied, and 
engaged agency, is central to Taylor’s theorizing in Sources. While Taylor himself has 
been exceedingly clear on this point in a variety of essays, Ruth Abbey may actually state 
the case best regarding the rootedness of Taylor’s thought in this phenomenological 
outlook, and the way it allows him to challenge the naturalist representational model of 
knowledge.  
This picture of engaged embodied agency challenges not just the tendency 
towards minimizing the body’s impact on ordinary ways of knowing but also the 
very possibility of an inner/outer separation that characterizes the representational 
approach to knowledge. The sort of know-how that expresses itself in everyday 
coping cannot be construed as something that resides in my head or even in my 
body alone. It manifests itself in a way of operating in and with the world, so any 
idea of separating the self from its world becomes forced and artificial. 
However, it is not just knowledge about the world that Taylor depicts in 
this way: self-knowledge and self-interpretations are also embodied.                                           
                                                                                                                 (Abbey 2000, 181) 
It is both curious, and somewhat frustrating, that Taylor does not take the time in 
Sources to elaborate upon what he has said elsewhere regarding embodied, and engaged 
agency. Taylor expends a good deal of ink in Sources critiquing the disengaged notion of 
agency at the heart of the naturalist perspective. Yet, Taylor seems to take for granted 
that his readers understand the particular brand of embodiment which he attaches to his 
concept of engaged agency, and the arguments he marshals against naturalism based 
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upon this perspective. Here Taylor presumes too much. To begin with, Taylor seems to 
presuppose that a Merleau-Pontyan theory of embodiment more or less exhausts the term.  
Prior to delving into the ways in which Taylor’s presumption of embodiment falls 
short of the possible understandings which I argue must be considered when discussing 
embodiment, I think it is prudent to review exactly what Taylor includes under the term 
embodiment.  In his essay “The Validity of Transcendental Arguments” Taylor 
summarizes the theory of embodiment, which he derives from Merleau-Ponty, and which 
frames his investigation into moral agency.  
Now our perception of the world is essentially that of an embodied agent, 
engaged or at grips with the world… our perception as an experience is such that 
it could only be that of an embodied agent engaged with the world. Let’s consider. 
Our perceptual field has an orientational structure, a foreground and a 
background, an up and down. And it must have; that is, it can’t lose this structure 
without ceasing to be a perceptual field in the full sense, our opening onto a 
world. (Taylor 1995, 23) 
 
 For Taylor, the construal of embodied agency as constituting our “opening onto a 
world” is basic to the phenomenological theory of Merleau-Ponty. Taylor has adopted 
this perspective, tying embodiment to spatial orientation, as a basic feature of his moral 
theory. No concept goes unchanged when interpreted, and thus to say that Taylor ascribes 
to a Merleau-Pontyan theory of embodiment is overly facile. To grasp the character of 
embodiment which defines Taylor’s perspective, we must explore how he reads Merleau-
Ponty’s theory himself.  
Happily, Taylor wrote an exegetical essay entitled, “Embodied Agency”, in which 
he undertakes an analysis of this aspect of Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology. In the 
introduction of “Embodied Agency” Taylor casts Merleau-Ponty’s legacy as having 
advanced a philosophical understanding of humans as embodied agents. Taylor illustrates 
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the importance of Merleau-Ponty’s work in this area, claiming that Merleau-Ponty “has 
made the most convincing case for this view, and that he has explored its ramifications to 
unparalleled distance and depth” (Taylor 1989a, 1). However, the measure of “distance 
and depth” which Taylor attributes to Merleau-Ponty’s exploration of embodiment is 
calculated according to what Taylor believes pertinent to the phenomenology of 
embodiment. To wit, Taylor’s summary of Merleau-Ponty’s groundbreaking insights. 
The core thesis might be put in a few terse assertions. The human subject 
is an agent, engaged in activity, and engaged in a world, which is his world. He is 
an embodied subject. (ibid) 
 
Taylor emphasizes the engaged position of the embodied human subject as, in 
Merleau-Ponty’s words, “être au monde”, or being in the world (Taylor 1989a, 7). This 
clearly resonates with the picture of the engaged agent which Taylor champions in 
Sources. Indeed, Taylor takes the opportunity in “Embodied Agency” to denounce the 
“chimaera” of the naturalist paradigm of disengagement; “the notion of the subject as 
monad, or as an inner core which could be described without reference to the world” 
(Taylor 1989a, 8). Taylor concludes his essay concerning the place of embodiment in the 
work of Merleau-Ponty with an appeal for the expression of the character of embodied 
agency in the linguistic dimension. Taylor argues that we must “innovate in language, 
and bring the structures of our being in the world to clarity by formulations which open 
up a zone which is ordinarily outside our range of thought and attention” (Taylor 1989a, 
19).  
Taylor’s demand that we “innovate in language” strongly accords with his 
emphasis in Sources upon articulation, exemplified in his argument concerning the “best 
account principle”. Taylor borrows Merleau-Ponty’s description of our “being in the 
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world” and applies it to his concept of the agent orienting themselves in the space of 
moral questions. Important features of Taylor’s moral theory, such as engagement, 
reflection, and articulation, evince the strong influence of Merleau-Ponty’s assertion that 
“an articulated field is essential to having a world, that embodied agency is essential to 
the articulated field; that a sense of ourselves as agents is constitutive of the field” 
(Taylor 1989a, 17).  
In “Embodied Agency” Taylor asserts that “we have an articulated field: we 
accept as self-evident that we have access to the world through a perceptual field; and we 
are brought to see that we cannot make sense of this field if we try to reconstruct it in 
terms which make no reference to embodied agency” (ibid). For Taylor the articulated 
field is ontological, and the “best account” is an account geared toward making sense of 
our orientation in the space of moral questions. A space we are embedded in as embodied 
agents.  
The importance of Merleau-Ponty’s construal of embodiment for Taylor’s project 
in Sources is demonstrated by Taylor’s insistence that articulating one’s stance in the 
space of moral questions represents an essential aspect of moral agency. In “Embodied 
Agency” Taylor outlines the orientating nature of embodiment, stating that “we wouldn’t 
understand what the articulations, up-down, near-far, etc. could conceivably be, if we 
weren’t embodied agents with a sense of ourselves as embodied agents” (Taylor 1989a, 
7). This statement resonates strongly with his contention in Sources that underlying 
agents’ frameworks for navigating the space of moral questions, is a sense of spatial 
orientation ingrained in their perspective as embodied agents.  
What this brings to light is the essential link between identity and a kind of 
orientation. To know who you are is to be oriented in moral space, a space in 
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which questions arise about what is good or bad, what is worth doing and what 
not, what has meaning and importance for you and what is trivial and secondary. I 
feel myself drawn here to use a spatial metaphor; but I believe this to be more 
than personal predilection. There are signs that the link with spatial orientation 
lies very deep in the human psyche. (Taylor 1989b, 28) 
 
 There is much to admire in Taylor’s “phenomenological account of identity” as he 
lays it out in Sources. I strongly endorse Taylor’s interpretation of Merleau-Ponty’s basic 
premise of embodied agency as he applies it to the context of the space of moral 
questions. Taylor’s contention that, as embodied agents, we all have a sense of up, down, 
near and far, and that this orientating sense extends to our stance in the space of moral 
questions, renders his warning that losing one’s orientation in moral space leads to a 
confusion indicative of a dissociative disorder, or pathology, all the more disturbing 
(Taylor 1989b, 31).  
Taylor develops an interesting line of arguments concerning the relationship 
between embodiment and moral orientation. One need not, however, challenge the 
tenability of Taylor’s claims regarding the “limits of the conceivable in human life” 
(Taylor 1989b, 32), to effect a critique of the “distance and depth” of Taylor’s model of 
embodiment.  
In giving a “best account” Taylor makes it clear that the moral agent is acting 
from an engaged perspective and that the “terms we select have to make sense across the 
whole range of both explanatory and life uses” (Taylor 1989, 58). In Taylor’s discussion 
of the fully engaged self, wherein he envisions agents orienting themselves, and 
articulating their stance in the space of moral questions, the consideration for 
embodiment seems to stop at the abstract level of orientation.  
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Ultimately, I contend that Taylor’s account of an embodied sense of orientation in 
the space of moral questions lacks any serious consideration of agents’ actual bodies. 
Taylor’s claim that “a sense of ourselves as agents is constitutive of the field” implies 
that articulation, such as that envisioned by Taylor’s “best account principle”, is free to 
ignore the corporeal. I believe a great deal is left out if we follow Taylor’s lead regarding 
embodiment and moral agency. As embodied agents there are features of our 
embodiment with which Taylor seems unconcerned.  Taylor’s formulation of an agent’s 
“best account” necessarily leaves out crucial references to embodied experience such as 
gender, ethnicity, sexuality, and health. I argue that, in this respect, Taylor’s thinking 
about embodiment suffers from a disengagement from the particular. This disengagement 
limits Taylor’s construal of the relationship between embodiment and moral identity to 
the sense of orientation. As such, what emerges in Taylor’s theory is a concept of a self 
whose identity is defined by an understanding of where one stands in relation to one’s 
goods.  
to be able to answer for oneself is to know where one stands, what one wants to 
answer. And that is why we naturally tend to talk of our fundamental orientation 
in terms of who we are. To lose this orientation, or not to have found it, is not to 
know who one is. And this orientation, once attained, defines where you answer 
from, hence your identity. (Taylor 1989b, 29)  
 
On Gender 
Taylor fails to consider any of the corporeal, cultural, or political dimensions of 
embodiment which may limit agents’ ability to “answer” with regard to their identities. 
Furthermore, are our moral identities as monolithic as Taylor’s description suggests? It 
would be unfair to describe Taylor’s philosophy as patriarchal, and it is my distinct intent 
to steer clear of the sort of easy ad hominem attacks characteristic of such a line of 
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critique. Nevertheless, Taylor’s body of thought does evince universalizing tendencies 
with respect to the development of moral identity and the model of the self he envisions. 
Taylor’s attitude here evinces a glaring lack of attention to the power and place of ideas 
and expectations regarding gender and identity in the modern west. It is important here to 
differentiate between Taylor’s acknowledgement of the exclusion and marginalization of 
women and other groups from certain prospects of social realization (Taylor 1989b, 46), 
and the more integral consideration of gender as a fundamental feature of embodiment 
which my critique addresses. 
 I should also note that my comments are restricted to Taylor’s moral philosophy 
as it appears in Sources of the Self, and that, although I am well aware of Taylor’s 
arguments regarding the politics of recognition, which appeared in an essay of the same 
name in the edited volume Multiculturalism in 1992, I do not consider the political 
analysis Taylor carried out therein as informing the notion of embodiment which 
underlies his work in Sources. My own critical investigation here will be restricted to the 
matter of gender and embodiment in Taylor’s moral theory as it appears specifically in 
the first part of Sources. The absence of any substantive foray into the rich territory of 
gender theories leaves a massive gap in Taylor’s portrait of the modern self.  
Although there has been a limited engagement with some of Taylor’s work on the 
part of certain Feminist thinkers, it has been largely restricted to his political philosophy. 
Melissa A. Orlie outlines the paucity of dialogue between Taylor and Feminist 
philosophers in her essay “Taylor and Feminism: From Recognition of Identity to a 
Politics of the Good.” In her essay, which appeared in the collection Charles Taylor 
edited by Ruth Abbey, Orlie outlines how feminist critique of Taylor has stuck largely to 
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his work on the theory of recognition. Orlie cites, as an example, the way in which 
scholars such as “Susan Wolf and Linda Nicholson question Taylor’s apparent 
assumption that his arguments about distinct cultural identities can be applied to women 
as a social category” (Orlie 2004, 140). Orlie points out that while Wolf and Nicholson 
ask insightful questions regarding the place of gender in what is essentially an ethno-
cultural framework, they do not address Taylor’s moral theory in their critique. Orlie 
launches a lucid and challenging argument which presents moral concerns as crucial to 
feminist political theory. Orlie asserts that “As feminist theorists and activists have 
become more astute about power, they have become less articulate about their visions of 
the good” (Orlie 2004, 140).  
Orlie contends that feminists must complement the potent critique of gender bias 
and suppression with coherent expressions of the “goods” which inspire feminist 
analysis. What Orlie is pointing to is the lack of an explicit account of the moral ideas 
underlying the reformative work of critical theories. Orlie’s argument can be applied to a 
broad range of critical philosophies. While the thrust of Orlie’s critique is geared toward 
raising an awareness of the place of moral sources in feminist theory and critique, I 
believe that she simultaneously exposes a converse shortcoming in Taylor’s own 
approach.  
The feminist focus on the political and social dimensions of embodied experience 
includes a serious consideration for the corporeal consequences involved in theorizing 
agents’ bodies. Such concern is absent from Taylor’s concept of embodiment, which is 
rooted in a sense of spatial orientation. Unfortunately, Orlie never pursues this path of 
critique as she is occupied with her own project welding moral and political theories into 
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the superstructure of western feminist discourse. Nevertheless, her essay acted as an 
impetus for my own thinking about the absence of gender in Taylor’s theory.  
  It is disconcerting that a thinker as meticulous as Taylor would be blind to the 
message conveyed by the presentation of a theory of embodied moral identity which 
ignores gender. To grasp the severe consequences of excluding a consideration of gender 
from a theory of embodiment and identity, we must establish a basic understanding of 
what it is that is being excluded.  
 In the interest of clarity and concision, I will restrict my analysis to what I 
consider to be two of the most helpful approaches to the consideration of gender and 
embodiment vis à vis our discussion of Taylor. These two approaches to gender occupy 
somewhat antagonistic positions in the realm of gender studies. However, I believe each 
offers unique elements necessary for a more substantive examination of the modern 
notion of selfhood. The two figures who best articulate these respective perspectives on 
gender, embodiment, identity and the self, are Luce Irigaray, and Judith Butler. The 
central point of disagreement between the theoretical approaches to gender, advanced by 
Irigaray and Butler, has to do with the question of whether gender, i.e. categorization 
female/male, is strictly a function of a “juridical” power narrative, as says Butler, or has 
some antecedent metaphysical qualities, as Irigaray concludes.  
Both Irigaray and Bulter make excellent arguments regarding the nuances of the 
tropes and metaphors which suffuse the vocabulary of the body, gender, and identity in 
the west. The examination of both theorists is important for keeping in mind that the term 
gender does not signify a static category, and that my critique of Taylor represents one of 
many, different, possible approaches. Consequently, I shall bracket the tensions between 
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Irigaray’s and Butler’s conclusions, and stick to those insights most pertinent to our 
critical intervention into Taylor’s theory. 
In her seminal work Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity, 
Butler takes a Foucauldian tack regarding the matter of language, representation and the 
categorization of gender, and the mode of critical engagement which such a discursive 
model requires.  
The juridical structures of language and politics constitute the contemporary field 
of power; hence, there is no position outside this field, but only a critical 
genealogy of its own legitimating practices. As such, the critical point of 
departure is the historical present, as Marx put it. And the task is to formulate 
within this constituted frame a critique of the categories of identity that 
contemporary juridical structures engender, naturalize, and immobilize. (Butler 
1990, 8) 
 
In pursuit of such a temporally situated, material critique, Butler undertakes a critical 
analysis of the genealogy underlying the ways in which the normalizing power of western 
“juridical” language and practice has given rise to systems of regulating ideals governing 
the inculcation, and commensurate expectations, of gender in western societies. A main 
insight derived from Butler’s critical analysis demonstrates how subjects enter into a pre-
constituted field of existential norms and understandings. Taylor touches on a similar 
notion in his discussion of how agents are “partly constituted” through their development 
within pre-existing language communities (Taylor 1989b, 35). Taylor’s description of 
this phenomenon is largely positive, and functions to lay a communal foundation for the 
commensurability of the agent’s quest to articulate an increasingly authentic account of 
moral identity within his theory.  
Butler’s portrayal of the discursive framework is, in contrast to Taylor’s, 
markedly less upbeat. Butler elucidates how, in the west, the normatizing discursive 
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framework is established upon a juridical and political superstructure born of the modern 
idealization of equality, rationality and a secularized soteriology of progressiveness. 
Butler highlights how the recognition of one’s subjectivity in our society is contingent 
upon the legitimizing force of the norms attached to the idea of who is entitled to the 
rights guaranteed by the juridical structure. Entitlement here is tied to a naturalistic 
concept of internally coherent, binary gender. Butler’s analysis focuses upon the 
troubling naturalist a priori correlation between the corporeal and the cultural.  
This conception of gender presupposes not only a causal relation among sex, 
gender, and desire, but suggests as well that desire reflects or expresses gender 
and that gender reflects or expresses desire. The metaphysical unity of the three is 
assumed to be truly known and expressed in a differentiating desire for an 
oppositional gender—that is, in a form of oppositional heterosexuality. Whether 
as a naturalistic paradigm which establishes a causal continuity among sex, 
gender, and desire, or as an authentic-expressive paradigm in which some true self 
is said to be revealed simultaneously or successively in sex, gender, and desire… 
The institution of a compulsory and naturalized heterosexuality requires and 
regulates gender as a binary relation in which the masculine term is differentiated 
from a feminine term… The act of differentiating the two oppositional moments 
of the binary results in a consolidation of each term, the respective internal 
coherence of sex, gender, and desire. (Butler 1990, 30-31)  
 
 The absence of any explicit consideration of gender in Taylor’s theoretical 
discourse in Sources passively endorses the naturalistic assumptions regarding gender. I 
am aware that I am effectively convicting Taylor on a count of omission. Nonetheless, to 
omit a consideration of gender from an argument against naturalism as sophisticated as 
that which Taylor makes in “Identity and the Good” is unacceptable. In failing to take 
gender into account, Taylor effectively consents to the naturalist scheme wherein 
essential characteristics are assigned based upon the binarism inherent in the 
“consolidation of each term, the respective internal coherence of sex, gender, and desire.”  
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It is troubling that Taylor gives no weight to the facet of gender in his reflections 
on the development of moral identity (Taylor 1989b, 29). It begs the question; does the 
intuitive relationship which Taylor postulates exist between agents and goods evince no 
gendered characteristics? Are agents’ stances in the space of moral questions established 
prior to the imposition of societal norms governing gender? If this is the case, it would at 
least partly explain why Taylor does not include attention to gender in his concept of the 
“best account”. If moral identity is forged in a space free from the binary gender norms 
dominant in the west, then perhaps Taylor does not think it relevant to include gender as 
an influence upon “best accounts”.  
Still, in so much as the “best account” is an articulation of an agent’s moral 
identity, expressed in the languages of moral and spiritual discernment, we learn “by 
being brought into an ongoing conversation by those who bring us up” (Taylor 1989b, 
35), it seems a grave oversight to ignore gender in articulation. Unless, of course, when 
Taylor states that “There is no way we could be inducted into personhood except by 
being initiated into a language” (ibid), he has in mind a language unburdened by norms 
regarding gender, ethnicity, class, and so on. Further, the matter of sexuality, and norms 
regarding sexual orientation, raise thorny questions concerning the limited content of a 
“best account” articulated by what I argue is the universalized, neutered concept of self 
advanced by Taylor in Sources.  
Jane Flax offers a salient reading of the origins in the Enlightenment of the 
grammar which imbues modern moral philosophy with a desire for universal appeal. A 
desire which I contend colours some of Taylor’s arguments in Sources.  
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A number of assumptions and wishes motivate this hankering for a universal. It is 
a trace of the continuing operation of Enlightenment belief systems and the 
absence of useful alternatives to them.  
One characteristic Enlightenment belief is articulated by Kant, Rousseau, 
and others (for example, our contemporaries Rawls and Habermas). These authors 
assert that a moral claim can possess force or legitimacy only if it is made in the 
name of all (mankind). These approaches share a fundamental problem—such a 
unitary voice requires the suppressing of many differences. The masking of this 
suppression makes the appearance of universality, universal consent (or 
pragmatics), or a general will more convincing. (Flax 1993, 26)     
 
This raises some interesting questions regarding Taylor’s “best account 
principle”. The act of articulating a “best account” in Taylor’s theory may be approached 
as a performative act. Taylor claims that articulation brings empowering moral sources 
closer to us, “And in the most evident examples the power is not a function of the 
formulation alone, but of the whole speech act. Indeed, the most powerful case is where 
the speaker, the formulation, and the act of delivering the message all line up together to 
reveal the good” (Taylor 1989b, 96). The symmetry of the model Taylor presents is quite 
appealing. However, is such a balanced performance possible? Can agents be so single 
purposed? And what of the identity Taylor apprehends as expressed in these accounts, are 
we to understand it as being as coherent as his formula above? Butler advances some 
interesting arguments regarding gender, performance, and identity, which might help us 
to think more critically about Taylor’s model of the “whole speech act.”  
gender is not a noun, but neither is it a set of free-floating attributes, for we have 
seen that the substantive effect of gender is performatively produced and 
compelled by the regulatory practices of gender coherence. Hence, within the 
inherited discourse of the metaphysics of substance, gender proves to be 
performative—that is, constituting the identity it is purported to be. In this sense, 
gender is always a doing, though not a doing by a subject who might be said to 
preexist the deed. The challenge for rethinking gender categories outside of the 
metaphysics of substance will have to consider the relevance of Nietzsche’s claim 
in On the Genealogy of Morals that “there is no ‘being’ behind doing, effecting, 
becoming; ‘the doer’ is merely a fiction added to the deed—the deed is 
everything.” In an application that Nietzsche himself would not have anticipated 
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or condoned, we might state as a corollary: There is no gender identity behind the 
expressions of gender; that identity is performatively constituted by the very 
“expressions” that are said to be its results. (Butler 1990, 33)  
 
 I have no doubt that Taylor would take serious issue with Butler’s Nietzschean 
premise denying the “being behind the doing”. Nevertheless, Butler makes a salient case 
for understanding all performative acts (which I contend includes “best accounts”) as 
coloured by the norms native to the socio-historical context of the performance. This 
includes the languages in which they are performed. As such, we need to ask what norms 
might be perpetuated through the articulation of a “best account”. And might these norms 
be clothed in a veneer of universality by the agents who apprehend them to be 
empowering?   
Butler’s work can help us in another facet of our examination of Taylor’s theory. 
In Sources Taylor develops a very particular model of moral agency. Butler describes her 
project as, 
a genealogy of gender ontology, this inquiry seeks to understand the discursive 
production of the plausibility of that binary relation and to suggest that certain 
cultural configurations of gender take the place of “the real” and consolidate and 
augment their hegemony through that felicitous self-naturalization. 
 
If there is something right in Beauvoir’s claim that one is not born, but 
rather becomes a woman, it follows that woman itself is a term in process, a 
becoming, a constructing that cannot rightfully be said to originate or to end. As 
an ongoing discursive practice, it is open to intervention and resignification.         
                                                                                         (Butler 1990, 43) 
 
Taylor makes no serious reference to gender in Sources. Nevertheless, we might 
ask, what would a “genealogy of gender” turn up in Taylor’s work? I posit that if we 
investigate the discursive production of the self by Taylor in Sources, what we encounter 
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is a genre of universalized, abstracted, and neuter masculine agent.
20
 The combination of 
the terms neuter, masculine, and universal, in reference to the qualities of the archetypal 
agent presented in Sources (as well as many other works of modern philosophy), seems 
paradoxical and confused. After all, how could a subject be simultaneously neuter, and 
masculine? Following Butler, we must first acknowledge that the concept of gender may 
be interpreted as a product of discourse. It is accepted that an oxymoronic configuration 
of terms appears from time to time in discourse, and as troubling as they may be, they are 
a reality of language games. Further, the imposition of a particular category of being, i.e. 
masculinity, as a universal quality overarching other categories of being, is readily 
apparent in western discourses. Some of the most penetrating, expository work in this 
area of discourse genealogy and gender theory has been carried out by Luce Irigaray.  
The idiosyncratic, poetic tenor of Irigaray’s writing, allows her to probe and 
explore aspects of language in a manner which forces her readers to confront the actuality 
of what Margret Whitford described as the “woman-as-subject and her identity in thought 
and culture” (Whitford 1991, 13). Through her articulation of a complex and thickly 
descriptive grammar evoking the “female” body, Irigaray provides a vocabulary laden 
with “corporeality” for speaking about “sexe” and embodiment. Irigaray challenges the 
naturalistic grammar that normalizes the masculine as a universal condition of being, i.e. 
mankind, thus assigning the feminine to a descriptive sub-category of the omnipotent 
masculine.  
                                                 
20
 Taylor launches Sources with the statement that “I want to explore various facets of what I will call the 
‘modern identity’. To give a good first approximation of what this means would be to say that it involves 
tracing various strands of our modern notion of what it is to be a human agent, a person, or a self.” (Taylor 
1989b, 3) Yet, at no point does he consider gender in relation to any of these categories. Thus, the “human 
agent, person, or self” which develops is neuter. Further, in so far as Taylor envisions the bearers of 




The prevalence of the assignation of the feminine under the sign of normalized 
masculine universality in the west is epitomized by Taylor’s inattentiveness to gender in 
his theorizing the self. Irigaray’s work makes it clear that moral discourse shall remain 
both stunted and unjust as long as it revolves around the normalized, masculine universal 
subject. In her essay “The Three Genres”, Irigaray claims that “Genre represents the site 
of the nonsubstitutable positioning of the I and the you and of their modalities of 
expression” (Irigaray 1991, 141). This statement elicits a sense of the differentiation of 
subjectivity and responsibility manifested in a relational framework.  
However, the prevalence of a “neuter” abstracted genre of the universal 
masculine, allows for a disavowal of relational subjectivity. Irigaray describes how the 
masculine genre is cloaked in discursive universality, insidiously establishing a 
grammatical normativity couched in the particular interests of patriarchal power 
structures, somewhat akin to Butler’s notion of juridical discourse.  The deferral of a 
specific grammatical genre allows for the “neuter” masculine universal to preside over 
discourse, and enforce a patriarchal, disembodied authority. Thus, the dialectic between 
the I and the you is subsumed under a masculine universal grammar which colours all 
elements of “being in the world”.  
Irigaray illustrates how this hegemonic grammar is used in the French language to 
paint phenomena both natural and moral, transposing the “il pleut” into the ethical 
impersonal “il faut”.(ibid). The damaging effects of the disembodied perspective 
inculcated by the adoption of the “neuter” position are not limited to the subjugation of 
the feminine. Irigaray points out that the “neuter” also prevents men from apprehending 
their own condition as “sexuate” beings.  
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Abstracted from what Irigaray holds is their “sexuate” nature, it is impossible for 
men to grasp the breadth of the difference at play in the world. Irigagray paints 
relationality as dependent upon sexual difference
21
, and that the production and 
reproduction of both the physical and the intellectual, requires sexual difference. Irigaray 
maintains that relationality shall remain unjust and injurious to all agents as long as the 
de-sexuate disembodiment perpetuated by the “neuter” masculine universal subject 
represents the normative position in western discourses. Irigaray states that “Man, who, 
thanks to his labour, has a monopoly on the symbolic, has not thought his body or his 
flesh” (Irigaray 1991, 150). Men identify with the universal masculine genre and thus fail 
to grasp their own particularity. As a consequence, men are blind to the particularity of 
others. It is my contention that despite all of Taylor’s acumen regarding embodied 
agency, he nevertheless suffers from the effects of writing in a “neuter” grammar, which 
excludes the fundamental consideration of embodiment and gender. In effect, Taylor has 
given his concept of the self a body, but has neglected to consider the flesh. 
 Irigaray offers us a possible mode for re-thinking embodiment and sexuate 
relationality through a theory of an ethics of sexual difference. The challenge which 
Irigaray’s ethics of sexual difference presents to the idea of the “neuter”, masculine 
universal subject is born of a strong articulation of the woman/feminine as a genre 
different from, and irreducible to, the masculine universal ideal. The hoped for effect of 
such a strong articulation is that the dissonance of a voice erupting from what is assumed 
to be the unified category of agency, wherein all agents are represented by the “neuter” I, 
and guided by the masculine universal “il faut”, will be forced to recognize the presence 
of the feminine as a distinct genre. The disruption of the metaphysics of the “neuter”, 
                                                 
21
 a position that is at odds with that of Butler 
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masculine universal paradigm is underlined by Whitford’s description of what  Irigaray 
argued represented the other for the “neuter” I; “man’s other, says Irigaray, has always 
been conceived of as god, and not the other sex” (Whitford 1991a, 47).  
I contend that a hint of this dialectic overshadows Taylor’s construal of the 
relationship between the self and the good in Sources. In the denouement to Taylor’s 
theoretical argument in the first part of Sources, he suggests that “Our modern senses of 
the self not only are linked to and made possible by new understandings of good but also 
are accompanied by (i) new forms of narrativity and (ii) new understandings of social 
bonds and relations” (Taylor 1989b, 105).  Following Irigaray, we might ask what 
manner of new social bonds might develop under the auspices of a vision of the good 
attributed to a “neuter” self? Neither gender, nor sexuality, is considered to merit 
consideration as elements of either “strong evaluation” or the articulation of a “best 
account” by Taylor.  
I argue that in light of Taylor’s neglect of gender and sexual difference in his 
model of moral identity development and articulation, it is well within reason to conclude 
that the “new understandings of good” which he attributes to the modern self, perpetuates 
the delusion of the “neuter” genre. Taylor’s emphasis upon the elemental orientating 
relationship between the self and the good would appear to make the good the true other 
of the self. Irigaray has made us aware of the danger born of an I, or self, unaware of their 
own “corporeality”, and their position amongst others as a gendered/sexed, differentiated, 
particular, and responsible moral agent. Reading Taylor through the prism of feminist 
critique problematizes Taylor’s notion of embodiment. In ignoring gender, Taylor’s 
concept of the moral agent, and the “best account” they articulate, evinces a 
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disengagement from the historical and cultural particularities attached to gender. In a 
strong sense, feminist critique confronts us with the body which is abstracted in Taylor’s 
theory of embodiment.  
On Difference 
The picture of the self which emerges from Taylor’s work in Sources appears 
indifferent to difference. The Taylorian self is overwhelmingly concerned with plotting 
its own transitions toward more lucid and coherent visions and articulations of its own 
moral identity through the expression of “best accounts”. The passive indifference toward 
others evinced in Taylor’s model of the self is best expressed in his statements regarding 
incommensurability and universality.  
It may be that our contact with certain cultures will force us to recognize 
incommensurability, as against simply a balance of goods- and bads- for- 
everyone that we cannot definitively weigh up. But we certainly shouldn’t assume 
this is so a priori.  
Until we meet this limit, there is no reason not to think of the goods we are 
trying to define and criticize as universal, provided we afford the same status to 
those of other societies we are trying to understand. This does not mean of course 
that all our, or all their, supposed goods will turn out at the end of the day to be 
defensible as such; just that we don’t start with a preshrunk moral universe in 
which we take as given that their goods have nothing to say to us or perhaps ours 
to them. (Taylor 1989b, 62) 
 
Taylor manages to squeeze a great deal of slippery argument into a small passage 
here. A passage which I contend requires a good deal of unpacking. On the surface, 
Taylor seems to advance a case for a type of relative universalism. He lays a veneer of 
mutuality over the encounter between conflicting visions of the good, which allows for 
the possibility of a productive discourse taking place between rival moral worldviews, all 
the while gingerly side stepping any actual risk to the agents’ respective moral accounts. 
If, as Taylor suggests, we enter into discourse with agents whose “best account” is 
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radically different from our own, with the option that once we meet what Taylor 
considers the “limit” of commensurability we may retreat into our original position 
thought of as “universal” for us, thus categorizing our opponents stance as “universal” for 
them, are we not simply adopting an ethos of moral isolationism? What standard of 
definition and critique does Taylor envision framing discourse between rival moral 
accounts? Further, although Taylor does not set out from a position within “a preshrunk 
moral universe in which we take as given that their goods have nothing to say to us or 
perhaps ours to them”, his conditions of incommensurability and relative universalism 
certainly allow that we may legitimately conclude “that their goods have nothing to say to 
us or perhaps ours to them.”  
  The isolationist stance which I argue Taylor reserves for moral agents engaged in 
discourse who reach the “limit” of commensurability, is a necessary consequence of the 
manner in which Taylor asserts the self initially develops moral identity. Taylor 
establishes his model of moral identity development upon the pillars of intuition and 
practical reasoning. At present, our concern lies with Taylor’s construal of practical 
reasoning as it is directly tied to the embodied dimension of Taylor’s model. As I have 
argued over the course of the previous chapters, Taylor advances an epistemological 
program based upon the possibility of agents transitioning toward better accounts of their 
vision of the good. Taylor’s explanation appears imminently reasonable in so far as he 
describes this process as “a reasoning in transitions” which “aims to establish, not that 
some position is correct absolutely, but rather that some position is superior to some 
other”, as such, it is concerned “with comparative propositions” (Taylor 1989b, 72).  
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The play of comparative reasoning seems quite practical for an agent seeking to 
orient themselves in the space of moral questions. I argue that what precedes Taylor’s 
description of practical, comparative reasoning in this passage, is representative of the 
root of the isolationism which characterizes Taylor’s portrayal of encounters with 
difference between moral agents. In his strong defence of practical reasoning, Taylor 
questions the modern desire to develop a rational mode for establishing the superiority of 
a given view (Taylor 1989b, 71). Taylor concludes that such either/or reasoning 
constitutes a false choice.  
But if our moral ontology springs from the best account of the human 
domain we can arrive at, and if this account must be in anthropocentric terms, 
terms which relate to the meanings things have for us, then the demand to start 
outside of all such meanings, not to rely on our moral intuitions or on what we 
find morally moving, is in fact a proposal to change the subject. (Taylor 1989b, 
72)  
 
 Taylor asserts that, contra naturalist languages which attempt to devise a 
disengaged, objective grammar for moral reasoning; we ought instead to subscribe to an 
intuitive, expressive grammar. Here the question of authenticity looms large. If we follow 
the naturalist path, Taylor suggests that we are avoiding dealing with the subject at hand. 
Worse still, to ignore our moral intuitions implies being haunted by the sense of living 
inauthentic and undignified lives. I find Taylor’s indictment of disengagement 
convincing. Yet, I am troubled by certain aspects of his arguments, and the consequences 
such a perspective entails for the possibility of discourse.  
Taylor demands that we deal in anthropocentric terms. Yet he includes no 
consideration of gender in his reflections on “human agency”. Furthermore, Taylor 
suggests that we navigate the space of moral questions, reasoning in terms which have 
meaning for us, that correspond to our strong intuitions and the goods which move us. In 
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light of this, I am compelled to ask, is Taylor referring to terms which have meaning for 
us as agents born into normalizing traditions, who have inherited languages shaped by 
particular socio-historical and political circumstances? and if so, how can we possibly 
accede to Taylor’s claim that there is “no reason not to think of the goods we are trying to 
define and criticize as universal, provided we afford the same status to those of other 
societies we are trying to understand” (Taylor 1989b, 62).  
If our accounts must be in anthropocentric terms, then these accounts must also 
necessarily include all the particular differences inherent in our anthropologies. I have no 
doubt that each group might be able to treat their own goods as universal, but I have 
serious doubts about whether we could accord the same treatment to the goods of others. 
This mutually exclusive universalism strains credulity.  More disconcerting is Taylor’s 
suggestion that “our moral ontology springs from the best account of the human domain 
we can arrive at” (Taylor 1989b, 72). Does this mean that as each agent renders their own 
“best account”, they commensurately produce a corresponding moral ontology? If so, 
how does the individual moral ontology jibe with the inherited communal moral 
ontology? It would certainly seem that the agent’s opening onto the world is, for Taylor, 
profoundly rooted in their moral intuitions. 
My perspective is defined by the moral intuitions I have, by what I am morally 
moved by. If I abstract from this, I become incapable of understanding any moral 
argument at all. You will only convince me by changing my reading of my moral 
experience, and in particular my reading of my life story, of the transitions I have 
lived through—or perhaps refused to live through. (Taylor 1989b, 73) 
 
 The moral ontology this passage points to is one deeply set within the inner life of 
the agent. Although, Taylor still seems to leave the door open to dialogue in allowing that 
an(other) might convince an agent to change their position based on showing the agent 
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that their reading of their own experience is mistaken. This constitutes no mean feat, as it 
basically demands convincing an agent to transition to a more lucid view of their own life 
experience. Yet, in some ways an agent’s view is their experience. Thus, to convince 
them to change their view requires that they also acknowledge that their whole approach 
to life has been in some way “wrong”. The effort to sway an agent to change their 
position through discourse becomes absolutely Herculean if we follow Taylor’s assertion 
that the “best account principle” defines the boundaries of any outside critique of an 
agent’s moral worldview. In weighing whether one’s sense of the worthiness of a moral 
source is derived from its, “infinite” value, or rather from a more base desire which 
projects a “seemingly exalted status on some object”, Taylor invokes his “best account 
principle”. 
The only way to decide is by raising this or that particular critique. Is there a 
transition out of my present belief which turns on an error-reducing move? Do I 
have to recognize, for instance, that previously unavowed fears and desires of a 
discreditable kind have been lending lustre to this good, which it quite losses 
when these are factored out? What successfully resists all such critique is my 
(provisionally) best account. There is nothing better I could conceivably have to 
go on. Or my critics either for that matter. So says the BA principle. (Taylor 
1989b, 74) 
  
In this passage, Taylor renders a picture of the agent as the ultimate arbiter over 
their moral ontology. The notion that the Taylorian agent self-reads is a given. Taylor’s 
concepts of transition and “strong evaluation” depend upon self-reading (ibid). That the 
“best account” resists not only self-critique, but also the critique of others intuits 
something all-together different. Taylor admonishes the reader not to “start with a 
preshrunk moral universe” when encountering difference (Taylor 1989b, 62). Yet, 
following Taylor’s theory of the “best account” it appears that we have recourse to resist 
critique through an appeal to our preshrunk moral vocabularies. Taylor claims that 
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“through language we remain related to partners of discourse, either in real, live 
exchanges, or in indirect confrontations” (Taylor 1989b, 38). However, if we follow 
Taylor’s criteria of the “best account principle”, we never really run the risk of putting 
our vision of the good at stake when we engage in discourse with others. In Sources, 
Taylor describes the importance of agents’ “qualitative distinctions” for defining their 
orientation in the space of moral questions. Taylor concludes that these represent 
“contestable answers to inescapable questions” (Taylor 1989b, 41). However, if we 
adhere to the standard for critique set up by Taylor’s “best account principle”, it appears 
that how contestable the answers to these inescapable questions are judged to be, 
ultimately depends upon agents’ self-reading. 
 In La Philosophie Morale et Politique de Charles Taylor, Bernard Gagnon offers 
an eloquent description of the relationship between the self and the ontological in 
Taylor’s moral philosophy. Playing off of the disengaged perspective of naturalism, 
Gagnon explains how Taylor’s engaged, moral realism renders the essence of moral 
consideration an integral element in practical reasoning and articulation. 
L`imagination créatrice de l`homme a ainsi son importance dans l`affirmation de 
ces vérités, car la possibilité d`un regard absolu sur les choses en soi nous est 
aussi fermée que celle d`un regard pur sur soi; la redécouverte de ces vérités 
premières ne peut prendre forme que dans une type particulier d`engagement , 
dans la façons dont nous incarnons dans la réalité (mode de vie, pratique, 
institution) notre visions des choses. Or, à ce titre, une representation peut être 
dite plus juste ou plus vraie qu`une autre si elle permet d`ouvrir des dimensions de 
notre perception qui autrement resteraient dans l`oubli. Le réalisme moral a donc 
trait aux considerations pratiques de notre regard sur les choses et concerne notre 
existence au monde. Essence et existence sont complémentaires: la relation que 
j`entretiens face à la première détermine en partie le mode de la seconde; de 
même que mon existence constitue aussi une ouverture particulière à l`essence. 
Cette dernière relation, l`existence comme ouverture aux essences, doit être 




 Of particular importance in Gagnon’s exegesis is the way in which he highlights 
how, for Taylor, our engaged perspective rooted in our embodied nature impacts the 
ways in which we bring to bear our visions of the good in our lives. Gagnon offers a 
rather poetic description of how Taylor’s scheme has us incarnating our moral visions in 
reality.  
On the “Fullness of Being” 
I contend that Taylor’s preoccupation with the capacity of the self to transition 
toward increasingly authentic and dignified identity stems from a Socratic influence 
regarding the fullness of being tied to articulation. Taylor’s defence of the modern notion 
of authenticity is also bound up with this sense of taking the measure of being (Taylor 
1991b, 82). Taylor’s concept of articulation and “best account” is a fruit born not too far 
from the Socratic tree. Taylor’s moral theory hinges upon the quest of agents to refine 
their accounts of what goods command their love and reverence. In asking why we bother 
trying to articulate our sense of the good, Taylor employs a rhetorical question as a means 
of delivering a claim about moral agency.  
There is, of course, a one-line Socratic answer to this. It emerges from a 
particular ethical view, or range of views, which sees reason, in the sense of the 
logos, of linguistic articulacy, as part of the telos of human beings. We aren’t full 
beings in this perspective until we can say what moves us, what our lives are built 
around. (Taylor 1989b, 92)  
 
Taylor acknowledges that he shares “some version of this conception” (ibid). It is 
clear that Taylor’s qualification of the “best account” as provisional in nature, intuits that 
the ultimate achievement of “full being” tout court is not a possibility that he would 
accept. It is also clear that Taylor’s moral theory makes the quest for ever more lucid 
articulations of the moral sources that empower us as moral agents, imperative for 
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satisfying the demands of authenticity. Taylor’s theory reflects a strong Socratic 
influence regarding the measure of the fullness of one’s being as correlative to one’s 
ability to express one’s moral feelings; “The central notion here is that articulation can 
bring us closer to the good as a moral source, can give it power” (ibid).   
I find this Socratic element troubling. In a fashion similar to his inattention to 
gender consideration in Taylor’s model of embodiment, his equation of “fullness of 
being” with the capacity to articulate a sophisticated account of one’s feelings about the 
good, Taylor normalizes a model of  moral agency that excludes whole classes of people. 
Taylor’s Socratic inspired amalgam of full being and sophisticated articulacy, prevents 
whole swaths of agents from moving closer to the good, and thus, developing a fuller 
sense of being. There are a plethora of factors which may adversely impact the ability of 
an agent to articulate their sense of the good. Taylor’s measure of “full being” operates 
on a sliding scale which uses a base degree of cognitive functioning assumed as a normal 
standard; but what of agents who fall short? Where do those agents who differ from the 
norm in relation to cognition fit into Taylor’s scheme? What of agents categorized as 
autistic, or impaired? What of agents who, for material reasons, do not have access to the 
resources (i.e. education, technology, even nutrition) required to develop an erudite, 
refined, articulated ethos? I argue that based on Taylorian accounting these agents are 
destined never to measure up, as it were.  
 As in the case of Taylor’s inattentiveness to gender in his discussion of embodied 
moral agency, I think that Taylor is guilty of a lack of thoughtfulness, rather than of a 
pre-meditated prejudice relative to the exclusive character of his measure of being. Lack 
of malice does not, however, diminish the harmfulness of devising a model of moral 
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agency, wherein physically and materially privileged agents, have an insurmountable 
head start over everyone else. Further, Taylor effectively takes quotidian norms regarding 
cognitive functioning and extends them into a metaphysical sub-structure governing 
moral agency. After all, if the quest toward authentic moral identity, and fullness of 
being, depends upon an ever more lucid and coherent expression of what goods move us 
emotionally, and orient us rationally, then it is the most articulate agents, the agents who 
are best at self reading, who will register highest on Taylor’s Socratically weighted scale. 
Perhaps some will argue that I am ignoring the emphasis which Taylor places upon the 
dialogical nature of the self, or the ways which Taylor envisions the self as formed in 
conversation, (both aspects of Taylor’s philosophical work which we have already 
explored in this dissertation). Taylor has developed an important description of the self as 
always already positioned as an interlocutor. Yet, his ultimate emphasis upon agents’ 
moral development rooted in self-reading, ultimately weakens the influence of one’s 
conversation partners. Taylor strongly argues against the characterization of the self as 
“primarily a subject of representations” (Taylor 1991a, 307). In contrast, Taylor presents 
tropes portraying the self as engaged in dialogical action. 
Sawing and dancing are paradigm cases of dialogical actions. But there is 
frequently a dialogical level to actions that are otherwise merely coordinated. A 
conversation is a good example. Conversations with some degree of ease and 
intimacy move beyond mere coordination and have a common rhythm. The 
interlocutor not only listens but participates with head nodding and “unh-hunh” 
and the like, and at a certain point the “semantic turn” passes over to the other by 
a common movement. The appropriate moment is felt by both partners together in 
virtue of the common rhythm… An action is dialogical, in the sense I am using it, 
when it is effected by an integrated, nonindividual agent. This means that for 
those involved in it, its identity as this kind of action essentially depends upon the 
sharing of agency. These actions are constituted as such by a shared 





Taylor makes a rather radical argument regarding shared agency in this passage, 
an argument I endorse. It is important to note, however, that the dialogical element of the 
self which Taylor is describing is the social agent, the agent out in the world engaging 
amongst other agents. Further, Taylor is using the term dialogical to colour interaction 
between agents. This is a long way from saying that the self’s reckoning of its own 
position, relative to the good, is determined in a dialogical fashion. Taylor states that 
“human beings always have a sense of self, in this sense, that they situate themselves 
somewhere in ethical space” (Taylor 1991a, 306). This jibes with what we have already 
encountered in our examination of Taylor’s line of argument in Sources. Thus, it appears 
that the dialogical aspect of the self which Taylor describes in his essay “The Dialogical 
Self” is primarily a means of arguing against the representationalist (quasi-Cartesian) 
paradigm of the self.  
Taylor makes a similar case in his essay “The Person”, wherein he impugns the 
“interiorisation” of the sense of self; “I also think that something has been lost in the 
interiorisation, particularly an understanding of the significance of being an interlocutor” 
(Taylor 1985a, 281). I have already attested to Taylor’s avowal of the self as existing 
within “webs of interlocution” (Taylor 1989b 36). However, we encounter the limit of the 
dialogical in Taylor’s assertion that “What successfully resists all such critique is my 
(provisionally) best account. There is nothing better I could conceivably have to go on. 
Or my critics either for that matter. So says the BA principle” (Taylor 1989b, 74). 
Furthermore, Taylor’s emphasis upon the articulation of a “best account” as the primary 
means of measuring the fullness of one’s authentic moral being, leaves very little room 
for the dialogical in one’s reckoning themselves to be well oriented toward the good.  
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I am not suggesting that Taylor is advancing an atomistic model of the self as 
monad. Yet, he does draw a bright line separating the expression of the “best account” 
from the hurly-burly of discourse. Taylor imagines agents’ increasing sense of 
authenticity as grounded primarily upon error reducing, “self-reading” (Taylor 1995, 52). 
What becomes apparent is that Taylor’s concern as a moral philosopher has to do 
primarily with helping agents to realize their own fullness of being. Taylor’s rendering of 
the “best account” as a category of articulation which is ultimately protected from 
critique, portrays moral identity as founded upon a uniquely powerful relationship 
between each agent and the goods which they feel most empowering. Taylor pushes this 
insulated, reciprocal model even further by differentiating between how agents orient 
themselves toward “goods” vs. how they orient themselves toward “hypergoods”.  
At this point the reader ought to be familiar with the place of goods in the 
Taylorian theoretical universe. We have examined how Taylor envisions goods as 
exercising a sort of moral magnetism, drawing agents toward them in the space of moral 
questions as empowering their senses of what it is good to be. Further, we have 
elucidated how reflection upon, and articulation of these goods allows agents to assess 
the fullness, authenticity and dignity of their own moral identities. Up until this point, I 
have limited my discussion of the tiered nature of Taylor’s concept of goods. However to 
continue our examination of Taylor’s moral theory, we must tackle his concept of the 
“hypergood”.  Understanding the role of “hypergoods” in Taylor’s model will help us 
understand why he establishes a sense of “best accounts” as privileged ground; 
demanding that all interlocutors play by the discursive rules established by the “best 
account principle”. Our examination of “hypergoods” will also help to flesh out my 
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depiction of the Taylorian moral agent as primarily oriented toward concerns of personal 
authenticity, and the fullness of being.  
In Sources, Taylor describes “hypergoods” as “higher goods”, which suggests a 
hierarchical structure within Taylor’s moral theory.  This hierarchy is personal however; 
that is, it pertains only to individual agent’s apprehensions of where goods rank within 
their unique frameworks for orientating themselves within the space of moral questions.  
Most of us not only live with many goods but find that we have to rank them, and 
in some cases, this ranking makes one of them of supreme importance relative to 
the others. Each of the goods I am talking about here is defined in a qualitative 
contrast, but some people live according to a higher-order contrast between such 
goods as well. They recognize the value of self-expression, of justice, of family 
life, of the worship of God, of ordinary decency, of sensitivity, and a host of 
others; but they consider one of these—perhaps their relation to God, or perhaps 
justice—as of overriding importance… 
For those with a strong commitment to such a good, what it means is that 
this above all others provides the landmarks for what they judge to be the 
direction of their lives. While they recognize a whole range of qualitative 
distinctions, while all of these involve strong evaluation, so that they judge 
themselves and others by the degree they attain the goods concerned and admire 
or look down on people in function of this, nevertheless the one highest good has 
a special place. (Taylor 1989b, 62-63)   
 
Although Taylor is careful to maintain that the allegiance to a “higher good” does 
not necessarily indicate an obsessive, single minded pursuit of the good, it is clear that 
the presence of a “higher good” in one’s framework does order all of the other goods. It is 
also evident, following Taylor, that such a “higher good” leaves a sizeable footprint upon 
the character of an agent’s “best account”. This influence is demonstrated by Taylor’s 
assertion that it is the orientation to this overarching good “which comes closest to 
defining my identity, and therefore my direction to this good is of unique importance to 
me” (Taylor 1989b, 63). Although Taylor endeavours to maintain the dynamic character 
of his theory in the face of such higher order goods, his description of the “best account” 
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as a tentative account, becomes problematic when one delves deeper into his construal of 
“hypergoods” as sources of the self.  
Taylor warns of the worrying consequences which await agents devoted to such a 
“higher good” who find themselves unable to justify their lives as being in tune with, or 
moving toward their supreme good. Taylor describes the possible feelings of “despair”, 
and “unworthiness” which threaten to strike at the “very roots of my being as a person” 
(ibid), if one reads oneself as not measuring up to their most strongly valued good. This 
casts “higher goods” as integral to one’s sense of the self as dignified. Although one’s 
account may change, and is thus tentative, the presence of the “higher good” seems 
anything but tentative.  
Richard Rorty used the example of the poet to raise the issue of the place of 
“higher goods” in Taylor’s portrait of the self. For his part, Rorty apprehends poets as 
exemplifying the human as “self-fashioner”, as opposed to Taylor’s view of the poet as 
someone who motions toward something other than themselves, or indeed other than 
human (Rorty 1989, 20). However, the other which Taylor has in mind here is not 
someone or something challenging our vision of the good, it is the very source of our 
vision. The other which Taylor envisions the poet motioning toward, is the “higher good” 
at the center of their moral ontology (Taylor 1989b, 492).  
We know that the poet, if he is serious, is pointing to something―God, the 
tradition―which he believes to be there for all of us. But we also know that he 
can only give it to us refracted through his own sensibility. We cannot just detach 
the nugget of transcendent truth; it is inseparably imbedded in the work― this is 
the continuing relevance of the Romantic doctrine of the symbol. (ibid) 
 
  Although the agent expresses, and thus shares their account, within “webs of 
interlocution”, the account remains a product of an inward oriented, intuitional, self-
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clarifying evaluation. Rorty points to this passage from the latter half of Sources as 
evidence of Taylor’s vision of the intertwining of the “hypergood” and the self. This 
raises questions regarding agents’ reactions to difference. Taylor initially casts the 
devotion to “higher goods” as a feature of only some peoples’ moral frameworks (Taylor 
1989b, 62). Yet, he then contradicts himself by suggesting that all of us accede to some 
notion of a personally, incomparably higher good, which orders, and orients, our sense of 
authentic moral identity. 
Even those of us who are not committed in so single-minded a way 
recognize higher goods. That is, we acknowledge second-order qualitative 
distinctions which define higher goods, on the basis of which we discriminate 
among other goods, attribute differential worth or importance to them, or 
determine when and if to follow them. Let me call higher-order goods of this kind 
‘hypergoods’, i.e., goods which not only are incomparably more important than 
others but provide the standpoint from which these must be weighed, judged, 
decided about. (Taylor 1989b, 63) 
 
Ruth Abbey takes note of this vacillation by Taylor, between the character of 
“hypergoods” in agents’ frameworks as at one point optional, and at another, 
fundamental. Abbey wants to read Taylor as ultimately attaching “hypergoods” to only 
some peoples’ moral identities. Abbey asserts that Taylor depicts some agents as ordering 
their moral ontology around a core “hypergood”, while others “live their lives devoid of 
any sense of such a preponderant good” (Abbey 2000, 37). If this is correct, I contend it 
only serves as further evidence of the Socratic scale at work within Taylor’s theory. After 
all, an agent capable of articulating a coherent, and ordered, “best account” of their vision 
of the good life, will surely register as living a more dignified and authentic moral life 
than the agent whose account is awash in an opaque sense of what they apprehend as 
meaningful, an account “devoid of any sense of such a preponderant good.”  
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Taylor’s appraisal of the power of “hypergoods” extends beyond their role 
ordering agents’ moral frameworks. Taylor goes so far as to claim that the status of 
“hypergoods”, “is just what defines the ‘moral’ in our culture: a set of ends or demands 
which not only have unique importance, but also override and allow us to judge others” 
(ibid). This begs the question; what kind of morality is at stake in the quest for moral 
identity described by Taylor in Sources? For his part, Taylor states that he wants to 
broaden the horizons of the moral in our culture beyond what he describes as the 
limitations of the “obligation” ethic inscribed in modern philosophy (Taylor 1989b, 64). 
Taylor announces his desire to expand the content of morality at the very outset of his 
writing in Sources; declaring that “We are all universalists now about respect for life and 
integrity” (Taylor 1989b, 6), and thus, we can assume that obligation is perhaps too 
myopic a definition for the moral. Here we can readily discern Taylor’s concern for 
“what it is good to be”, rather than the preoccupation with “what it is right to do” (Taylor 
1989b, 3). 
Argument 
I am compelled to ask, however, if Taylor’s interpretation of “obligation” as a 
vestige of philosophical naturalism is not too narrow. Further, does Taylor’s assertion of 
the universal “respect for life and integrity” not seem shockingly naïve? Taylor’s sense 
that we need to move past the strict sense of morality as “defined purely in terms of 
respect for others” (Taylor 1989b, 14), is rooted in his belief that in the wake of the 
modern, universal “respect for life and integrity” we must look past the Kantian, 
humanist horizon toward a consideration of the other two axes of moral thinking, “our 
understandings of what makes a full life’’ and “the range of notions concerned with 
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dignity” (Taylor 1989b, 15). However, Taylor himself fails to consider the respect for 
others in his assumption of a homogeneous, sexless, genderless, cognitively normalized 
moral agent. I do not think Taylor is wrong including concerns for dignity and the 
fullness of life as proper subjects for moral thinking. However, in my reading, his overly 
optimistic declaration of universal respect for others as a given feature in contemporary 
western societies, coupled with his depiction of homogeneous moral agency, as well as 
his presentation of “hypergoods”, results in a sense of the self overly concerned with its 
own dignity and authenticity. It is on these grounds that I apprehend Taylor’s model of 
the self to exhibit certain, worryingly narcissistic traits.  
It is not my intention here to accuse Taylor of slipping into a Cartesian model of 
interiority, or of advocating for the atomistic sense of agency tied to the vision of radical 
individualism. I acknowledge that Taylor’s model of the self is not self-sustaining. 
Further, I agree with commentators such as Nicholas H. Smith who assert that Taylor’s 
brand of hermeneutic philosophy firmly establishes that agents “can never achieve full 
self-possession. The thinking and acting subject is always already situated in the semantic 
dimension, and so subject to norms that are in some sense given” (Smith 2004, 41). 
Nevertheless, an agent can exist within “webs of interlocution”, and express themselves 
in a shared language, whilst still exercising a degree of self-reflection so focused upon a 
quest for authentic and dignified moral identity, as to be qualified as narcissistic
22
.  
Furthermore, Taylor’s assertion that “our moral ontology springs from the best 
account of the human domain we can arrive at” (Taylor 1989b, 72), which we can infer is 
rooted in our relationship to our “hypergoods”, puts a rather logocentric sheen on his 
theory of articulation. Smith explains that for hermeneutic philosophers such as Taylor, 
                                                 
22
 Please see pg. 10 of the Introduction of this dissertation for a clarification of my use of this term. 
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“language is at once and indivisibly the medium through which we think about the world 
(the semantic dimension in which truth and other norms hold sway) and the medium 
through which we create a world” (Smith 2004, 40). Taylor’s theory of the “best account” 
as founded upon an agent’s unique relationship with powerful moral goods, while 
commensurately serving as the font for the agent’s moral ontology, goes further than the 
hermeneutic view of the world as built upon common semantic themes. Taylor’s theory 
suggests that each agent creates their own moral world, as it were; and while they live 
amongst other agents, and express their visions of the good within “webs of 
interlocution”, each agent ultimately defines for themselves “what it is good to be”. This 
situation is codified in Taylor’s statement that “There is nothing better I could 
conceivably have to go on. Or my critics either for that matter. So says the BA principle 
(Taylor 1989b, 74).  
I appreciate the philosophical hermeneutic view of the world as given and shaped 
in the semantic dimension. Crucially, however, I do not draw boundaries around the 
moral dimension the way that Taylor has done. Taylor presents agents as both embedded 
in “webs of interlocution”, while simultaneously engaged in a private relationship with 
their particular “goods”, and “hypergoods”. In the case of interlocution, Taylor argues 
that agents are firmly oriented toward one another in shared linguistic traditions which 
they inherit, and which set the normative standards of comprehensibility for the 
community.  Yet, Taylor has reserved the semantic territory of the moral as particular to 
each agent; created through the articulation of their “best account”. In light of this, it is 
difficult to see how substantive a discussion between agents concerning what constitutes 
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the good might possibility be, based upon the criteria Taylor sets for critique, and 
reflection, vis à vis the “best account principle”.  
This situation might be tenable for those who agree with Taylor regarding the 
universality of our “respect for life and integrity” (Taylor 1989b, 6). However, for those 
of us who view contemporary society in a somewhat less sanguine light based upon the 
continued manifestation of social injustice and material inequality, the demand to focus 
upon “respect for others” and our “obligations to other people” (Taylor 1989b, 14), 
continue to hold paramount importance as the work proper to moral philosophy. Taylor 
acknowledges that the “moral beliefs which cluster around the sense that human life is to 
be respected and that the prohibitions and obligations which this imposes on us are 
among the most weighty and serious in our lives” (ibid). Yet, following Taylor’s 
universalist statement, these moral beliefs can be considered a de facto feature of all 
modern agents’ worldviews, and thus for Taylor, they do not require much in the way of 
further thought, or articulation. Taylor is much more interested in the questions of “how I 
am going to live my life which touch on the issue of what kind of life is worth living, or 
what kind of life would fulfill the promise implicit in my particular talents, or the 
demands incumbent on someone with my endowment, or of what constitutes a rich, 
meaningful life” (ibid).  
It is my contention that we must not divide the moral in the way Taylor has, i.e., 
between obligation to others, the measure of fullness, and the sense of the self as 
dignified and authentic (Taylor 1989b, 15). I strongly believe that Taylor’s emphasis 
upon the expressive dimension of moral thought, characterized as a “best account”, holds 
a great deal of promise. As a philosopher who continues to be troubled by the inequity 
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present in our quotidian lives, however, I feel that this feature of Taylor’s theory might 
better be marshaled in an attempt to develop a salient expression of the imperative that 
moral agents orient their “best account” toward accountability, rather than authenticity.  
In order to explore the possibility of re-imagining Taylor’s concept of the “best 
account” in such a light, I will embark, in the next chapter, upon a critical and 
comparative reading of Taylor’s work alongside that of the philosophy of Emmanuel 
Levinas. In playing Levinas off of Taylor, and vice versa, I will explore questions, and 
possible insights, that may be gleaned from a critical and comparative reading of 





























It is not possible for there to be no masters and servants, but let me also be the 
servant of my servants, the same as they are to me.  
                                                                  (Dostoevsky 1990, 289) 
 
 In this, the final chapter of my dissertation, I will undertake a speculative 
investigation into the possibility of a description of moral agency born of elements 
derived from the work of Charles Taylor and Emmanuel Levinas. I wish to make it clear 
that I am not claiming to have produced a consensus position on the nature of the good 
through a synthesis of their respective theories. Such a syncretic enterprise would, I 
contend, be doomed from the start by the irreconcilability of their respective arguments.  
Consequently, it is important to state that it is not my goal to portray Taylor’s 
moral paradigm as amenable to a Levinasian notion of archaic responsibility. Nor am I 
suggesting that Levinas’ ethics might somehow be translated into a model for practical 
reasoning. Anyone who has had the pleasure of reading these philosophers’ respective 
works would, I believe, discount the possibility of finding agreement between their 
wildly divergent positions regarding the character of the self, and the nature of the good.  
In this chapter I am not alleging to speak for either Taylor or Levinas. The voice here is 
my own. With that said, I borrow ideas and concepts freely from both Levinas and 
Taylor. I have mined their respective works to provide the substance for my re-imagining 
Taylor’s “best account” from an articulation of authentic moral identity based upon self-
reading, to an articulation of one’s accountability born of our “being in the world” 
amongst others.  
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 I am not the first writer, (nor do I imagine that I will be the last), to subject the 
thought of Taylor and Levinas to a comparative analysis. Nicholas H. Smith references 
Emmanuel Levinas in his essay “Taylor and the Hermeneutic Tradition”, which appeared 
in Ruth Abbey’s volume Charles Taylor. Smith’s discussion, although brief, does help to 
establish some of the common themes which allow for the tentative imagining of a 
possible conversation between Taylor’s and Levinas’ works. Smith assigns the thought of 
both Taylor and Levinas to the somewhat amorphous field of philosophical hermeneutics. 
This field is most explicitly tied to the (unfinished) theory of Martin Heidegger. 
However, it would be extremely problematic to describe either Levinas or Taylor as 
proponents of a Heideggerian hermeneutics.
23
  
I contend that it is more fitting to apprehend Taylor and Levinas as in some ways 
responding to Heidegger’s forays into theorizing being, existence, experience, and 
understanding. Smith does a good job of laying out the blind spot in Heidegger’s 
hermeneutics which draws the attention of philosophers such as Levinas and Taylor who 
evince a particular concern for the ethical dimension of phenomenological investigation.  
One of the central issues in the tradition of post-Heideggerian hermeneutics has 
been the question of its relation to ethics. Notoriously, Heidegger seemed to think 
that ethics could be left to itself once we situated ourselves properly in relation to 
Being, or as he almost formulated it in his earlier writings, once we achieved 
genuine (that is, “nonsubjectivist”) authenticity in our thought and action. If 
human beings are self- interpreting animals, our natures are not simply given to 
us. We must assume responsibility for our own existence, and whatever ethical 
orientation we have is only properly viewed in light of this self-responsibility.        
                                                                                                               (Smith 2004, 42) 
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 Levinas advances a variety of critiques of Heidegger in his works. Indeed, Levinas charges that 
Heidegger’s ontology “affirms the primacy of freedom over ethics.” The consequence of which is that the 
“relation with Being that is enacted as ontology consists in neutralizing the existent in order to comprehend 
or grasp it. It is hence not a relation with the other as such but the reduction of the other to the same.” 




Smith introduces Levinas as a philosopher who emphasized the “priority of ethics 
over ontology in a philosophical discourse”. Smith concludes his brief summary of 
Levinas’ perspective by stating that “it is far from clear how we are to interpret the 
concrete ethical implications of his hermeneutic endeavour – if indeed there are any” 
(Smith 2004, 43). Smith contrasts what he ascertains to be the “problematic relation 
between post-Heideggerian hermeneutics and ethics” evinced in Levinas’ work (along 
with that of Sartre) with the lucidity of Taylor’s contribution to the field. Smith credits 
Taylor with bringing an “explicit moral perspective… to the post-Heideggerian thesis 
that human beings are self-interpreting animals” (ibid).  
To be fair to Smith, his essay is primarily concerned with Charles Taylor and his 
place within the post-Heideggerian hermeneutic tradition. Hence, Levinas’ brief cameo in 
Smith’s discussion serves primarily to illustrate, through contrast, the lucidity of Taylor’s 
focus upon an “explicit moral perspective” within the phenomenological tradition. 
Nevertheless, if one’s only encounter with Levinas was in the context of Smith’s essay, 
as a philosopher unconcerned with authenticity, who privileged an interpretation of ethics 
as “giving oneself over to the other human being or ‘substituting’ for the Other”, one 
could not be blamed for presuming Levinas to be wholly unconcerned with either the 
self, or embodiment.  
Smith asserts that for Levinas the relation of the self to the other, or better, “for 
the other”, is what is “primordial”, “rather than self-relation”, or “relation to Being” 
(ibid). I do not disagree with Smith on the point of the “for the other” as the “primordial” 
orientation in Levinas’ work. However, Smith goes on to conclude that, because Levinas 
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rejected the possibility of developing a discourse based upon this relation, he may 
consequently be portrayed, along with Heidegger and Sartre, as “at most a reluctant 
ethicist” because he was “just as averse as they are to talking about moral ‘values’ or 
‘agency’” (ibid). Here, I argue that Smith misses out on a fundamental aspect of Levinas’ 
philosophy. Smith’s desire to contrast the “reluctance” of Levinas with the lucid, 
“explicitly moral perspective” (ibid), of Taylor, vis à vis their respective contributions to 
hermeneutics, ignores a radical difference separating the two philosophers’ projects.   
As I explained in the first chapter of this dissertation, Levinas described ontology 
as the plane of the “said”.24 Contra Smith, I assert that Levinas evinces no problems 
discussing “values” or “agency”. In fact, these are important concepts in Levinas’ 
description of the ontological plane and consciousness, which is “born as the presence of 
a third party”, someone other, than the I and the other (Levinas 1974, 160). 
The foundation of consciousness is justice. Not that justice makes a 
preexisting meditation intervene. An event like meditation – synchronization, 
comparison, thematization – is the work of justice, of entry of the diachrony of 
proximity, of the signifyingness of saying into the synchrony of the said, a 
“fundamental historicity” in the sense of Merleau-Ponty. It is the necessary 
interruption of the Infinite being fixed in structures, community and totality. 
Synchronization is the act of consciousness which, through representation and the 
said, institutes “with the help of God,” the original locus of justice, a terrain 
common to me and the others where I am counted among them, that is where 
subjectivity is a citizen with all the duties and rights measured and measurable 
which the equilibrated ego involves, or equilibrating itself by the concourse of 
duties and the concurrence of rights. But justice can be established only if I, 
always evaded from the concept of the ego, always desituated and divested of 
being, always in non-reciprocatable relationship with the other, always for the 
other, can become an other like the others.                                                       
                                                                                (Levinas 1974, 160-161) 
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Smith’s labeling of Levinas as “at most a reluctant ‘ethicist’” (Smith 2004, 43), is 
the consequence of employing a conventional definition of ethics as proscriptive, for 
describing a philosopher who rejected the very possibility of expressing ethics in a theme. 
However, as evinced in the above passage, Levinas cared a great deal about “values” 
such as justice, and the role of “agency” qua consciousness. To grasp the distinctions 
which Levinas made between ethics as “the one for the other”, and justice as “an event 
like meditation-synchronization, comparison, thematization”, one must wrestle with the 
differentiation between ontology and ethics in Levinas’ philosophy.  
Here again I am re-treading ground which I covered in discussing language and 
philosophy in the first chapter of my dissertation. I will revisit a portion of a passage I 
quoted from Totality and Infinity in my first chapter to help to elucidate how Levinas’ re-
imagining of ethics renders Smith’s comments unfounded. This will also help to set the 
stage for how I apprehend a comparative engagement with Taylor’s and Levinas’ works 
to be possible. 
Preexisting the disclosure of being in general taken as the basis of 
knowledge and as meaning of being is the relation with the existent that expresses 
himself; preexisting the plane of ontology is the ethical plane.                                                       
                                                                                       (Levinas 1961, 201) 
 
Levinas’ use of the term “preexisiting” in this passage is misleading, as he did not 
intend for a linear, or derivative relation between the ethical and the ontological planes to 
be supposed. Levinas makes this prohibition against temporalizing ethics clear in his 
assertion early on in Otherwise Than Being that time in its “recuperating temporalization, 
without time lost, without time to lose, and where the being of substance comes to pass – 
there must be signaled a lapse of time that does not return, a diachrony refractory to all 
188 
 
synchronization, a transcending diachrony” (Levinas 1974, 9). It is through this 
diachrony that a trace of ethics casts a shadow over the plane of ontology.  
Diachrony, for Levinas, causes a disturbance in the totalizing drive of linear time. 
This disturbance troubles our sense of being at home in the world. Levinas’ notion of a 
“lapse of time that does not return” describes the haunting feeling that something 
“otherwise than being” impinges upon us. It is in this fashion that we can speak of ethics 
as transcendent in Levinas’ theory. For Levinas, ethics can never become a category of 
knowledge.
25
 However, knowledge is not the sole means of perception tied to 
embodiment. As such, ethics may be felt as an anarchic force which troubles the 
consciousness of subjects with unreasonable demands. In this regard, ethics may be 
described as a weight bearing down upon agency, upsetting our peace of mind.  
Levinas is a master of the use of poetic tropes and metaphors for alluding to the 
description of that which resists categorization. As such, it is important that we approach 
Levinas’ comments with a keen sense of how he understands ethics as “otherwise than 
being”, and thus, as unrepresentable, unpresent, and unmade. I contend that through 
Levinas we can envisage ethics as that which allows for the interruption of identity as 
self-interest, and morality as reciprocity.  
Smith’s statement that (in regard to Levinas), it is “far from clear how we are to 
interpret the concrete ethical implications of his hermeneutic endeavour – if indeed there 
are any” (Smith 2004, 43), wildly misses the mark vis-à-vis the nature of Levinas’ 
“endeavour”. I believe Levinas would have been aghast at the prospect of someone 
reading “concrete ethical implications” into his work. Following Levinas, how could 
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anything concrete be fashioned from that which is “otherwise than being”, except through 
an entombment within the structures of totalizing self-consciousness? For Levinas, ethics 
is a summons which echoes through the cracks in the foundations of “concrete” moral 
paradigms.  
The oneself has not issued from its own initiative, as it claims in the plays 
and figures of consciousness on the way to the unity of an Idea. In that Idea, 
coinciding with itself, free inasmuch as it is a totality which leaves nothing 
outside, and thus, fully reasonable, the oneself posits itself as an always 
convertible term in a relation, a self-consciousness. But the oneself is 
hypostatized in another way. It is bound in a knot that cannot be undone in a 
responsibility for others. This is an anarchic plot, for it is neither the underside of 
a freedom, a free commitment undertaken in a present or a past that could be 
remembered, nor slave’s alienation, despite the gestation of the other in the same, 
which this responsibility for the other signifies. In the exposure to wounds and 
outrages, in the feeling proper to responsibility, the oneself is provoked as 
irreplaceable, as devoted to the others, without being able to resign, and thus as 
incarnated in order to offer itself, to suffer and to give. It is thus one and unique, 
in passivity from the start, having nothing at its disposal that would enable it to 
not yield to the provocation. (Levinas 1974, 105) 
 
   Ipseity, in Levinas’ description, is oriented toward an anarchic responsibility for 
the other. Yet, the fulfillment of this responsibility is forever beyond the capacity of 
agents to satisfy it. It always remains a provocation which cannot be fully answered. I 
believe that this provocation has the potential to thrust agents out of the self-interested 
mode of moral reasoning which I have argued develops in Taylor’s description of moral 
agency. To grasp how such a movement out of self-interested moral agency might be 
effected, requires an examination of how Levinas uses the trope of transcendence in his 
work.  
Levinas makes a salient statement regarding the ground shared between the 
oneself as responsible, and the possibility of transcendence in the section entitled 
“Substitution” in Otherwise than Being. It is crucial that one grasp how Levinas’ theory 
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pivots around the notion of disrupting the normative conception of temporal linearity. 
This disruption arises from the overflowing sense of responsibility for the other, felt by 
the oneself, which defies any realistic expectation of fulfillment. Further, one must also 
apprehend the non-voluntary character of this responsibility. The agent is not offered a 
choice with regard to this responsibility; it simply is. Here we encounter the genius of 
Levinas’ usurpation of the model of the self-realizing agent.  
To be without a choice can seem to be violence only to an abusive or hasty and 
imprudent reflection, for it precedes the freedom non-freedom couple, but thereby 
sets up a vocation that goes beyond the limited and egoist fate of him who is only 
for-himself, and washes his hands of the faults and misfortunes that do not begin 
in his own freedom or in his present. (Levinas 1974, 116) 
  
 For Levinas, choice and freedom are features of being. As such, agents are free to 
choose to ignore the provocation to be responsible; thus, “washing” their hands of any 
non-reciprocal duty to others. However, making this choice does not release one from 
being responsible. Choosing to ignore the provocation to be responsible merely 
constitutes a decision to dwell within the limits of the “egoist fate of him who is only for-
himself” (ibid). The “egoist fate” suggests an in-dwelling form of agency fixated on self-
interested reduction of everything to same. In contrast to the “egoist fate” Levinas 
presents a picture of the responsible I, and the transcendence of being.  
Responsibility for the other, this way of answering without a prior commitment, is 
human fraternity itself, and it is prior to freedom…The non-interchangeable par 
excellence, the I, the unique one, substitutes itself for others. Nothing is a game. 
Thus being is transcended.” (Levinas 1974, 116-117)  
 
Levinas did not envision “substitution” as either a possible, or an appropriate, 
course of action on the “plane of ontology”. However, the choice to respond to the 
provocation to be responsible, despite the impossibility of meeting the demand, does 
indeed constitute a possible course of action on the “plane of ontology”. As such, the 
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“egoist fate” can be combatted through a sincere effort to be responsible, to strive to 
become a “non-interchangeable I”. The effort to be responsible, to express one’s 
culpability without consideration for reciprocity, orients one toward what Levinas 
describes as the adventure of transcendence. In Totality and Infinity Levinas offers a 
description of goodness, and its relation to transcendence, being, the “face to face”, and 
the “third party”. This passage is particularly interesting when read against Taylor’s 
description of goods in Sources. 
The face to face is not a modality of coexistence nor even of the knowledge (itself 
panoramic) one term can have of another, but is the primordial production of 
being on which all the possible collocations of terms are founded. The revelation 
of the third party, ineluctable in the face, is produced only through the face. 
Goodness does not radiate over the anonymity of a collectivity presenting itself 
panoramically, to be absorbed into it. It concerns a being which is revealed in a 
face, but thus it does not have eternity without commencement. It has a principle, 
an origin, issues from an I, is subjective. It is not regulated by the principles 
inscribed in the nature of a particular being that manifests it (for thus it would still 
proceed from universality and would not respond to the face), nor in the codes of 
the State. It consists in going where no clarifying―that is, panoramic―thought 
precedes, in going without knowing where. An absolute adventure, in a primal 
imprudence, goodness is transcendence itself. Transcendence is the transcendence 
of an I. Only an I can respond to the injunction of a face.                                                          
                                                                                                 (Levinas 1961, 305) 
 
  For Levinas goodness “issues from an I, is subjective.” Further, goodness requires 
a going forward without prior reflection. In contrast, Taylor dwells upon notions of goods 
as beacons which orient agents in the space of moral questions. A space which, following 
Levinas, I apprehend to be “panoramic”. Following Taylor agents reflect upon, and 
clarify goods, through “best accounts” expressed in terms which become “indispensable” 
for “making sense of their lives” (Taylor 1989b, 58). Taylor’s concern for themes such as 
“dignity” (Taylor 1989b, 57), as apropos to an agent’s “best account” of their vision of 
the good life elicits a sense of the “egoist fate”. Further, I argue that Taylor’s self-
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interested model of moral agency displays symptoms of the “conatus of beings” (Levinas 
1974, 4). That is, the overriding self-interest of an ego driven by an existential desire for 
persistence.  
No doubt Taylor would disagree with this characterization. Taylor presents 
“dignity” as the fruit of a “search for clairvoyance” on the part of the agent in the quest 
for authentic moral identity. Reading Taylor’s use of clairvoyance against his injunction 
that “the self’s interpretations can never be fully explicit. Full articulacy is an 
impossibility” (Taylor 1989b, 34), we can conclude that full clairvoyance also constitutes 
an impossibility. However, as with articulation the impossibility of reaching full 
clairvoyance does not, in Taylor’s view, taint the fruit of partial, increased clairvoyance, 
measured in terms such as “dignity”, or “authenticity”. For Taylor, the quest for 
clairvoyance represents a means of dealing with the inescapabilty of “being in the 
world”/ “être au monde”, after the fashion of Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty.  
In “Overcoming Epistemology” Taylor states that “We can’t turn the background 
against which we think into an object for us. The task of reason has to be conceived quite 
differently: as that of articulating the background, ‘disclosing’ what it involves” (Taylor 
1995, 12). The concept of “disclosure” in Taylorian theory, functions according to a 
Kantian inspired scheme of transcendental deduction and argument. Taylor follows Kant 
in focusing attention upon agents’ experiences of knowledge as oriented toward the 
meaning which objects have for the agents engaged with them. Commensurately, Taylor 
takes a dim view of philosophical empiricism and its search for the meaning which 
objects may possess in and of themselves. Taylor’s attitude is strongly evinced in the 
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differentiation between the bailiwick of empirical science, and that of the philosophical 
study of the self and morality, with which he is concerned in Sources. 
Of course, the terms of our best account will never figure in a physical 
theory of the universe. But that just means that our human reality cannot be 
understood in the terms appropriate for this physics. This is the complement to the 
anti-Aristotelian purge of natural science in the seventeenth century. Just as 
physical science is no longer anthropocentric, so human science can no longer be 
couched in the terms of physics. Our value terms purport to give us insight into 
what it is to live in the universe as a human being, and this is a quite different 
matter from that which physical science claims to reveal and explain. This reality 
is, of course, dependent on us, in the sense that a condition for its existence is our 
existence. But once granted that we exist, it is no more a subjective projection 
than what physics deals with. (Taylor 1989b, 59) 
 
On Transcendence and the Transcendental 
This harkens to a point I made in the second chapter of this dissertation, wherein I 
employed the same passage as evidence of Taylor’s moral realist position contra 
philosophical naturalism.
26
 Taylor’s realism is intractably intertwined with his notion of 
transcendental reflection. Taylor’s “best account principle” is born of this marriage. The 
“best account” expresses the degrees to which the agent is able to “disclose” the 
background against which they apprehend the world as meaningful, and their life as 
good. I believe some interesting insights regarding descriptions of moral agency may be 
derived by contrasting Levinas’ emphasis upon the provocation to transcend, and 
Taylor’s focus upon the importance of transcendental reflection. I argue that contrasting 
these very different concepts against one another opens a window onto imagining “best 
account” otherwise than an account of authentic moral identity.  
Levinas presents the provocation of ethics, to be responsible beyond all reason, as 
allowing for transcendence as an “adventure”, going out toward others, “going without 
knowing where” (Levinas 1961, 305). Levinas’ use of transcendence evinces a religious 
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 Please see chapter two pgs. 71-72 of this dissertation.  
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etymology, rooted in the play between the finite and the infinite. For Levinas, 
transcendence forces us to acknowledge that which is beyond self-interested being. For 
Taylor, an agent who feels provoked to responsibility would do well to first reflect upon 
the source of this provocation, and then disclose the background against which they 
comprehend it, and arrange it within the framework they employ to orient themselves 
within the space of moral questions. The Taylorian agent reduces the provocation to a 
feature of their own moral ontology through a genre of transcendental reflection. Taylor’s 
model of transitional gains in knowledge and self-understanding represent the means 
through which he proposes we empower ourselves as moral agents by exploring “the 
limits of the conceivable in human life” and developing an “account of its ‘transcendental 
conditions’” (Taylor 1989b, 32). 
Levinas charges subjects with the mission of going forth to meet their 
responsibility prior to knowing why, or questioning for whom. Taylor, advises agents that 
the strongly valued goods which they bring to the light of knowledge through 
“disclosure”, are integral to their identity as authentic selves. Further, Taylor asserts that 
these goods frame one’s judgments and actions, and set the standard for what is real for 
each moral agent. 
What is real is what you have to deal with, what won’t go away just 
because it doesn’t fit with your prejudices. By this token, what you can’t help 
having recourse to in life is real, or as near to reality as you can get a grasp of at 
present. Your general metaphysical picture of “values” and their place in “reality” 
ought to be based on what you find real in this way. It couldn’t conceivably be the 
basis of an objection to its reality. (Taylor 1989b, 59)    
  
 The picture of reality Taylor lays out in this passage is rooted in his reading of 
Kant as providing the framework for the phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty; a relation 
Taylor explores in his essay, “The Validity of Transcendental Arguments”. In this essay, 
195 
 
Taylor advances a powerful model of human understanding as embodied. Taylor 
proceeds to argue that “a proof that we are inescapably embodied agents to ourselves 
does show the form that any account must take which invokes our own self-
understanding” (Taylor 1995, 27). The “form of account” which Taylor contends is 
unavoidable for human beings as embodied agents, is that which expresses one’s “general 
metaphysical picture of ‘values’ and their place in ‘reality’”. This account (a “best 
account”) is developed through the use of a transcendental deduction which takes as its 
evidence that which one “can’t help having recourse to in life” (Taylor 1989b, 59).  
Taylor asserts that the premise upon which we embark on our transcendental 
reflections are, at best, “sketchy”. In this light, we can read the first part of Sources as a 
theoretical schematic for bringing to awareness the “indispensable” sources of meaning 
from the background of experience.  
So we start off with a sketchy characterization which can be seen right off as a 
formulation of a limiting condition: say that experience must be of something. 
Then we go on to show that this involves experience having coherence; and then 
we try to show that this coherence must consist in the applicability of the 
categories. But there is nothing sacred about the number of steps…  
Indeed, the first stage is different in nothing from the later stages, except 
in being easier to grasp. It appears self-evident; but the later steps must also be 
made to appear self-evident. They constitute indispensability claims, but so does 
the first stage. The big change is that the argument moves us from weaker to 
stronger thesis, from experience being of something to the applicability of the 
categories… We try to show that the richer description’s holding is indispensable 
to the sketchier one’s holding, because the former simply spells out what the latter 
adumbrated. (Taylor 1995, 32)       
 
 Taylor believes that through transitional gains in knowledge, agents can push out 
the boundaries of the “limits of the conceivable in human life” and improve the “account 
of its “transcendental conditions’’ (Taylor 1989b, 32). The ultimate goal of undertaking 
these reflections in Taylor’s work is to arrive at increasingly clairvoyant expressions of 
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self-understanding. Commensurately, this understanding allows for agents to develop a 
more authentic and dignified sense of self. Nicholas Smith provides support for this 
conclusion in his assertion that “for Taylor, in important cases our self-understanding 
constitutes who we are. There are feelings, moods, and social relations that are shaped 
through the way we articulate or express them” (Smith 2004, 43). Smith goes on to distill 
an important point concerning the moral dimension of Taylor’s philosophy. The tenor of 
Taylor’s discourse readily lends itself to a misreading of terms such as good/hypergood, 
moral, worth, etc. Smith points out that far from offering a moralizing vocabulary with 
specific value criteria, in Taylor’s scheme “All that is needed to have a self or identity 
constituted by moral concerns is for some desires and purposes to matter because of their 
worth. But that worth need not be “moral” in the narrow sense, say, of being dutiful, or 
altruistic, or benevolent” (Smith 2004, 44).  
Smith’s reading echoes Taylor’s remarks regarding the inattention of modern 
moral philosophy vis-à-vis “what it is good to be” in Sources (Taylor 1989b, 3). Thus, we 
can see that, for Taylor, transcendental reflection allows agents to increase their feelings 
of dignified and authentic selfhood through the clarification of the goods which empower 
their moral ontologies. Thus equipped, the Taylorian agent engaged in what I have been 
calling Taylor’s “transitional epistemology” is able to express increasingly lucid 
understandings of their “metaphysical picture” of “values”; ipso facto increased self-
clarity.  
As noted above, Smith claims that Levinas is “at most a reluctant ‘ethicist’” and 
that par contre, Taylor voices an “explicitly moral perspective”. However, based upon 
our exploration of Taylor’s and Levinas’ respective descriptions of moral agency, I 
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contend that the precise implications of being an “ethicist”, or of exercising a “moral 
perspective”, depend upon how one interprets the terms ethics and moral.  
 To further our comparative examination of Taylor and Levinas, it will be helpful 
to consider some aspects of the analysis advanced by Philip J. Harold in his book 
Prophetic Politics: Emmanuel Levinas and the Sanctification of Suffering. Harold 
undertakes a rare discussion of Levinas’ philosophy alongside Taylor’s thinking about 
ethics and articulation. I must admit that I harbor some reservations regarding Harold’s 
readings of certain Levinasian tropes, such as “substitution” (Harold 2009, 171), and the 
possibility of a politics being distilled from Levinasian disinterestedness (Harold 2009, 
215); even a “prophetic politics”. However, despite my uneasiness with Harold’s 
overarching argument, I find value in his work. Harold triangulates a point of contact 
between Levinas and Taylor using values, speech, and ontology.  
Levinas’s late philosophy holds out for a responsibility unable to be thematized in 
ontological discourse. While for Levinas ontological discourse as a whole 
ultimately fails to account for human uniqueness and its resources are incapable 
of reaching the true responsibility one has for one’s neighbor, it does have an 
important role to play. A subjective theory of value, a procedural conception of 
justice, a reduction of everything to human choice, all fail to come to grips with 
how we in fact live our lives, to wit, in search of a good that we understand to be 
no mere illusion or fantasy, which we can describe in ontological language. 
Human values are indispensable and are valid independently of our choice, and 
here Levinas is in line with Taylor. (Harold 2009, 154)                                      
 
Harold adds a qualifier to this point of contact between Levinas and Taylor. 
Although both Taylor and Levinas share a real concern for the expression of human 
values, Levinas contra Taylor does not grant “ontological language a foundational role”. 
Furthermore, Harold asserts that Taylor’s construal of values as goods/hypergoods 
orienting agents’ moral attitudes and grounding them in “conscious knowledge”, 
represents “what Levinas strains to oppose” (ibid).  
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Harold provides a helpful framework for thinking about how Levinas’ and 
Taylor’s very different theoretical discourses may be used to develop a tentative 
description of a “best account” which expresses one’s orientation in the space of moral 
questions toward something other than self-empowering goods. This is not to say that 
Harold provides a map for integrating Taylorian theory with Levinasian philosophy. As I 
have previously stated, such a synthesis would be a futile and presumptuous task. 
However, re-imagining the themes from both philosophers’ works, substituting Taylor’s 
focus on transcendental reflection with Levinas’ emphasis upon transcendent 
provocation, would, I contend, present interesting possibilities for contemporary moral 
discourse.  
Juxtaposition 
Such a re-imagining necessitates a very careful negotiation of the central 
arguments made by Levinas and Taylor in their respective works. The results of this 
negotiation are sure to upset the sensibilities of the partisans attached to each philosopher. 
However, disturbance, discontent, and disruption, are often the most efficacious fuels for 
re-imagining. Furthermore, the description of moral agency which emerges from my 
effort makes no claims of orthodoxy in either case. And thus, both Taylorians and 
Levinasians are free to ignore it altogether.  
The comparative analysis of Taylor’s and Levinas’ moral theories is rife with 
complications. Even when the goal is expressly not one of synthesis, but rather of critical 
contrast, there are points at which the entire enterprise teeters on the edge of tenability. 
One such point is encountered in Taylor’s critique of certain philosophical notions of 
morality and the self, oddly buried in an endnote of Sources. This critique, which I 
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contend should have been made much more explicitly by Taylor in the main body of 
Sources, includes a section targeting a moral theory which bears uncanny similarities to 
that advanced in Levinas’ philosophical works.  
In the first part of Sources, Taylor differentiates between the “right” and the 
“good”. Taylor first presents the normative case of the priority of the right over the good 
as it is understood in “consequentialist theory” (Taylor 1989b, 89). The reader will not be 
shocked to learn that Taylor is not an advocate of consequentialism. Taylor argues that 
where the good means “whatever is marked out as higher by a qualitative distinction, 
then we could say that the reverse is the case, that in a sense, the good is always primary 
to the right” (ibid). Taylor’s claim of the supremacy of the good over the right is built 
upon his understanding of agents’ “qualitative distinctions” underlying their “best 
account” as constituting moral reality; “the good is what, in its articulation, gives the 
point of the rules which define the right”(ibid).  
I contend that Taylor’s scheme championing the good over the right is best 
understood as a genre of transcendental argument, as described above. Taylor works to 
bolster his claim by addressing three competing claims, all of which he categorizes as 
trumpeting the right over the good. First, Taylor tackles the Kantian inspired arguments 
for the right over the good, resting upon “weakly valued goods”, which Taylor 
apprehends as keeping “its most basic insights inarticulate” (ibid). Taylor concludes that 
his theory is stronger than the Kantians stemming from the clarifying power of his model, 
which includes “qualitative distinctions” and “articulation”. In short, Taylor apprehends 
his genre of transcendental argument as going further and deeper.  
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The second competing claim which Taylor confronts is “the thesis that morality is 
concerned only with what actions are obligatory and not with qualitative distinctions” 
(Taylor 1989b, 532-533). Taylor dismisses this theory based on the premise that its 
adherents are, in fact, moved by very strong hypergoods attached to modern, western 
sensibilities, i.e. “freedom, altruism, and universalism” (Taylor 1989b, 88). Taylor indicts 
the proponents of procedural ethics based upon obligatory action as being in a state of 
denial with regard to the goods which anchor their arguments. Taylor claims that these 
thinkers are “caught in a strange pragmatic contradiction, whereby the very goods which 
move them push them to deny or denature all such goods. They are constitutionally 
incapable of coming clean about the deeper sources of their own thinking. Their thought 
is inescapably cramped” (ibid).  
The third competing claim presents a more formidable obstacle for Taylor in that 
it advances a vision of morality conceived in terms of our duty, or “obligation” to others 
(Taylor 1989b, 533). This vision of ethical life rooted in one’s “obligation to others” 
bares more than a passing resemblance to Levinas’ philosophy, although Taylor never 
mentions Levinas by name.  Taylor acknowledges that this claim openly avows its 
source, and hence, does not fall afoul of his criteria regarding the proper apprehension of 
the “nature of morality.” Furthermore, Taylor allows that the notion of an ethical life as a 
life of obligation to others “turns on a real distinction, in that we can discern these 
different kinds of demands in our ethical life” (ibid). However, despite Taylor’s 
acceptance of the validity of the conceptual grounds upon which the demand to serve 
others is based; he objects to it on what I argue are moral grounds.  
201 
 
Taylor evinces a consistent concern for what he suggests is the “health” of the 
self. Commensurately, he casts a wary eye on any vision of morality which he discerns to 
be empowered by hypergoods which “exact a price of self-mutilation” (Taylor 1989b, 
107). Taylor’s allusion to “self-mutilation” provides a particularly disturbing sense of the 
perils which he believes lay in wait for agents on the quest for authentic selfhood. 
Taylor’s project, read through the lens of his own theory, evinces its own hypergoods. 
The strongest of these is the possibility of the ongoing development of an authentic, 
dignified understanding of the self through transitions rooted in practical reasoning, and 
the articulation of “best accounts”. Hence, when Taylor charges that the notion of an 
ethical life as one devoted to others exhibits “something hubristic and self-destructive in 
the attempt to carry this exclusive choice consistently through, a forgetfulness of self 
which aspires beyond human powers” (Taylor 1989b, 533). I contend that his objection is 
on moral grounds.  
 Taylor does not explicitly invoke Levinas in his critique of the “obligation” ethos. 
Nevertheless, since Taylor describes a theory of obligation similar to Levinas’, it might 
be fruitful to examine how Taylor’s warning against the “hubristic” and “self-
destructive” consequences of such an “obligation” ethos squares up against Levinas’ 
description of “responsibility for the other”.   
It is not that the entry of a third party would be an empirical fact, and that 
my responsibility for the other finds itself constrained to a calculus by the “force 
of things.” In the proximity of the other, all the others than the other obsess me, 
and already this obsession calls out for justice, demands measure and knowing, is 
consciousness. A face obsesses and shows itself, between transcendence and 
visibility/invisibility. Signification signifies in justice, but also, more ancient than 
itself and the equality implied by it, justice passes by justice in my responsibility 
for the other, in my inequality with respect to him for whom I am a hostage.  




 Doubtless, Levinas’ hostage trope could be read as “self-mutilation”, evoking 
themes of sacrifice and denial. However, I argue that such a reading would be 
wrongheaded in that it fails to take into account Levinas’ consideration of the “third” and 
the requirements of justice. Harold provides a lucid description of how Levinas 
conceived of the disparity between “saying” and the “plane of the ethical”, and the “said” 
of the “ontological plane”; “there is no pure realm of the ethical, as the entrance of the 
third has always already taken place and the ethical work of justice involves both the 
saying and the said together” (Harold 2009, 153). Thus, the provocation to absolute 
responsibility of “the one for other” is tempered by the necessity of doing justice for “all 
the others”.  
The relationship with the third is an incessant correction of the asymmetry of 
proximity in which the face is looked at. There is weighing, thought, 
objectification, and thus a decree in which my anarchic relationship with illeity is 
betrayed, but in which it is conveyed before us. There is betrayal of my anarchic 
relation with illeity, but also a new relationship with it: it is only thanks to God 
that, as a subject incomparable with the other, I am approached as an other by the 
others, that is, “for myself.” “Thanks to God” I am an other for the others.  
                                                                                                  (Levinas 1974, 158) 
 
As Levinas states, it is “thanks to God” that one finds oneself “an other for the 
others.” Not through choice, but something akin to providence. The question naturally 
arises, how does Levinas conceive of God in this scenario? Is Levinas invoking a 
paternalistic God? Or, perhaps, he is alluding to an esoteric divinity? Is Levinas’ use of 
the term God meant to signify our “throwness” into being? Does this passage express the 
quality of our state of being at once, both, subjects for ourselves and for others, just as 
others are subjects both for us and for themselves? Fortunately, Levinas provides us with 
a framework for interpreting the signification of the term “God” in his discourse.  
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God is not involved as an alleged interlocutor: the reciprocal relationship binds 
me to the other man in the trace of transcendence, in illeity. The passing of God, 
of whom I can speak only by reference to this aid or this grace, is precisely the 
reverting of the incomparable subject into a member of society. (ibid) 
 
It seems to me that Levinas’ description here, of “this aid or this grace” which 
makes us responsible for others, but also makes others responsible for us (without our 
meriting it) staves off the horrific prospect of “self-mutilation” or “self-destruction” with 
which Taylor is concerned. Further, Levinas’ assertion that the provocation to be 
responsible, which pushes us toward a transcendence of self-interested being, allows us to 
reflect upon our “inequality” with she for whom we are responsible, should assuage any 
fear of “hubris” being born of “obligation”. Of course Taylor could mark down this sense 
of “inequality” to “self-destructiveness”, but again our “inequality” needs to be read 
against  how our “relationship with the third is an incessant correction of the asymmetry 
of proximity in which the face is looked at” (Levinas 1974, 158). The basic difference 
which emerges in the contrast between Taylor’s and Levinas’ moral theories turns upon 
what the self ought to be properly concerned with.  
Taylor’s arguments display a tremendous concern for describing how we are to 
apprehend our(selves) as the bearers of unique and authentic moral identities, and how 
the vigor of our moral identities depends upon the clarity of our self-reading and the 
expression of the moral sources which empower us. Levinas offers a rather different 
description of the self. One which Taylor would, I believe, adamantly reject. 
That in the responsibility for another, the ego, already a self, already obsessed by 
the neighbor, would be unique and irreplaceable is what confirms its election. For 
the condition for, or the unconditionality of, the self does not begin in the auto-
affection of a sovereign ego that would be, after the event, “compassionate” for 
another. Quite the contrary: the uniqueness of the responsible ego is possible only 
in being obsessed by another, in the trauma suffered prior to any auto-
identification, in an unrepresentable before. (Levinas 1974, 123) 
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Like Taylor, Levinas presents the self as unique. However, the uniqueness of the 
self for Levinas does not flow from self-understanding and self-expression; it is a 
uniqueness forged by being responsible prior to “auto-identification”. Here the contrast 
between Taylor and Levinas is extremely stark. I believe that Taylor’s model of the self 
epitomizes “auto-identification”, while Levinas works furiously to disrupt “auto-
identification” with that which is other. Taylor’s notion of the self is preoccupied with the 
personal measure of authenticity; its moral identity is a reflection of the degree to which 
it lives up to its own values. Levinas’ model of the self is that of one whose self-
reflection is disturbed by the call to accountability; morality here has to do with a going 
forth toward this call, and thus cannot be measured, nor used as a basis for identity after 
Taylor’s fashion.  
Levinas is renowned for his nearly impenetrable style of writing. Taylor, on the 
other hand, is often lauded for his straight forward manner. On the surface these 
characterizations seem rather apropos. However, for all of Taylor’s salient argument 
regarding practical reasoning and articulation, there are some puzzling aspects to his 
choice of certain terms in “Identity and the Good”. As I noted earlier, Levinas often 
draws upon religious tropes and metaphors in his descriptions. Taylor, although not 
avoiding them altogether, employs religious tropes much more sparingly. Yet, at the 
conclusion of Taylor’s arguments in “Identity and the Good” Taylor chooses to close his 
case with an appeal to readers to “put an end to the stifling of the spirit and to the atrophy 
of so many of our spiritual sources” (Taylor 1989b, 107). Why the invocation of the 
spiritual here? Do “moral sources” not suffice?  
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Taylor makes reference to the “spiritual” and “spiritual sources” at various points 
in Sources. In laying out his agenda for “Identity and the Good” Taylor states that “In 
particular, what I want to bring out and examine is the richer background languages in 
which we set the basis and point of the moral obligations we acknowledge.” Taylor 
further clarifies his project asserting that, “More broadly, I want to explore the 
background picture of our spiritual nature and predicament which lies behind some of the 
moral and spiritual intuitions of our contemporaries” (Taylor 1989b, 3-4). Taylor’s use of 
the terms “spiritual” and “spiritual sources”, in “Identity and the Good”, in some 
instances echoes his use of “moral sources” and at others, seems to differ from it. It is not 
clear whether the “background picture of our spiritual nature” is akin to his use of the 
trope of the “background” of our moral languages. Do they both signify what Taylor has 
described as the pool of “inarticulate understanding” (Taylor 1991a, 308), against which 
our representations are reflected back to us as intelligible?  
With regard to moral language, Taylor’s “background” trope resonates with a 
Kantian notion of the slim premise upon which agents can begin to engage in 
transcendental reasoning. However, Taylor’s use of the term “spirit” and “spiritual 
sources” evokes a different sort of “background”.  
If articulacy is to open us, to bring us out of the cramped postures of suppression, 
this is partly because it will allow us to acknowledge the full range of goods we 
live by. It is also because it will open us to our moral sources, to release their 
force in our lives. The cramped formulations of mainstream philosophy already 
represent denials, the sacrifice of one kind of good in favour of another, but 
frozen in a logical mould which prevents their even being put in question. 
Articulacy is a crucial condition of reconciliation. 
Of course, if reconciliation is impossible, then articulacy will buy us much 
greater inner conflict. This might be thought a risk. But even in this case, we 
would have at least put an end to the stifling of the spirit and to the atrophy of so 
many of our spiritual sources which is the bane of modern naturalist culture.  
                                                                                       (Taylor 1989b, 107) 
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Taylor speaks of releasing the force of moral sources in our lives through the 
articulation of “the full range of goods we live by.” Taylor links this expressive 
endeavour to the liberation of “the spirit”, and the unshackling of our “spiritual sources” 
from the yoke of modern naturalism. At this point in “Identity and the Good” Taylor has 
already built a vocabulary for making his case regarding agents’ need to orient 
themselves toward moral sources which correspond to their understanding of what 
constitutes a “worthwhile” life. Taylor also clearly explains why these sources must then 
be expressed in a “best account” which empowers agents’ sense of striving ever closer to 
their ideal of authentic moral identity; thus providing them with a sense of dignified 
selfhood. Why then, at the conclusion of this argument does Taylor invoke the “spirit” 
and the “spiritual”? Could this be an inference to the Romantics’ idea of the spirit of 
nature coursing through being, which Taylor treats at length in the second part of 
Sources? Or is it evidence of Taylor’s theistic sympathies?   
Argument 
I believe Taylor’s use of the “spirit” and “spiritual” “background” tropes allude to 
an aspect of moral identity which is not reducible to one’s moral ontology. Taylor’s 
choice of the “spiritual” suggests something not native to the ontological. Here a very 
tentative point of contact can be made with Levinas’ differentiation of the “ethical plane” 
and the “ontological plane”. However, tentative may be too generous a description since 
Taylor does not perceive the unbridgeable gulf between “spiritual sources” and 
expression, in the way that Levinas does the “saying” and the “said”.  
Taylor believes that, not only might we express our “spiritual sources” via 
articulation, but we may even go so far as to “reconcile” the modern sense of the self as 
207 
 
self-determining, with the recognition that our sense of self “depends on what one can 
call a moral topography” (Taylor 1989b, 106). Following Taylor, I believe that language 
can act as a vehicle for the articulation of strongly felt moral and spiritual intuitions, even 
those for which we have only a vague and haunting impression. However, contra Taylor, 
I do not believe that the purpose of our endeavour to express these feelings ought to be 
geared toward a “reconciliation” with the ideal of modern subjects as the “bearers of 
individual rights” (ibid), and the empowerment of self-regarding, authentic moral 
identity. Quite the contrary, following Levinas, I hold that the force of what Taylor calls 
“spiritual sources” should be understood as disrupting and fragmenting the “auto-
identification” upon which Taylor’s model of authentic selfhood depends.  
Taylor’s project in “Identity and the Good” focuses upon developing a coherent 
theoretical framework for agents to understand them(selves) as oriented toward certain 
moral “goods” and “hypergoods”.  Taylor’s arguments suggest that agents use this 
understanding to engage in an ongoing expressivist archeology. This archeology enables 
agents to unearth layers of meaning which fuel their “best accounts”, which in turn, 
empower their sense of living authentic and dignified lives. However, what if we were to 
interpret the sense in which Taylor wishes to put an “end to the stifling of the spirit” 
(Taylor 1989b, 107), as having nothing to do with the empowerment of the self, but 
rather as acknowledging a responsibility to something other than the realization of our 
own authentic moral identity?  Under this rubric, could Taylor’s “spiritual sources” be 
apprehended as “unleashing” the overwhelming and irreconcilable sense of our 
responsibility to others as constituting the condition of our being subjects? My thinking 
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here is influenced by Levinas’ statement that “Responsibility is what first enables one to 
catch sight of and conceive of value” (ibid). 
It is based upon this play between Taylor and Levinas that I venture the 
following. What if we were to interpret Taylor’s expressivist model of the “best account”, 
not as a means to pursue ever more lucid descriptions of our own moral ontologies, but 
rather under the auspices of Levinas’ statement that “The philosophical speaking that 
betrays in its said the proximity it conveys before us still remains, as a saying, a 
proximity and a responsibility” (Levinas 1974, 168). What if we eschewed Taylor’s hope 
that the “best account principle” might lead to “reconciliation” and “empowerment” of 
the self, and instead, embraced a Levinasian inspired ethos of the “best account principle” 
as a means for expressing our “assignation” to responsibility and accountability?  
My line of argument here is based upon speculation, juxtaposition, and tentative 
description. As such, I do not claim that either Levinas’, or Taylor’s theories inevitably 
lead to the possibility which I am proposing.  
 In Totality and Infinity Levinas waxes poetic about the I and the other. He frames 
this discussion against the backdrop of infinity and describes the posture of the I as 
absolutely passive. The other is a revelation, and has a “positive structure: ethical. The 
first revelation of the other, presupposed in all the other relations with him, does not 
consist in grasping him in his negative resistance and in circumventing him by ruse. I do 
not struggle with a faceless god, but I respond to his expression, to his revelation” 
(Levinas 1961, 197). Levinas strove to write in an asymmetric fashion about the I and the 
other . However, the notion of relationality and response reverberate throughout his 
works.  Based upon the tropes he uses, I believe we can develop a compelling vocabulary 
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for articulating a “best account” of our moral agency as founded upon accountability. An 
account wherein, following Robert Bernasconi’s analysis of Levinas’ dialogue with 
Martin Buber,  a “trace of the saying is perhaps to be found in the said, just as the 
descriptions in Totality and Infinity serve to discover a trace of the infinite in the finite” 
(Bernasconi 1988, 128). I contend this lays the foundation for an understanding of an 
articulation of the (spiritual) intuition that moral agency is founded upon a provocation to 
be accountable.  
Included in the same volume as Bernasconi’s essay on Levinas and Buber is an 
excellent interview with Levinas conducted by Tamara Wright, Peter Hughes, and Alison 
Ainley. In the course of this interview Levinas expands upon his understanding of the I 
and the other, and the emergence of justice. Levinas asserts that the “interlocutor is first 
of all in this ethical posture by which my lips open for speech, or by which I am 
addressed. I am called upon to respond. I think that the first language is the response. But, 
with the appearance of the third – the third must also have a face. If the third is also a 
face, one must know whom to speak to first” (Wright, Hughes, and Ainley 1988, 174). In 
Levinas’ thinking, an ethical relation is impossible when the singularity of the face to 
face is shattered by the inevitable appearance of the face of the third, fourth, fifth and so 
on. The reason, according to Levinas, is that with the plurality of others comes the need 
for comparison and judgment, exercises in what Levinas deigns Greek thought and 
politics (ibid). However, Levinas values these actions as necessary, indeed as essential, 
for the work of justice on the “ontological plane”. In his response, Levinas anticipates the 
question regarding the need for a theory of ethics if justice always ultimately constitutes 
the ground of interrelation.     
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If everything terminates in justice, why tell this long story about the face,      
which is the opposite of justice? The first reason is that it is ethics which is the 
foundation of justice. Because justice is not the last word; within justice, we seek              
a better justice. (Wright, Hughes, and Ainley 1988, 175) 
 
 In re-imagining the “best account” as an expression of our moral agency founded 
upon our being accountable to others, prior to our concern for our own dignity, I am 
leaning heavily upon Levinas’ statement that “I think that the first language is the 
response” (Wright, Hughes, and Ainley 1988, 174). However, contra Levinas, I do not 
think that the language of response is necessarily complicated by the appearance of more 
than the one other. In using Taylor’s concept of the “best account principle”, our 
articulation of accountability signifies an expression of both a basic embodied feature of 
moral agency, as well as a starting point for increasingly more articulate accounts of the 
demands which stem from our being accountable; always allowing us to seek “a better 
justice”, a more just response.  
I believe that a model for this sort of a “best account” is pointed toward in 
Otherwise than Being. In section d, entitled “Witness and Language” in chapter five of 
Otherwise than Being, Levinas expounds on his notion of “substitution”, stating that it is 
a “pre-originary susceptibility” (Levinas 1974, 146). That is, “otherwise” to freedom and 
decision. To make his case Levinas cites a passage from Fyodor Dostoyevsky’s The 
Brothers Karamazov.  
Dostoyevsky’s rich characters and the themes of justice and culpability central to 
the plot of The Brothers Karamazov, provide fertile ground for thinking about morality 
and responsibility. Of particular note is the way in which Dostoyevsky’s handling of 
culpability may have influenced Levinas. It is important to note here that, in my opinion, 
Levinas’ concept of “culpability” is often misunderstood by Anglophone readers. This 
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misinterpretation is a result of the translation of Levinas’ French term “coupable” as 
“guilty”. The translator of Otherwise than Being, Alphonso Lingis, chose to translate 
“coupable” as “guilty”. It is my contention that this decision has led to the confusion 
amongst Anglophone readers of the notion of culpability in the juridical sense, with guilt 
in the emotional sense. As an example of the dissonance which this translation causes in 
reading Levinas’ work, I cite two passages from Otherwise than Being. The first evinces 
the exponential character of responsibility wherein “The more I return to myself, the 
more I divest myself, under the traumatic effect of persecution, of my freedom as a 
constituted, willful, imperialistic subject, the more I discover myself to be responsible; 
the more just I am, the more guilty I am” (Levinas 1974, 112). This passage could easily 
be read as importing the emotional sense of guilt into “anarchic” responsibility.27 
However, to do so would be to undermine the crucial distinction which Levinas has 
painstakingly drawn between being and “otherwise than being”. The consequence of this 
would be to allow an emotional sense of guilt to play a role in the “one-for-the-other”, 
which would open a backdoor in Levinas’ theory through which consciousness might 
stream in, thus rendering the other an object of consciousness. The danger here is that 
important facets of Levinas’ philosophy are lost in translation. “Coupable” is more akin 
to culpable in English.  
There are important differences between culpability and guilt. First, guilt is often 
attached to a self-regarding feeling or judgment. Culpability, par contre, may be read as 
being liable or responsible irrespective of one’s feelings. Culpability doesn’t necessarily 
have anything to do with the conscience. One may be found to be culpable for simple 
negligence, regardless of remorse. In this respect culpability is intricately related to the 
                                                 
27
 “anarchic” here refers to responsibility prior to “auto-identification”.  
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notion of responsibility as the starting point for moral agency. Further, in Levinas’ 
grammar the trope of persecution of the “I” works well with culpability, as the “I” is 
persecuted/prosecuted from a “height” as responsible for the “other”  “prior to any auto-
identification, in an unrepresentable before” (Levinas 1974, 123). Thus, unlike in the case 
of emotional guilt, one is, following Levinas, culpable without respect for consciousness 
or conscientiousness.  
More evidence for the case against reading “coupable” as “guilty” is found in 
Levinas statement that “The for-the-other characteristic of the subject can be interpreted 
neither as a guilt complex (which presupposes an initial freedom), nor as a natural 
benevolence or divine “instinct” , nor as some love or some tendency to sacrifice” 
(Levinas 1974, 124). It is clear that Lingis’ use of “guilt” does not measure up to 
Levinas’ use of “coupable”. Culpability in the accusative tense is to blame. This is 
important as the notion of the subject as responsible, of the “one-for-the-other”, and the 
notion of blame are related. One is “blameworthy” in the same sense that one is alive. 
The passage which Levinas’ quotes from Dostoyevsky’s The Brothers Karamazov 
evinces this relationship.  
“Each of us is guilty before everyone for everyone, and I more than the others”. 
                                                                                                        (Levinas 1974, 146).  
 
This proclamation, which Dostoyevsky puts in the mouth of Markel, the dead 
brother of the Elder Zosima, is an expression of culpability and “blameworthiness”. 
However, it is not stated dourly by Markel upon his death bed, but rather with great joy.  
The declaration does not evince a sense of guilt but rather of being responsible; 
ecstatically so. This is borne out by the passage which follows the proclamation. 
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At that mother even smiled, she wept and smiled: “How can it be,” she said, “that 
you are the most guilty before everyone? There are murderers and robbers, and 
how have you managed to sin so that you should accuse yourself most of all?” 
“Dear mother, heart of my heart,” he said (he had then begun saying such 
unexpected, endearing words), “heart of my heart, my joyful one, you must know 
that verily each of us is guilty before everyone, for everyone and everything. I do 
not know how to explain it to you, but I feel it so strongly that it pains me. And 
how could we have lived before, getting angry, and not knowing anything?” Thus 
he awoke every day with more and more tenderness, rejoicing and all atremble 
with love. (Dostoyevsky 1990, 289)    
  
Here is a proclamation by a being facing their finitude responsibly. This is the 
character of the re-imagined “best account” which I apprehend as being made possible by 
the juxtaposition of Taylor’s and Levinas’ respective insights. An articulation, one’s 
finding oneself accountable, in the same sense that one finds oneself “thrown” into being. 
The Heideggerian connotations here are obvious. However, a direct comparison with the 
notion of “being-towards-death” is not immediately helpful for our examination.  
My reading of culpability in Levinas and Dostoevsky is supported to some extent 
by the excellent analysis of the relationship of Levinas with the work of Dostoyevsky 
carried out by Alain Toumayan. In his essay “‘I more than the others’: Dostoevsky and 
Levinas”, Toumayan asserts that Levinas employs the Dostoyevsky quote to elicit “the 
notions of guilt, answerability, and responsibility within this formula while preserving its 
basic expression of asymmetry and nonreciprocity” (Toumayan 2004, 56). Toumayan 
goes on to state that Levinas’ varied use of the quotation is “authorized by Dostoyevsky’s 
text (Dostoyevsky uses most frequently vinovatyi, which means both guilty and 
responsible)” (ibid).  
With the exception of replacing the term coupable with guilty, following the 
reasoning I have outlined above, Toumayan’s analysis is extremely helpful. Toumayan 
drives home the sense in which Dostoyevsky’s prose helps Levinas to articulate a sense 
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of accountability which exceeds our capacity to respond as finite beings. Yet, read within 
the context of the novel wherein Dostoyevsky originally framed the statement, one is not 
left despairing in the face of our inability to meet the infinite demands of accountability. 
Rather, one can take heart that in articulating our accountability, and in going forth, 
attempting to meet our overflowing sense of being responsible, we might work to bring 
not only a degree of justice into the world, but perhaps even “tenderness” and love 
(Dostoyevsky 1990, 289).  
In Sources of the Self Taylor places a high priority on the need for agents to get 
clear about what moral and spiritual sources move them. Indeed, Taylor never hesitates 
when an opportunity arises to point out which goods he perceives as motivating his 
philosophical opponents (Taylor 1989b, 102). Levinas, on the other hand, forcefully 
argues against agents ever understanding the call of the other/ethics which is “otherwise 
than being”. In re-imagining the “best account principle” I would like to walk a middle 
path between clairvoyance and mystery. To claim to know the other is to make an object 
of them, regardless of the sincerity of one’s intentions. Commensurately, to acquiesce to 
the opacity of ethics, as conceived by Levinas, runs counter to the human desire to 
understand, and reflect upon, our “being in the world”. In the attempt to forge a path 
between the perspectives’ of Taylor and Levinas, I have found help from Dostoyevsky. 
Embodied Accountability 
In describing the changes which occurred in the character Markel upon his death 
bed, Dostoyevsky has the character explain to his mother that, with regard to his new 
found desire to become a servant to his servants, and to stand guilty “in everything before 
everyone”; “I do not know how to explain it to you, but I feel it so strongly that it pains 
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me” (Dostoyevsky 1990, 289). Markel is unable to offer an account of the precise sources 
of his sudden feeling of absolute responsibility for others. We might reach for terms like 
epiphany, or revelation, to categorize what has transpired. However, these words usually 
connote some great, sudden, understanding. Such an understanding is absent in this case. 
Nevertheless, the feeling is acute and Markel does endeavour to give expression to it. I 
contend that Markel’s expression is a “best account” of responsibility following my 
suggestions above. I argue that the best way to describe this account is as an expression 
of embodied accountability.  
To support my argument I would like to return to Taylor’s reading of Merleau-
Ponty in Taylor’s essay “Embodied Agency”. Taylor uses Merleau-Ponty’s concept of 
“être au monde”, or “being in the world”, to describe our intrinsic engagement with the 
world. Taylor uses this as a premise to state that a great deal of “our perceiving activity is 
involuntary” (Taylor 1989a, 10). It is my assertion that the “involuntary” character of our 
“perceiving activity” extends to our perceiving our accountability to others as a feature of 
our being embodied, present prior to “auto-identification”, and irrespective of our desire 
to choose to be responsible, or not. 
Following Taylor’s statement that “We have to innovate in language, and bring 
the structures of our being in the world to clarity by formulations which open up a zone 
which is ordinarily outside our range of thought and attention” (Taylor 1989a, 19). I 
argue that we must endeavour to express our sense of embodied accountability, even if 
like Markel, we cannot elucidate its origins. Re-imagining Taylor’s “best account 
principle” as an expression of accountability rather than authenticity, consists of 
articulating our responsibility for others as the source of moral agency itself.  
216 
 
The quest by agents for a sense of authentic identity too often makes an enemy of 
difference. It drives us to covet a dignified sense of self-regard, and ignore our 
accountability to others. I agree wholeheartedly with Taylor regarding the need to 
“innovate in language” and “open up a zone which is ordinarily outside our range of 
thought and attention.” However, I contend that the “zone” which we need to open 
ourselves up to is that of our embodied accountability to others. The first step toward 
opening up this zone is through the articulation of our “best account” as accountable, of 
our “being in the world” grâce à les autres et pour les autres, thanks to others and for 
others. I am arguing that, contra Taylor, moral identity is founded though our 
responsibility to others, rather than our ability to live up to a self-interpreted, and self-
empowering hypergood.  
To anticipate a Taylorian critique, I am well aware that my argument might be 
written down to my being moved by the hypergood of accountability. Perhaps this is so. 
However, the crux of my argument does not revolve around a reflexive archeology of the 
self. The crux of my argument revolves around the re-imagined “best account”, which is 
the imperative to give expression to our being here for the other; prior to any reflection 
upon what this responsibility might intuit regarding our sense of self. As such, the 
consequence is not a more salient expression of our moral identities, but rather the 
expression of our embodied accountability to others as the source and condition for 
developing moral identity. It is the expression of our finding ourselves open to others, in 
the same way that we find ourselves open to sound, smell, and touch. To articulate a 
“best account” of accountability is to “innovate in language”, in an effort to bring our 
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embodied accountability to conscious attention, and to clarify the structure of our being 











































19. And to imagine a language means to imagine a form of life.  
                                                                           (Wittgenstein 1958, 11e)  
 
 I chose to begin my dissertation with the above quote from Wittgenstein and I 
find myself once again relying upon it to move my discussion forward. Over the course 
of the preceding chapters I have attempted to imagine a language for describing 
accountability as embodied. In this endeavour I have borrowed mightily from a variety of 
thinkers, none more so than Emmanuel Levinas and Charles Taylor. In deciding how to 
bring my dissertation to an end, I once again turned to Levinas for inspiration. I have 
struggled to maintain a critical awareness of the drive for systemacy and totality which 
lurks within every philosophical work, including my own. While I am certain that I have 
indulged this drive at points throughout my dissertation, I would like to take one last stab 
at renouncing any claim to a comprehensive outlook.  
I chose the title postscript for this the last section of my dissertation, rather than 
“conclusion”, as I wanted to circumvent a sense of closure, or of tying things up. It is my 
somewhat presumptuous hope, that my work opens a door to discussion and further 
imagining. I am aware that my desire to resist systemacy is complicated by the universal 
character of my argument regarding embodied accountability. It is true that I believe that 
our accountability to others is an embodied feature of our “being in the world”.  
I have largely used philosophical language to frame my discussion of 
accountability. However, to express the core element of what I envisioned as a re-
imagined “best account” of accountability, I relied upon the language of literature. 
Likewise, I believe that the notion of embodied accountability may be articulated through 
myriad different forms of language, i.e. poetry, painting, dance, etc. Going forward, I 
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would like to focus more attention upon aspects such as gender and health in relation to 
the articulation of embodied accountability.   
 In reflecting upon Wittgenstein’s statement regarding imagining a language, I find 
reason to believe that there are potent tropes and metaphors to be found amongst the 
variety of languages in which we live our lives, which might be used for developing 
better accounts of embodied accountability. As a philosopher concerned with moral 
discourse, it is my intent to work upon finding and developing more helpful descriptive 
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